paternity challenge in Utah

2014Id. ¶¶ 28, 41. 16 See also Thurnwald v. A.E., 2007 UT 38, ¶¶ 28, 33, 44, 47 , 163 P.3d 623 (reiterating this standard in identifying a potential consti- tutional problem with applying the Adoption Act‘s requirement of a paternity petition within twenty-four hours of the birth of a child in a manner that would ―make it impossible for unwed fa- thers of children born on weekends or holidays to preserve their rights postbirth,‖ but interpreting the statutory filing deadline to be subject to extension under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 6 and interpreting the statute to provide a ―minimum period of

2014Id. ¶¶ 28, 41. 16 See also Thurnwald v. A.E., 2007 UT 38, ¶¶ 28, 33, 44, 47 , 163 P.3d 623 (reiterating this standard in identifying a potential consti- tutional problem with applying the Adoption Act‘s requirement of a paternity petition within twenty-four hours of the birth of a child in a manner that would ―make it impossible for unwed fa- thers of children born on weekends or holidays to preserve their rights postbirth,‖ but interpreting the statutory filing deadline to be subject to extension under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 6 and interpreting the statute to provide a ―minimum period of

2014Id. ¶¶ 28, 41. 16 See also Thurnwald v. A.E., 2007 UT 38, ¶¶ 28, 33, 44, 47 , 163 P.3d 623 (reiterating this standard in identifying a potential consti- tutional problem with applying the Adoption Act‘s requirement of a paternity petition within twenty-four hours of the birth of a child in a manner that would ―make it impossible for unwed fa- thers of children born on weekends or holidays to preserve their rights postbirth,‖ but interpreting the statutory filing deadline to be subject to extension under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 6 and interpreting the statute to provide a ―minimum period of

2014Id. ¶¶ 28, 41. 16 See also Thurnwald v. A.E., 2007 UT 38, ¶¶ 28, 33, 44, 47 , 163 P.3d 623 (reiterating this standard in identifying a potential consti- tutional problem with applying the Adoption Act‘s requirement of a paternity petition within twenty-four hours of the birth of a child in a manner that would ―make it impossible for unwed fa- thers of children born on weekends or holidays to preserve their rights postbirth,‖ but interpreting the statutory filing deadline to be subject to extension under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 6 and interpreting the statute to provide a ―minimum period of

2026Thus, the juvenile court’s determination regarding Father’s parental rights applied only as to Child. 4 Cite as: 2026 UT 2 Opinion of the Court against adoption and, shortly after Infant’s birth, experienced a mental health crisis resulting in her hospitalization.

2019Further, the court found that Rhorer had abandoned his paternity claim altogether by instead pursuing dual fatherhood and shared parent-time and stating that he did not want to disrupt the relationship between the child and Husband. ¶25 Rhorer does not address these rulings in his briefing to us, other than making a conclusory statement that he did not abandon 6 Cite as: 2019 UT 72 Opinion of the Court his paternity claim. 2 He did respond to [Husband’s] argument regarding waiver in his reply brief.

2015Id.

2006Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UT App 391,¶ 14 , 101 P.3d 830 (listing elements óf equitable estoppel); see also Kristen D. v. Stephen D., 280 A.D.2d 717 , 719 N.Y.S.2d 771, 772-73 (2001) (“Courts have long recognized the availability of the doctrine of equitable estoppel as a defense in a paternity proceeding." (citations omitted)); Richard W. v. Roberta Y., 240 A.D.2d 812 , 658 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1997) (applying equitable estoppel principles to bar a paternity challenge).

2006Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UT App 391,¶ 14 , 101 P.3d 830 (listing elements óf equitable estoppel); see also Kristen D. v. Stephen D., 280 A.D.2d 717 , 719 N.Y.S.2d 771, 772-73 (2001) (“Courts have long recognized the availability of the doctrine of equitable estoppel as a defense in a paternity proceeding." (citations omitted)); Richard W. v. Roberta Y., 240 A.D.2d 812 , 658 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1997) (applying equitable estoppel principles to bar a paternity challenge).

2006Rather, we review the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a particular paternity challenge conflicts with the policy goal of preserving the stability of the marriage. ¶ 16 The trial court apparently relied on In re J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990), to reach its finding that preservation of marriage becomes moot upon the divorce or separation of the parties.

2006Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UT App 391,¶ 14 , 101 P.3d 830 (listing elements óf equitable estoppel); see also Kristen D. v. Stephen D., 280 A.D.2d 717 , 719 N.Y.S.2d 771, 772-73 (2001) (“Courts have long recognized the availability of the doctrine of equitable estoppel as a defense in a paternity proceeding." (citations omitted)); Richard W. v. Roberta Y., 240 A.D.2d 812 , 658 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1997) (applying equitable estoppel principles to bar a paternity challenge).

2006Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UT App 391,¶ 14 , 101 P.3d 830 (listing elements óf equitable estoppel); see also Kristen D. v. Stephen D., 280 A.D.2d 717 , 719 N.Y.S.2d 771, 772-73 (2001) (“Courts have long recognized the availability of the doctrine of equitable estoppel as a defense in a paternity proceeding." (citations omitted)); Richard W. v. Roberta Y., 240 A.D.2d 812 , 658 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1997) (applying equitable estoppel principles to bar a paternity challenge).

2001In support of this argument, Butterfield relies on Phillips ex rel. *1140 Utah State Department of Social Services v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980), where this court held that a lab technician with a bachelor of science degree in bacteriology, who worked at the lab that conducted the paternity test at issue, was not qualified to testify to the validity of the paternity test.

2001Id. at 1236 .