attractive nuisance doctrine in Kentucky

1922The two cases upon which alone plaintiff relies to bring this one within the attractive nuisance doctrine are Lyttle v. Harlan Town Coal Co., 167 Ky. 345 , and L. & N. R.

1918"We have written a number of cases on the subject of the duty of the owners of attractive and dangerous premises to protect them from trespassing children, and have extended what is known as the attractive nuisance doctrine possibly farther than, and certainly as far as, any other court whose opinions have come under our observation ; but we do not think the principle announced in Branson’s Admr. v. Labrot, 81 Ky. 638 ; Lyttle v. Harlan Town Coal Co., 167 Ky. 345 ; Miller v. Chandler, 168 Ky. 606 , can be applied to the facts of this case.

1934The court, in the course of its opinion delivered by Judge Carroll, said: “We have written a number of cases on the subject of the duty of the owners of attractive and dangerous premises to protect them from trespassing children, and have extended what is known as the attractive nuisance doctrine possibly farther than, and certainly as far as, any other court whose opinions have come under our observation; but we do not think the principle announced in Bransom’s Adm’r v. Labrot, 81 Ky. 638 , 50 Am.

1934A. 1915D, 160, the court in considering this attractive nuisance doctrine said: “In Bransom’s Adm’r v. Labrot, etc., 81 Ky. 638 , 50 Am.

1961The various decisions from this jurisdiction upon which appellees rely, Jarvis v. Howard, 1949, 310 Ky. 38 , 219 S.W.2d 958 (boy playing “follow the leader” fell while jumping from a coal loading ramp to a coal car); Guelda v. Hays & Nicoulin, Inc., Ky.1954, 267 S.W.2d 935 (boy slipped and fell on the muddy basement floor of a building under construction); Fourseam Coal Corp. v. Greer, Ky.1955, 282 S.W.2d 129 (boy fell from a coal tipple); Coon v. Kentucky & I.

1961The various decisions from this jurisdiction upon which appellees rely, Jarvis v. Howard, 1949, 310 Ky. 38 , 219 S.W.2d 958 (boy playing “follow the leader” fell while jumping from a coal loading ramp to a coal car); Guelda v. Hays & Nicoulin, Inc., Ky.1954, 267 S.W.2d 935 (boy slipped and fell on the muddy basement floor of a building under construction); Fourseam Coal Corp. v. Greer, Ky.1955, 282 S.W.2d 129 (boy fell from a coal tipple); Coon v. Kentucky & I.

1961On this proposition the following language from Goss v. Shawnee Post, etc., Ky., 265 S.W.2d 799, 800 , should be noted: “The tendency of our Court is to restrict rather than to enlarge the attractive nuisance doctrine, Ice Delivery Co. v. Thomas, 290 Ky. 230 , 160 S.W.2d 605 , and to exclude from its application such things as walls, fences, simple tools and appliances and conditions arising from the ordinary use of property, else the ownership of real estate would become a burden instead of a benefit.” The majority opinion refers to the structure which young Goben pulled over on himself as “a

1961On this proposition the following language from Goss v. Shawnee Post, etc., Ky., 265 S.W.2d 799, 800 , should be noted: “The tendency of our Court is to restrict rather than to enlarge the attractive nuisance doctrine, Ice Delivery Co. v. Thomas, 290 Ky. 230 , 160 S.W.2d 605 , and to exclude from its application such things as walls, fences, simple tools and appliances and conditions arising from the ordinary use of property, else the ownership of real estate would become a burden instead of a benefit.” The majority opinion refers to the structure which young Goben pulled over on himself as “a

1949The recent case of Teagarden v. Russell’s Adm’x, 306 Ky. 528 , 207 S. W. 2d 18, 22 , and cases cited therein, discuss the theory of the attractive nuisance doctrine and its application in this jurisdiction.

1949The recent case of Teagarden v. Russell’s Adm’x, 306 Ky. 528 , 207 S. W. 2d 18, 22 , and cases cited therein, discuss the theory of the attractive nuisance doctrine and its application in this jurisdiction.

2003See Hanners v. City of Ashland, Ky., 331 S.W.2d 729 (1959) (city not liable for drowning death in reservoir); Schauf's Adm’r v. City of Paducah, 106 Ky. 228 , 50 S.W. 42 (1899) (city not liable for drowning of child in pond created in gravel excavation pit).

2003See Hanners v. City of Ashland, Ky., 331 S.W.2d 729 (1959) (city not liable for drowning death in reservoir); Schauf's Adm’r v. City of Paducah, 106 Ky. 228 , 50 S.W. 42 (1899) (city not liable for drowning of child in pond created in gravel excavation pit).

1968The case cited by him in support thereof raises nothing more than a presumption which can clearly be rebutted. *576 In Goss v. Shawnee Post No. 3204, V.F.W. of U. S., Ky., 265 S.W.2d 799 , it was held “that the tendency of our Court is to restrict rather than to enlarge the attractive nuisance doctrine.” Further, it has been held on numerous occasions that the possessor of land owes no duty or obligation to keep it safe for the benefit of intruders who come upon it for their own purposes however innocent the purpose may be.

1961On this proposition the following language from Goss v. Shawnee Post, etc., Ky., 265 S.W.2d 799, 800 , should be noted: “The tendency of our Court is to restrict rather than to enlarge the attractive nuisance doctrine, Ice Delivery Co. v. Thomas, 290 Ky. 230 , 160 S.W.2d 605 , and to exclude from its application such things as walls, fences, simple tools and appliances and conditions arising from the ordinary use of property, else the ownership of real estate would become a burden instead of a benefit.” The majority opinion refers to the structure which young Goben pulled over on himself as “a

1961The various decisions from this jurisdiction upon which appellees rely, Jarvis v. Howard, 1949, 310 Ky. 38 , 219 S.W.2d 958 (boy playing “follow the leader” fell while jumping from a coal loading ramp to a coal car); Guelda v. Hays & Nicoulin, Inc., Ky.1954, 267 S.W.2d 935 (boy slipped and fell on the muddy basement floor of a building under construction); Fourseam Coal Corp. v. Greer, Ky.1955, 282 S.W.2d 129 (boy fell from a coal tipple); Coon v. Kentucky & I.

1955In denying recovery, the Court said: “ * * * This ramp was no more dangerous than any other structure upon which a child may climb and get hurt by jumping or falling therefrom. * * If this ramp was an attractive nuisance, then any other structure upon which a child might clim^and jump or fall from, likewise must be so classified.” The Court further said that the tendency is to excludé from the attractive nuisance doctrine such things as walls, fences, simple tools' and appliances' and conditions arising from the ordinary conduct of business, “else the use of real estate would become a burden i

1961The various decisions from this jurisdiction upon which appellees rely, Jarvis v. Howard, 1949, 310 Ky. 38 , 219 S.W.2d 958 (boy playing “follow the leader” fell while jumping from a coal loading ramp to a coal car); Guelda v. Hays & Nicoulin, Inc., Ky.1954, 267 S.W.2d 935 (boy slipped and fell on the muddy basement floor of a building under construction); Fourseam Coal Corp. v. Greer, Ky.1955, 282 S.W.2d 129 (boy fell from a coal tipple); Coon v. Kentucky & I.

1961The various decisions from this jurisdiction upon which appellees rely, Jarvis v. Howard, 1949, 310 Ky. 38 , 219 S.W.2d 958 (boy playing "follow the leader" fell while jumping from a coal loading ramp to a coal car); Guelda v. Hays & Nicoulin, Inc., Ky. 1954, 267 S.W.2d 935 (boy slipped and fell on the muddy basement floor of a building under construction); Fourseam Coal Corp. v. Greer, Ky. 1955, 282 S.W.2d 129 (boy fell from a coal tipple); Coon v. Kentucky & I.T.R.

1949Co. v. Vaughn, 292 Ky. 120 , 166 S.W.2d 43 , which reads: *41 “One who maintains upon his premises a condition, instrumentality, machine, or other agency which is dangerous to children of tender years by reason of their inability to appreciate the peril therein, and which may reasonably be expected to attract children of tender years to the premises, is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the dangers of the attraction.” In sections which follow the text just referred to in 38 American Jurisprudence, may be found an excellent discussion on the origin, theory and app

1949Co. v. Vaughn, 292 Ky. 120 , 166 S.W.2d 43 , which reads: *41 “One who maintains upon his premises a condition, instrumentality, machine, or other agency which is dangerous to children of tender years by reason of their inability to appreciate the peril therein, and which may reasonably be expected to attract children of tender years to the premises, is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the dangers of the attraction.” In sections which follow the text just referred to in 38 American Jurisprudence, may be found an excellent discussion on the origin, theory and app

1934Rep. 193 , Lyttle v. Harlan Town Coal Co., 167 Ky. 345 , 180 S. W. 519 , and Miller v. Chandler, 168 Ky. 606 , 182 S. W. 833 , can be applied to the facts of this case; The cattle dip into which this little boy unfortunately fell was on the private premises of the company, inclosed not only by one but by two fences, reasonably sufficient to keep out intruders. * * * “And so the law in its tender regard for the safety of children and in an effort to protect them from being hurt by the dangerous places, appliances, and machinery of one kind and another that may be found in premises where childre

1918"We have written a number of cases on the subject of the duty of the owners of attractive and dangerous premises to protect them from trespassing children, and have extended what is known as the attractive nuisance doctrine possibly farther than, and certainly as far as, any other court whose opinions have come under our observation ; but we do not think the principle announced in Branson’s Admr. v. Labrot, 81 Ky. 638 ; Lyttle v. Harlan Town Coal Co., 167 Ky. 345 ; Miller v. Chandler, 168 Ky. 606 , can be applied to the facts of this case.

2018The Hayeses argue that the lower courts erroneously applied legal concepts more appropriate to a time when contributory negligence barred recovery in negligence cases, ignored comparative fault, citing KRS2 411.182 and Hilen v. Hayes, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984), and misapplied the attractive nuisance doctrine.

2003This Court has held that one may be subject to liability under the attractive nuisance doctrine for "creating or maintaining a dangerous condition on the premises of another." Goben v. Sidney Winer Co., 342 S.W.2d at 711 .

2003This Court has held that one may be subject to liability under the attractive nuisance doctrine for “creating or maintaining a dangerous condition on the premises of another.” Goben v. Sidney Winer Co., 342 S.W.2d at 711 .

1992The annotation recognizes that a majority of American jurisdictions have adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 339, view and states: "Only a few courts have considered the application of the above stated principle [Restatement, § 339] in cases involving injury caused by animals, and of these a majority have held the attractive nuisance doctrine to be inapplicable as a matter of law." Of the cases collected in 64 A.L.R.3d 1069 (1975), and those cited by the parties, Dyches v. Alexander, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 47 (1967), held that a dog is not an attractive nuisance and is not per se of a danger

1992The annotation recognizes that a majority of American jurisdictions have adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 339, view and states: "Only a few courts have considered the application of the above stated principle [Restatement, § 339] in cases involving injury caused by animals, and of these a majority have held the attractive nuisance doctrine to be inapplicable as a matter of law." Of the cases collected in 64 A.L.R.3d 1069 (1975), and those cited by the parties, Dyches v. Alexander, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 47 (1967), held that a dog is not an attractive nuisance and is not per se of a danger

1992In Whitcanock v. Nelson, 81 Ill.App.3d 186 , 36 Ill.

1992In Whitcanock v. Nelson, 81 Ill.App.3d 186 , 36 Ill.

1992The annotation recognizes that a majority of American jurisdictions have adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 339, view and states: “Only a few courts have considered the application of the above stated principle [Restatement, § 339] in cases involving injury caused by animals, and of these a majority have held the attractive nuisance doctrine to be inapplicable as a matter of law.” Of the cases collected in 64 A.L.R.3d 1069 (1975), and those cited by the parties, Dyches v. Alexander, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 47 (1967), held that a dog is not an attractive nuisance and is not per se of a danger

1992The annotation recognizes that a majority of American jurisdictions have adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 339, view and states: "Only a few courts have considered the application of the above stated principle [Restatement, § 339] in cases involving injury caused by animals, and of these a majority have held the attractive nuisance doctrine to be inapplicable as a matter of law." Of the cases collected in 64 A.L.R.3d 1069 (1975), and those cited by the parties, Dyches v. Alexander, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 47 (1967), held that a dog is not an attractive nuisance and is not per se of a danger

1992The annotation recognizes that a majority of American jurisdictions have adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 339, view and states: “Only a few courts have considered the application of the above stated principle [Restatement, § 339] in cases involving injury caused by animals, and of these a majority have held the attractive nuisance doctrine to be inapplicable as a matter of law.” Of the cases collected in 64 A.L.R.3d 1069 (1975), and those cited by the parties, Dyches v. Alexander, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 47 (1967), held that a dog is not an attractive nuisance and is not per se of a danger

1992The annotation recognizes that a majority of American jurisdictions have adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 339, view and states: "Only a few courts have considered the application of the above stated principle [Restatement, § 339] in cases involving injury caused by animals, and of these a majority have held the attractive nuisance doctrine to be inapplicable as a matter of law." Of the cases collected in 64 A.L.R.3d 1069 (1975), and those cited by the parties, Dyches v. Alexander, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 47 (1967), held that a dog is not an attractive nuisance and is not per se of a danger

1992Both sides have recognized our decision in Louisville Trust Co. v. Nutting, Ky., 437 S.W.2d 484 (1968), and the Court of Appeals decision in Helton v. Montgomery, Ky.App., 595 S.W.2d 257 (1980), wherein the definition of attractive nuisance set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 339, was followed.

1992Both sides have recognized our decision in Louisville Trust Co. v. Nutting, Ky., 437 S.W.2d 484 (1968), and the Court of Appeals decision in Helton v. Montgomery, Ky. App., 595 S.W.2d 257 (1980), wherein the definition of attractive nuisance set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 339, was followed.

1992The annotation recognizes that a majority of American jurisdictions have adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 339, view and states: “Only a few courts have considered the application of the above stated principle [Restatement, § 339] in cases involving injury caused by animals, and of these a majority have held the attractive nuisance doctrine to be inapplicable as a matter of law.” Of the cases collected in 64 A.L.R.3d 1069 (1975), and those cited by the parties, Dyches v. Alexander, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 47 (1967), held that a dog is not an attractive nuisance and is not per se of a danger

1992The annotation recognizes that a majority of American jurisdictions have adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 339, view and states: "Only a few courts have considered the application of the above stated principle [Restatement, § 339] in cases involving injury caused by animals, and of these a majority have held the attractive nuisance doctrine to be inapplicable as a matter of law." Of the cases collected in 64 A.L.R.3d 1069 (1975), and those cited by the parties, Dyches v. Alexander, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 47 (1967), held that a dog is not an attractive nuisance and is not per se of a danger

1992Both sides have recognized our decision in Louisville Trust Co. v. Nutting, Ky., 437 S.W.2d 484 (1968), and the Court of Appeals decision in Helton v. Montgomery, Ky.App., 595 S.W.2d 257 (1980), wherein the definition of attractive nuisance set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 339, was followed.

1992Both sides have recognized our decision in Louisville Trust Co. v. Nutting, Ky., 437 S.W.2d 484 (1968), and the Court of Appeals decision in Helton v. Montgomery, Ky. App., 595 S.W.2d 257 (1980), wherein the definition of attractive nuisance set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 339, was followed.

1990Harris v. Cozatt, Inc., Ky., 427 S.W.2d 574 (1968).

1968Farmer v. Modern Motors Co., 235 Ky. 483 , 31 S.W.2d 716 .

1968Farmer v. Modern Motors Co., 235 Ky. 483 , 31 S.W.2d 716 .

1961On the other hand, in Gnau v. Ackerman, 1915, 166 Ky. 258 , 179 S.W. 217 , the doctrine was applied to a situation where a mortar bed of slaking lime (a dangerous substance) had been made in the center of a pile of sand, causing severe injuries to a boy who came to play in the sand.

1961On the other hand, in Gnau v. Ackerman, 1915, 166 Ky. 258 , 179 S.W. 217 , the doctrine was applied to a situation where a mortar bed of slaking lime (a dangerous substance) had been made in the center of a pile of sand, causing severe injuries to a boy who came to play in the sand.

1961In Latta v. Brooks, 1943, 293 Ky. 346 , 169 S.W.2d 7 , where a child picked up unslaked building lime from a wheelbarrow in a garage and threw it into the eyes of another child, it was held that the attractive nuisance doctrine did not apply because the unslaked lime was so commonly used and was not a dangerous substance (thereby rendering the accident unforeseeable) and also because the proximate cause of the injury was the independent, intervening act of the child who threw the lime.

1961In Latta v. Brooks, 1943, 293 Ky. 346 , 169 S.W.2d 7 , where a child picked up unslaked building lime from a wheelbarrow in a garage and threw it into the eyes of another child, it was held that the attractive nuisance doctrine did not apply because the unslaked lime was so commonly used and was not a dangerous substance (thereby rendering the accident unforeseeable) and also because the proximate cause of the injury was the independent, intervening act of the child who threw the lime.

1960Company v. Hutton, 220 Ky. 277 , 295 S.W. 175 , 53 A.L.R. 1328 , evidence was offered here to show the plaintiff was not of normal mentality for a child of his age.

1960Company v. Hutton, 220 Ky. 277 , 295 S.W. 175 , 53 A.L.R. 1328 , evidence was offered here to show the plaintiff was not of normal mentality for a child of his age.

1960Co. v. Robins, 209 Ala. 6 , 95 So. 367 , 36 A.L.R. 10 , the Supreme Court of Alabama, after a review of the authorities, held as a matter of law that the attractive nuisance doctrine was not applicable to a fifteen year old child.

1960Co. v. Robins, 209 Ala. 6 , 95 So. 367 , 36 A.L.R. 10 , the Supreme Court of Alabama, after a review of the authorities, held as a matter of law that the attractive nuisance doctrine was not applicable to a fifteen year old child.

1959Alvis’ Adm’r v. Weaver, 206 Ky. 95 , 266 S.W. 888 ; Puckett v. City of Louisville, 273 Ky. 349 , 116 S.W.2d 627 ; Bates v. Caudill, Ky., 255 S.W.2d 487 ; Fourseam Coal Corp. v. Greer, Ky., 282 S.W.2d 129 .