attractive nuisance doctrine (Georgia) · Go Syfert
← Georgia issues

attractive nuisance doctrine in Georgia

17 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1962–2010 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
Gregory v. Johnsongreen
ga · 1982 · cited in 6 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1982–2010
2 sentences

1994As the deceased and his father were not trespassers, we find distinguishable cases such as Gregory v. Johnson, 249 Ga. 151 ( 289 SE2d 232 ) and Knutzen v. O’Leary, 210 Ga. App. 590 ( 437 SE2d 347 ), which involve an application of the attractive nuisance doctrine for the protection of certain classes of trespassing children. *720 4.

1994As the deceased and his father were not trespassers, we find distinguishable cases such as Gregory v. Johnson, 249 Ga. 151 ( 289 SE2d 232 ) and Knutzen v. O’Leary, 210 Ga. App. 590 ( 437 SE2d 347 ), which involve an application of the attractive nuisance doctrine for the protection of certain classes of trespassing children. *720 4.

16
McCall v. McCalliegreen
gactapp · 1933 · cited in 3 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1964–1985
2 sentences

1985The theory likewise may not apply to any natural condition on private property. “[A]s to a natural condition or common danger existing in the order of nature, the attractive nuisance doctrine does not apply, and it is the duty of parents to warn their children of such dangers.” McCall v. McCallie, 48 Ga. App. 99, 100 ( 171 SE 843 ) (1933).

1985The theory likewise may not apply to any natural condition on private property. “[A]s to a natural condition or common danger existing in the order of nature, the attractive nuisance doctrine does not apply, and it is the duty of parents to warn their children of such dangers.” McCall v. McCallie, 48 Ga. App. 99, 100 ( 171 SE 843 ) (1933).

13
Starland Dairies, Inc. v. Evansgreen
gactapp · 1962 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1967–1982
2 sentences

1982“In the taxonomy of negligence law, the attractive nuisance doctrine is but another way of saying that under given circumstances the defendant is liable for the consequences of his negligence where he should in the exercise of ordinary care have foreseen that harm would result to an infant trespasser whose presence he should have anticipated.” Starland Dairies, Inc. v. Evans, 105 Ga. App. 813, 815 ( 125 SE2d 682 ) (1962).

1982“In the taxonomy of negligence law, the attractive nuisance doctrine is but another way of saying that under given circumstances the defendant is liable for the consequences of his negligence where he should in the exercise of ordinary care have foreseen that harm would result to an infant trespasser whose presence he should have anticipated.” Starland Dairies, Inc. v. Evans, 105 Ga. App. 813, 815 ( 125 SE2d 682 ) (1962).

12
Spooner v. City of Camillagreen
gactapp · 2002 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
1 sentence

2004“Georgia courts have long held that the attractive nuisance doctrine does not apply to ponds or other water hazards.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Spooner, supra, 256 Ga. App. at 183 (2) (b).

11
Blair v. Mandersongreen
gactapp · 1972 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981
2 sentences

1981Although the victim is a child this does not affect the legal status, since in such a case "our appellate courts have ruled that neither age nor capacity, mental or physical, is a factor of consideration." Blair v. Manderson, 126 Ga. App. 235, 236 ( 190 SE2d 584 ) et seq. (1972). *321 One of the leading and early cases of the doctrine of attractive nuisance in this state is found in Ferguson v. Columbus &c.

1981Although the victim is a child this does not affect the legal status, since in such a case "our appellate courts have ruled that neither age nor capacity, mental or physical, is a factor of consideration." Blair v. Manderson, 126 Ga. App. 235, 236 ( 190 SE2d 584 ) et seq. (1972). *321 One of the leading and early cases of the doctrine of attractive nuisance in this state is found in Ferguson v. Columbus &c.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (16)

CaseCitedYears
Ferguson v. Columbus & Rome Railway green
ga · 1886
2 sentences

1981Ferguson held that "[w]here a railroad company leaves a dangerous machine, such as a turn-table, unfastened in a city, on a lot which is not securely inclosed, and where people and children are wont to visit it and pass through it, this is negligence on the part of such company; and where an infant of ten or twelve years of age resorted to the turn-table, and in riding upon it was dangerously and seriously injured, the railroad company is liable for damages for such injuries to the infant." Ferguson, 77 Ga. 102 supra. I submit that the attractive nuisance doctrine or the "turn-table" doctrine

1981Ferguson held that “[w]here a railroad company leaves a dangerous machine, such as a turn-table, unfastened in a city, on a lot which is not securely inclosed, and where people and children are wont to visit it and pass through it, this is negligence on the part of such company; and where an infant of ten or twelve years of age resorted to the turn-table, and in riding upon it was dangerously and seriously injured, the railroad company is liable for damages for such injuries to the infant.” Ferguson, 77 Ga. 102 supra. I submit that the attractive nuisance doctrine or the “turn-table” doctrine

21962–1981
Wells v. Landmark American Corp. neutral
gactapp · 1996
2 sentences

2010“Under the attractive nuisance doctrine, a landowner may be liable for physical harm to trespassing children caused by an artificial condition upon its land if certain conditions are met.” (Emphasis omitted.) Wells v. Landmark American Corp., 221 Ga. App. 33 (1) ( 470 SE2d 711 ) (1996).

2010“Under the attractive nuisance doctrine, a landowner may be liable for physical harm to trespassing children caused by an artificial condition upon its land if certain conditions are met.” (Emphasis omitted.) Wells v. Landmark American Corp., 221 Ga. App. 33 (1) ( 470 SE2d 711 ) (1996).

12010–2010
Knutzen v. O'LEARY green
gactapp · 1993
2 sentences

1994As the deceased and his father were not trespassers, we find distinguishable cases such as Gregory v. Johnson, 249 Ga. 151 ( 289 SE2d 232 ) and Knutzen v. O’Leary, 210 Ga. App. 590 ( 437 SE2d 347 ), which involve an application of the attractive nuisance doctrine for the protection of certain classes of trespassing children. *720 4.

1994As the deceased and his father were not trespassers, we find distinguishable cases such as Gregory v. Johnson, 249 Ga. 151 ( 289 SE2d 232 ) and Knutzen v. O’Leary, 210 Ga. App. 590 ( 437 SE2d 347 ), which involve an application of the attractive nuisance doctrine for the protection of certain classes of trespassing children. *720 4.

11994–1994
Ferguson v. Columbus & Rome Railway neutral
ga · 1885
2 sentences

1981R., 75 Ga. 637 (the turntable case).

1981R., 75 Ga. 637 (the turntable case).

11981–1981
Roach v. Dozier green
gactapp · 1958
2 sentences

1974In Roach v. Dozier, 97 Ga. App. 568 ( 103 SE2d 691 ) plaintiff sought to hold a defendant, whose nephew had taken the family business funeral hearse liable under the attractive nuisance doctrine.

1974In Roach v. Dozier, 97 Ga. App. 568 ( 103 SE2d 691 ) plaintiff sought to hold a defendant, whose nephew had taken the family business funeral hearse liable under the attractive nuisance doctrine.

11974–1974
Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Pierce green
ga · 1916
2 sentences

1973We are not concerned with the attractive nuisance doctrine, as was Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Pierce, 145 Ga. 130 ( 88 SE 672 ) and other cases cited on p. 335.

1973We are not concerned with the attractive nuisance doctrine, as was Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Pierce, 145 Ga. 130 ( 88 SE 672 ) and other cases cited on p. 335.

11973–1973
Bowers v. the Texas Company green
gactapp · 1941
2 sentences

1973Bowers v. Texas Co., 65 Ga. App. 874 ( 16 SE2d 765 ) was decided on demurrer and involved a heavy tire which did no damage until the child went over and moved it.

1973Bowers v. Texas Co., 65 Ga. App. 874 ( 16 SE2d 765 ) was decided on demurrer and involved a heavy tire which did no damage until the child went over and moved it.

11973–1973
Kelley v. Black green
ga · 1948
2 sentences

1969Kelley v. Black, 203 Ga. 589 ( 47 SE2d 802 ), cited by plaintiff, does not appear to be applicable to the facts of this case.

1969Kelley v. Black, 203 Ga. 589 ( 47 SE2d 802 ), cited by plaintiff, does not appear to be applicable to the facts of this case.

11969–1969
State Ex Rel. W. E. Callahan Construction Co. v. Hughes green
· 1941
2 sentences

1967Callahan Const. Co. v. Hughes, 348 Mo. 1209 ( 159 SW2d 251 ), and in 1956 in Patterson v. Gibson (Mo.) 287 SW2d 853, 854-856 , it was said that section 339 was a restatement of the attractive nuisance doctrine but that 'this court has been unwilling to extend the doctrine as far as the rules adopted by the Restatement would extend it.’ ” Cox v. Gros, (Mo.) 360 SW2d 691 .

1967Callahan Const. Co. v. Hughes, 348 Mo. 1209 ( 159 SW2d 251 ), and in 1956 in Patterson v. Gibson (Mo.) 287 SW2d 853, 854-856 , it was said that section 339 was a restatement of the attractive nuisance doctrine but that 'this court has been unwilling to extend the doctrine as far as the rules adopted by the Restatement would extend it.’ ” Cox v. Gros, (Mo.) 360 SW2d 691 .

11967–1967
Hull Ex Rel. Hull v. Gillioz green
mo · 1939
2 sentences

1967Whatever section 339 of the restatement may mean, in 1939 in Hull v. Gillioz, 344 Mo. 1227, 1234-1235 , ( 130 SW2d 623, 627 ), in State ex rel.

1967Whatever section 339 of the restatement may mean, in 1939 in Hull v. Gillioz, 344 Mo. 1227, 1234-1235 , ( 130 SW2d 623, 627 ), in State ex rel.

11967–1967
Cox ex rel. Cox v. Gros neutral
mo · 1962
1 sentence

1967Callahan Const. Co. v. Hughes, 348 Mo. 1209 ( 159 SW2d 251 ), and in 1956 in Patterson v. Gibson (Mo.) 287 SW2d 853, 854-856 , it was said that section 339 was a restatement of the attractive nuisance doctrine but that 'this court has been unwilling to extend the doctrine as far as the rules adopted by the Restatement would extend it.’ ” Cox v. Gros, (Mo.) 360 SW2d 691 .

11967–1967
Brown v. Bone green
gactapp · 1951
2 sentences

1967This is in conflict with a general principle of law enunciated in controlling decisions, that the attractive nuisance doctrine will not be extended beyond the principle of the turntable cases.” I do not rely upon the case of Brown v. Bone, 85 Ga. App. 22 ( 68 SE2d 190 ) where it was held that as to a trespassing child a soil pan on a bulldozer suspended in a precarious state of balance with a mechanism like unto that of a gun trigger to release it did not come within the ambit of the doctrine.

1967This is in conflict with a general principle of law enunciated in controlling decisions, that the attractive nuisance doctrine will not be extended beyond the principle of the turntable cases.” I do not rely upon the case of Brown v. Bone, 85 Ga. App. 22 ( 68 SE2d 190 ) where it was held that as to a trespassing child a soil pan on a bulldozer suspended in a precarious state of balance with a mechanism like unto that of a gun trigger to release it did not come within the ambit of the doctrine.

11967–1967
Fickling v. City Council of Augusta green
gactapp · 1964
2 sentences

1967Further: “The attractive nuisance doctrine does not apply to ponds or other water hazards.” Fickling v. City Council of Augusta, 110 Ga. App. 330 ( 138 SE2d 437 ).

1967Further: “The attractive nuisance doctrine does not apply to ponds or other water hazards.” Fickling v. City Council of Augusta, 110 Ga. App. 330 ( 138 SE2d 437 ).

11967–1967
Patterson Ex Rel. Patterson v. Gibson neutral
mo · 1956
1 sentence

1967Callahan Const. Co. v. Hughes, 348 Mo. 1209 ( 159 SW2d 251 ), and in 1956 in Patterson v. Gibson (Mo.) 287 SW2d 853, 854-856 , it was said that section 339 was a restatement of the attractive nuisance doctrine but that 'this court has been unwilling to extend the doctrine as far as the rules adopted by the Restatement would extend it.’ ” Cox v. Gros, (Mo.) 360 SW2d 691 .

11967–1967
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Brackin green
ga · 1959
2 sentences

1967Co. v. Brackin, 99 Ga. App. 77 , supra. In reversing, the Supreme Court stated ( 215 Ga. 225 (3), supra) that “[w]e think that the Court of Appeals properly construed the plaintiff’s petition as being based upon the ‘attractive nuisance doctrine,’ ” perhaps basing this assumption upon this court’s statement, above quoted, to the effect that the theory was that the wire was an “attractive nuisance.” This court did not mention the attractive nuisance doctrine in its opinion and, as the author of the opinion, I can state that it was not considered applicable in that case.

1967Co. v. Brackin, 215 Ga. 225 ( 109 SE2d 782 ), reversing Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.

11967–1967
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Brackin green
gactapp · 1959
2 sentences

1967Co. v. Brackin, 99 Ga. App. 77 , supra. In reversing, the Supreme Court stated ( 215 Ga. 225 (3), supra) that “[w]e think that the Court of Appeals properly construed the plaintiff’s petition as being based upon the ‘attractive nuisance doctrine,’ ” perhaps basing this assumption upon this court’s statement, above quoted, to the effect that the theory was that the wire was an “attractive nuisance.” This court did not mention the attractive nuisance doctrine in its opinion and, as the author of the opinion, I can state that it was not considered applicable in that case.

1967Co. v. Brackin, 99 Ga. App. 77 ( 107 SE2d 864 ), where the Supreme Court asserted: “We think that the Court of Appeals properly construed the plaintiff’s petition as being based upon ‘the attractive nuisance doctrine.’ ” It is further to be noted that in Brackin, as here, the child was not a trespasser.

11967–1967

Statutes the citing opinions construe

GA § 9-11-56 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IL 48 (1921–2011) TX 39 (1931–2021) LA 33 (1949–2024) FL 33 (1925–2024) OH 32 (1968–2024) CA 31 (1919–1974) KY 24 (1918–2024) MO 20 (1939–2018) AZ 19 (1935–2024) KS 18 (1912–1995) GA 17 (1962–2010) NC 17 (1937–2012) WA 16 (1947–2020) MI 16 (1931–2018) OK 15 (1916–2024) IN 15 (1950–2012) AL 15 (1929–2009) PA 15 (1932–2013) MS 15 (1924–2005) TN 15 (1931–2002) WI 14 (1948–1998) UT 12 (1953–2024) NY 11 (1938–1964) ID 10 (1950–2007) NM 9 (1952–1998) MD 9 (1932–2019) MT 7 (1952–2010) AR 7 (1926–2017) WV 6 (1932–1992) SC 6 (1965–2011) CO 6 (1937–2013) CT 6 (1921–1993) RI 6 (1992–2022) DE 6 (1949–2022) MN 5 (1951–2001) VT 5 (1911–2026) NE 5 (1975–1992) WY 4 (1950–1995) SD 3 (1938–1980) IA 3 (1916–1969) OR 3 (1929–1977) NV 2 (1935–1972) DC 2 (1945–1981) MA 2 (1991–2006) NJ 2 (1950–1996) ME 2 (1993–1998)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check