attractive nuisance doctrine in South Carolina

1966We quote from Everett, supra, 245 S. C. 331, 140 S. E. (2d) 582 : “While the decision in the Franks case, supra, 78 S. C. 10, 58 S. E. 960 , is usually regarded as resting upon the attractive nuisance doctrine, the following excerpt from Thompson on Negligence, which states that doctrine and the alternative ground of recovery to which we have referred, was quoted with approval in the opinion: “ ‘ “* * * We now come to a class of decisions which hold the landowner liable in damages in the case of children injured by dangerous things suffered to exist unguarded on his premises, where they are ac

1965While the decision in the Franks case, supra, 78 S. C. 10, 58 S. E. 960 ; is usually regarded as resting upon the attractive nuisance doctrine, the following excerpt from Thompson on Negligence, which states that doctrine and the alternative ground of recovery to which we have referred, was quoted with approval in the opinion: “ * * We now come to a class of decisions which hold the landowner liable in damages in the case of children injured by dangerous things suffered to exist unguarded on his premises, where they are accustomed to come with or without license.

1969Following the verdict, the respondent made a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto upon the same ground as his previous motions for a nonsuit and directed verdict, such being that there was no evidence to support a verdict against him under either the attractive nuisance doctrine or under the- doctrine stated in the case of Everett v. White, 245 S. C. 331, 140 S. E. (2d) 582 .

1966We quote from Everett, supra, 245 S. C. 331, 140 S. E. (2d) 582 : “While the decision in the Franks case, supra, 78 S. C. 10, 58 S. E. 960 , is usually regarded as resting upon the attractive nuisance doctrine, the following excerpt from Thompson on Negligence, which states that doctrine and the alternative ground of recovery to which we have referred, was quoted with approval in the opinion: “ ‘ “* * * We now come to a class of decisions which hold the landowner liable in damages in the case of children injured by dangerous things suffered to exist unguarded on his premises, where they are ac

2011See Hartsock v. Bandhauer; 158 Ariz. 591 , 764 P.2d 352 (Ariz.App. 1988) (dogs are not considered an “artificial condition” as required for liability under the attractive nuisance doctrine); see also Aponte v. Castor, 155 Ohio App.3d 553 , 802 N.E.2d 171 (Ohio App.2003) (finding no authority in Ohio law that establishes a horse is an artificial condition); Gonzales v. Wilkinson, 68 Wis.2d 154 , 227 N.W.2d 907 (Wis.1975) (a dog cannot qualify as an attractive nuisance because “[although such a condition need not be permanently erected upon the land, it must be ‘artificially construed.’ ”).

2011See Hartsock v. Bandhauer; 158 Ariz. 591 , 764 P.2d 352 (Ariz.App. 1988) (dogs are not considered an “artificial condition” as required for liability under the attractive nuisance doctrine); see also Aponte v. Castor, 155 Ohio App.3d 553 , 802 N.E.2d 171 (Ohio App.2003) (finding no authority in Ohio law that establishes a horse is an artificial condition); Gonzales v. Wilkinson, 68 Wis.2d 154 , 227 N.W.2d 907 (Wis.1975) (a dog cannot qualify as an attractive nuisance because “[although such a condition need not be permanently erected upon the land, it must be ‘artificially construed.’ ”).

2004See Franks v. S. Cotton Oil Co., 78 S.C. 10 , 58 S.E. 960 (1907); McLendon v. Hampton Cotton Mills Co., 109 S.C. 238 , 95 S.E. 781 (1917); Sexton v. Noll Constr.

2004See Franks v. S. Cotton Oil Co., 78 S.C. 10 , 58 S.E. 960 (1907); *150 McLendon v. Hampton Cotton Mills Co., 109 S.C. 238 , 95 S.E. 781 (1917); Sexton v. Noll Constr.

2004Negligence § 507, at 240 (2000) ("Also, even though a thing or a condition may be both attractive and dangerous to children, the attractive nuisance doctrine cannot apply to it unless it is maintained or left in an unprotected or unguarded condition."). [13] See, e.g., Daniels v. Timmons, 216 S.C. 539, 550-51 , 59 S.E.2d 149, 155 (1950) ("All of the so-called attractive nuisance cases spring from negligence of the defendant in regard to his or her own property which is subject to being entered upon by a child who may be attracted onto the premises."); 65A C.J.S.

2004Negligence § 507, at 240 (2000) ("Also, even though a thing or a condition may be both attractive and dangerous to children, the attractive nuisance doctrine cannot apply to it unless it is maintained or left in an unprotected or unguarded condition."). [13] See, e.g., Daniels v. Timmons, 216 S.C. 539, 550-51 , 59 S.E.2d 149, 155 (1950) ("All of the so-called attractive nuisance cases spring from negligence of the defendant in regard to his or her own property which is subject to being entered upon by a child who may be attracted onto the premises."); 65A C.J.S.

2004In discussing IPC's motion for a directed verdict, he agreed it was "for the jury to say under the circumstances was it reasonable what [IPC] did and how they set it up and was the kid himself liable for it." [15] See State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142 , 587 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003) ("No point will be considered which is not set forth in the statement of issues on appeal.") (citing Rule 208(b)(1)(B), SCACR); Barnes v. Cohen Dry Wall, Inc., 357 S.C.App. 280, 592 S.E.2d 311 (2003) (declining to address an argument not set forth in the statement of issues on appeal).

2004In discussing IPC's motion for a directed verdict, he agreed it was "for the jury to say under the circumstances was it reasonable what [IPC] did and how they set it up and was the kid himself liable for it." [15] See State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142 , 587 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003) ("No point will be considered which is not set forth in the statement of issues on appeal.") (citing Rule 208(b)(1)(B), SCACR); Barnes v. Cohen Dry Wall, Inc., 357 S.C.App. 280, 592 S.E.2d 311 (2003) (declining to address an argument not set forth in the statement of issues on appeal).