paternity test in New York

2025Indeed, the parties' "motivation and honesty are irrelevant" ( Shondel J. , 7 NY3d at 331 ) because the determination whether equitable estoppel should be applied "depends entirely on the best interests of the child and not the equities between the adults" ( Jennifer L. , 145 AD3d at 1582 ).

2012Respondent had a choice to make; he could “either put the doubts aside and initiate a parental relationship with the child, or insist on a scientific test of paternity before initiating a parental relationship” (Shondel, 7 NY3d at 331 ).

2004Thus, in David L. v Cindy Pearl L. ( 208 AD2d 502 [2d Dept 1994]), due to the presumption of legitimacy, combined with equitable estoppel in a “best interests” analysis, a paternity test was not allowed in a case where a child was four years old and had an established relationship with the husband.

2004Thus, in David L. v Cindy Pearl L. ( 208 AD2d 502 [2d Dept 1994]), due to the presumption of legitimacy, combined with equitable estoppel in a "best interests" analysis, a paternity test was not allowed in a case where a child was four years old and had an established relationship with the husband.

2025Further, the foster care agency was under no obligation to reach out to the father ( see Matter of Ciara FF. [Robert FF.] ,235 AD3d at 1164; Matter of Tiyani AA. [Yani Z.] , 232 AD3d 1147 , 1150 [3d Dept 2024]; Matter of Lamar LL. [Loreal MM.] , 86 AD3d 680, 681 [3d Dept 2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 712 [2011]), and the record reflects that the father was given contact information for both petitioner and the foster care agency.

2025Further, the foster care agency was under no obligation to reach out to the father ( see Matter of Ciara FF. [Robert FF.] ,235 AD3d at 1164; Matter of Tiyani AA. [Yani Z.] ,232 AD3d 1147, 1150 [3d Dept 2024]; Matter of Lamar LL. [Loreal MM.] ,86 AD3d 680, 681 [3d Dept 2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 712 [2011]), and the record reflects that the father was given contact information for both petitioner and the foster care agency.

2025Indeed, the parties' "motivation and honesty are irrelevant" ( Shondel J. , 7 NY3d at 331 ) because the determination whether equitable estoppel should be applied "depends entirely on the best interests of the child and not the equities between the adults" ( Jennifer L. , 145 AD3d at 1582 ).

2018These critical legal principles and distinctions bear on whether petitioner met his burden of proof at the paternity hearing by presenting clear and convincing evidence ( Matter of Tanesha H. v Phillip C. , 57 AD3d 403 [1st Dept. 2008]).

2018Thus, in addition to [his] assumption of the actual physical and psychological burdens attendant to parenting a newborn, and the extent of the parent-child relationship that he forged with the baby after she was born, it is necessary to take into account the time, energy and money he expended to prepare for her arrival, his participation in decision making with regard to her upbringing and, not insignificantly, the fact that he married [his wife, the child's mother,] earlier than he had otherwise planned so as to legitimize the child" ( Matter of Richard W. v Roberta Y. , 240 AD2d at 814 ).

2016Here, the 2008 determination that petitioner lacked standing did not bar the instant proceeding because it did not decide the merits of petitioner’s paternity claim {see id. at 13-14 ; Ricatto v Mapliedi, 133 AD3d 737, 739 [2015]; Caliguri v JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 121 AD3d 1030, 1031 [2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 911 [2015]; Jackson v Jamaica Hosp.

2015Contrary to respondent’s contention, Family Court Act § 262 (a) does not provide for the right to assigned counsel on issues of support, and there is no constitutional right to assigned counsel in a support proceeding (Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. of City of N.Y. v Remy K.Y., 298 AD2d 261 , 262 [1st Dept 2002]).

2010While a hearing is often necessary to determine a child’s best interests, under these circumstances, where petitioner failed to tender any evidence that it would be of any benefit to the child if his petition for a paternity test were granted at this late juncture, Family Court properly dismissed the petition without a hearing “as it possessed sufficient information to render an informed decision consistent with the child’s best interests” (Matter of Razo v Leyva, 3 AD3d at 571 ; see Matter of Mobley v Ishmael, 285 AD2d at 648-649 ).

2007A preponderance of the evidence shows that the children are in a stable and caring preadoptive home, have bonded with their foster mother and the other children in the home, and have expressed no desire to see their father, and that termination of respondent’s parental rights is in their best interests (see Unique Jaleel S., 35 AD3d at 250 ).

2004It is well established that where there is no court decree of legal separation or divorce, access must be clearly and convincingly negated. ( See, Matter of Margaret A. v Nicholas M. , 39 AD2d 706 [2d Dept 1972]; Gray v Rose , 32 AD2d 994 [3d Dept 1969]; Matter of Donahue v American Radiator & Std.

2004It is well established that where there is no court decree of legal separation or divorce, access must be clearly and convincingly negated. ( See, Matter of Margaret A. v Nicholas M. , 39 AD2d 706 [2d Dept 1972]; Gray v Rose , 32 AD2d 994 [3d Dept 1969]; Matter of Donahue v American Radiator & Std.

2004(See, Fung v Fung, 238 AD2d 375 [2d Dept 1997].) In practice, this means that the presumption’s implementation has sometimes stood in the way of such evidence (e.g., a paternity test) being obtained.

1993Charles Hosp., 112 AD2d 297 ).

1992It was not until September 1990, after a petition was filed against him seeking confinement costs, that respondent first raised the issue of his paternity and it was not until February 1991 that he made the instant motion to vacate (see, Matter of Constance S. v Steven A., 130 AD2d 493 ).

1989Recent case law indicates that in these circumstances, respondent should be precluded from asserting this paternity claim (see, Matter of Montelone v Antia, 60 AD2d 603 ; see also, Matter of Boyles v Boyles, 95 AD2d 95 ; Matter of Sharon GG. v Duane HH., 95 AD2d 466 , affd 63 NY2d 859 ; State of New York ex rel.

1989H. v P., 90 AD2d 434 ).

1989Recent case law indicates that in these circumstances, respondent should be precluded from asserting this paternity claim (see, Matter of Montelone v Antia, 60 AD2d 603 ; see also, Matter of Boyles v Boyles, 95 AD2d 95 ; Matter of Sharon GG. v Duane HH., 95 AD2d 466 , affd 63 NY2d 859 ; State of New York ex rel.