attractive nuisance doctrine in Illinois

1948Wood v. Consumers Co. Our Supreme Court considers its decisions “most liberal to children.” (McDermott v. Burke, 256 Ill. 401 ) and its position in cases of this kind “well advanced” (Burns v. Chicago) but considers the position of the U. S. Supreme Court as to cautious application of the doctrine “sound as well as significant.” (Burns v. Chicago).

1948In McDermott v. Burke, 256 Ill. 401 , at pages 406, 407, the court' stated that it was a necessary element of liability under the attractive nuisance doctrine that the thing which causes the injury is tempting to children and to constitute a means of attracting them upon the premises which the owner should anticipate and that the dangerous thing must be so located as to attract them from the street or some public place where they may be expected to be.

1979Stat. 1971, ch. 70, par. 36.) It is more reasonable to believe that the legislature, being aware of the growth of the doctrine of attractive nuisance (see, for example, Gustafson v. Consumers Sales Agency, Inc. (1953), 414 Ill. 235 , 110 N.E.2d 865 ; City National Bank v. City of Kankakee (1957), 15 Ill.

1979Stat. 1971, ch. 70, par. 36.) It is more reasonable to believe that the legislature, being aware of the growth of the doctrine of attractive nuisance (see, for example, Gustafson v. Consumers Sales Agency, Inc. (1953), 414 Ill. 235 , 110 N.E.2d 865 ; City National Bank v. City of Kankakee (1957), 15 Ill.

1977While recognizing that the weight of the authority was to the effect that a body of water is not an attractive nuisance in and of itself (citing Mindeman v. Sanitary District (1925), 317 Ill. 529 and Gustafson v. Consumers Sales Agency (1953), 414 Ill. 235 ), the court found that the quarry was more than a quarry — it was a dump.

1977(Mindeman v. Sanitary District (1925), 317 Ill. 529 ; Gustafson v. Consumers Sales Agency (1953), 414 Ill. 235 ; Adams v. Brookwood Country Club (1958), 16 Ill.

1942Defendant also cites in support of its theory in this case the further cases of Austin v. Public Service Co. of Northern Illinois, 299 Ill. 112 ; Burns v. City of Chicago, 338 Ill. 89 ; McDermott v. Burke, 256 Ill. 401 ; and Follett v. Illinois Cent.

1941As stated in the case of Burns v. City of Chicago, 338 Ill. 89 , at page 100, the doctrine should be very cautiously applied.

1994The supreme court held that plaintiff's judgment against both the contractor/occupier and the supplier should stand, despite the general rule that an owner or occupier is under no duty of ordinary care to keep his property in any particular condition for the safety of trespassers. ( Kahn, 5 Ill.2d at 625 , 126 N.E.2d at 841-42 .) Kahn abolished the attractive-nuisance doctrine in Illinois and held that the principles of ordinary negligence govern the liability of an owner or occupier of land upon which a child is injured: "The naming or labeling of a certain set of facts as being an `attractiv

1994The supreme court held that plaintiff's judgment against both the contractor/occupier and the supplier should stand, despite the general rule that an owner or occupier is under no duty of ordinary care to keep his property in any particular condition for the safety of trespassers. ( Kahn, 5 Ill.2d at 625 , 126 N.E.2d at 841-42 .) Kahn abolished the attractive-nuisance doctrine in Illinois and held that the principles of ordinary negligence govern the liability of an owner or occupier of land upon which a child is injured: "The naming or labeling of a certain set of facts as being an `attractiv

1993Griffin v. State (1983), 36 Ill.

1987Foods, Inc. (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 552 , 328 N.E.2d 538 (whether a duty exists is a question of law to be determined by the court).) Our supreme court in Kahn v. James Burton Co. (1955), 5 Ill. 2d 614 , 126 N.E.2d 836 , held that the principles of ordinary negligence govern the liability of an owner or occupier of land upon which a child is injured, thus abolishing the attractive nuisance doctrine in Illinois.

1987Foods, Inc. (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 552 , 328 N.E.2d 538 (whether a duty exists is a question of law to be determined by the court).) Our supreme court in Kahn v. James Burton Co. (1955), 5 Ill. 2d 614 , 126 N.E.2d 836 , held that the principles of ordinary negligence govern the liability of an owner or occupier of land upon which a child is injured, thus abolishing the attractive nuisance doctrine in Illinois.

1985Under a ‘modified’ form, a negligent plaintiff may recover so long as the percentage of his fault does not exceed 50% of the total.” Alvis v. Ribar (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 1, 25 . 3 FELA introduced the principle of comparative negligence into American law in 1908.

1979App. 2d 458 , 146 N.E.2d 381 (abstract); Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 1254 (1949)), and the urging of certain writers that the doctrine be expanded to natural conditions (see discussion in Loney v. McPhillips (1974), 268 Ore. 378, 382 , 521 P.2d 340, 342 ), and of cases finding private owners or operators of picnic grounds liable, even though the park was open to the public without charge (Gwynn Oak Park, Inc. v. Becker (1940), 177 Md. 528 , 10 A.2d 625 ; Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 965 (1959)), wished to protect landowners whose property is used gratuitously, with or without their permission, for recreational

1979App. 2d 458 , 146 N.E.2d 381 (abstract); Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 1254 (1949)), and the urging of certain writers that the doctrine be expanded to natural conditions (see discussion in Loney v. McPhillips (1974), 268 Ore. 378, 382 , 521 P.2d 340, 342 ), and of cases finding private owners or operators of picnic grounds liable, even though the park was open to the public without charge (Gwynn Oak Park, Inc. v. Becker (1940), 177 Md. 528 , 10 A.2d 625 ; Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 965 (1959)), wished to protect landowners whose property is used gratuitously, with or without their permission, for recreational

1979App. 2d 458 , 146 N.E.2d 381 (abstract); Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 1254 (1949)), and the urging of certain writers that the doctrine be expanded to natural conditions (see discussion in Loney v. McPhillips (1974), 268 Ore. 378, 382 , 521 P.2d 340, 342 ), and of cases finding private owners or operators of picnic grounds liable, even though the park was open to the public without charge (Gwynn Oak Park, Inc. v. Becker (1940), 177 Md. 528 , 10 A.2d 625 ; Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 965 (1959)), wished to protect landowners whose property is used gratuitously, with or without their permission, for recreational

1979App. 2d 458 , 146 N.E.2d 381 (abstract); Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 1254 (1949)), and the urging of certain writers that the doctrine be expanded to natural conditions (see discussion in Loney v. McPhillips (1974), 268 Ore. 378, 382 , 521 P.2d 340, 342 ), and of cases finding private owners or operators of picnic grounds liable, even though the park was open to the public without charge (Gwynn Oak Park, Inc. v. Becker (1940), 177 Md. 528 , 10 A.2d 625 ; Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 965 (1959)), wished to protect landowners whose property is used gratuitously, with or without their permission, for recreational

1977(Mindeman v. Sanitary District (1925), 317 Ill. 529 ; Gustafson v. Consumers Sales Agency (1953), 414 Ill. 235 ; Adams v. Brookwood Country Club (1958), 16 Ill.

1977(Wagner v. Kepler (1951), 411 Ill. 368 , 1043 N.E.2d 231 .) Although the attractive nuisance doctrine has been abandoned, the law requires an owner or occupier to exercise ordinary care towards children whom he knows, or should know, are likely to trespass.

1977In such cases the occupier must exercise due care to remedy the condition or to otherwise protect the trespassing child from harm. ( Wagner v. Kepler (1951), 411 Ill. 368 , 1043 N.E.2d 231 .) Although the attractive nuisance doctrine has been abandoned, the law requires an owner or occupier to exercise ordinary care towards children whom he knows, or should know, are likely to trespass.

1976The licensee was one upon the premises for his own purposes with the consent of the occupier and not for some purpose connected with the occupier's activity or business. ( Pauckner v. Wakem (1907), 231 Ill. 276 ; Milauskis v. Terminal R.R.

1974Clarke v. Edging, 20 Ariz.App. 267 , 512 P.2d 30 .

1974Clarke v. Edging, 20 Ariz.App. 267 , 512 P.2d 30 .

1974(Schaffer v. Claremont Country Club, 168 Cal.App.2d 351 , 336 P.2d 254 .) When a condition on land is created by the action of man, the condition is artificial and not natural for purposes of the application of the attractive nuisance doctrine.

1974(Schaffer v. Claremont Country Club, 168 Cal.App.2d 351 , 336 P.2d 254 .) When a condition on land is created by the action of man, the condition is artificial and not natural for purposes of the application of the attractive nuisance doctrine.

1971(Dickeson v. Baltimore Ry., 42 Ill.2d 103, 106 .) The Supreme Court also stated that tire question of “the applicability of the attractive nuisance principles set forth in Kahn v. Burton, 5 Ill.2d 614 * # * need not be decided in this instance * * ( 42 Ill.2d 103, 109 .) In American National Bank, the Supreme Court did not consider the applicability of the attractive nuisance doctrine but affirmed the judgment against the defendant railroad.

1971(Dickeson v. Baltimore Ry., 42 Ill.2d 103, 106 .) The Supreme Court also stated that tire question of “the applicability of the attractive nuisance principles set forth in Kahn v. Burton, 5 Ill.2d 614 * # * need not be decided in this instance * * ( 42 Ill.2d 103, 109 .) In American National Bank, the Supreme Court did not consider the applicability of the attractive nuisance doctrine but affirmed the judgment against the defendant railroad.

1968The decision in Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. Smith, 186 Okla 631, 99 P2d 903 , was also based upon the special requirements of the attractive nuisance doctrine.

1967In the case of Schlatter v. City of Peoria, 309 Ill App 636, 33 NE2d 730 (1941) the court stated at page 638: “Motor vehicles are the common method of transportation, and to say that they constitute such an allurement to children of tender years as to give rise to the application of the doctrine of attractive nuisance, when the motor vehicle is in use, is not warranted.” An inspection of the photographs in the record shows the presence of the piles of dirt, the water fountain, the partially completed residence and the contractor’s equipment.

1966Ramsay v. Tuthill Building Material Co., 295 Ill 395, [ 129 NE 127, 129 , 36 ALR 23 ]; Gritton v. Illinois Traction, Inc., 247 Ill App 395; Restatement of the Law of Torts, sec 339; Prosser on Torts, sec 77. . . .” The foregoing rule was followed in Kahn v. James Burton Company, 5 Ill2d 614, 126 NE2d 836 , where, in discussing the liability of one who was neither a lessor nor a lessee nor one in possession either of the premises or the instrumentality causing the injury at the time of its occurrence, the court adopts the rule that the true basis of liability to a child is the foreseeability of

1963O’Donnell v. City of Chicago, 289 Ill App 41, 6 NE2d 449 .

1959The facts involved in the following cases were held to justify a finding of liability: Gustafson v. Consumers Sales Agency, Inc., 414 Ill. 235 ; City of Pekin v. McMahon, 154 Ill. 141 ; City Nat.

1942Defendant also cites in support of its theory in this case the further cases of Austin v. Public Service Co. of Northern Illinois, 299 Ill. 112 ; Burns v. City of Chicago, 338 Ill. 89 ; McDermott v. Burke, 256 Ill. 401 ; and Follett v. Illinois Cent.