definite rule in Pennsylvania

1965This holding was recently approved in Brinton et al. v. Kerr, 320 Pa. 62 where stated at page 64: “. . . we again announce as a definite rule that ‘the exclusive remedy [to try the title to office] is by an action of quo warranto’ ” ’ ”.

1962This holding was recently approved in Brinton et al. v. Kerr, 320 Pa. 62 , where stated at p. 64: . . we again announce as a definite rule that “the exclusive remedy [to try the title to office] is by an action of quo warranto.” ’ ” Our decision in Williams's Appeal, 312 Pa. 477 , is particularly applicable to the situation in the case at bar.

1962This holding was recently approved in Brinton et al. v. Kerr, 320 Pa. 62 , where stated at p. 64: . . we again announce as a definite rule that “the exclusive remedy [to try the title to office] is by an action of quo warranto.” ’ ” Our decision in Williams's Appeal, 312 Pa. 477 , is particularly applicable to the situation in the case at bar.

1940R. 568, 581) where the major question before the court was some other problem, where, as here, it is sought to be injected as the principal issue, we again announce as a definite rule that The exclusive remedy [to try the title to office] is by an action of quo war *559 ranto’: Com. ex rel. v. Gibson, 316 Pa. 429, 434 ; Williams’s App., 312 Pa. 477, 479 ; Com. ex rel. v. Conroy, 267 Pa. 518 ; Hutchinson v. Goshorn, 256 Pa. 69 . . .

1940R. 568, 581) where the major question before the court was some other problem, where, as here, it is sought to be injected as the principal issue, we again announce as a definite rule that The exclusive remedy [to try the title to office] is by an action of quo war *559 ranto’: Com. ex rel. v. Gibson, 316 Pa. 429, 434 ; Williams’s App., 312 Pa. 477, 479 ; Com. ex rel. v. Conroy, 267 Pa. 518 ; Hutchinson v. Goshorn, 256 Pa. 69 . . .

1935R. 568, 581) where the major question before the court was some other problem, where, as here, it is sought to be injected as the principle issue, we again announce as a definite rule that “the exclusive remedy [to try the title to office] is by an action of quo warranto”: Com. ex rel. v. Gibson, 316 Pa. 429 , 434; Williams's App., 312 Pa. 477, 479 ; Com. ex rel. v. Conroy, 267 Pa. 518 ; Hutchinson v. Goshorn, 256 Pa. 69 .

1940R. 568, 581) where the major question before the court was some other problem, where, as here, it is sought to be injected as the principal issue, we again announce as a definite rule that The exclusive remedy [to try the title to office] is by an action of quo war *559 ranto’: Com. ex rel. v. Gibson, 316 Pa. 429, 434 ; Williams’s App., 312 Pa. 477, 479 ; Com. ex rel. v. Conroy, 267 Pa. 518 ; Hutchinson v. Goshorn, 256 Pa. 69 . . .

1935R. 568, 581) where the major question before the court was some other problem, where, as here, it is sought to be injected as the principle issue, we again announce as a definite rule that “the exclusive remedy [to try the title to office] is by an action of quo warranto”: Com. ex rel. v. Gibson, 316 Pa. 429 , 434; Williams's App., 312 Pa. 477, 479 ; Com. ex rel. v. Conroy, 267 Pa. 518 ; Hutchinson v. Goshorn, 256 Pa. 69 .

1940R. 568, 581) where the major question before the court was some other problem, where, as here, it is sought to be injected as the principal issue, we again announce as a definite rule that The exclusive remedy [to try the title to office] is by an action of quo war *559 ranto’: Com. ex rel. v. Gibson, 316 Pa. 429, 434 ; Williams’s App., 312 Pa. 477, 479 ; Com. ex rel. v. Conroy, 267 Pa. 518 ; Hutchinson v. Goshorn, 256 Pa. 69 . . .

1935R. 568, 581) where the major question before the court was some other problem, where, as here, it is sought to be injected as the principle issue, we again announce as a definite rule that “the exclusive remedy [to try the title to office] is by an action of quo warranto”: Com. ex rel. v. Gibson, 316 Pa. 429 , 434; Williams's App., 312 Pa. 477, 479 ; Com. ex rel. v. Conroy, 267 Pa. 518 ; Hutchinson v. Goshorn, 256 Pa. 69 .

1940R. v. Rothstein et al., [ 116 Pa. Superior Ct. 156 ] supra, at page 161: “In order to crystallize the rulings of our earlier cases, we now state the definite rule that a diversion or reconsignment order obligates the one signing it for the payment of freight charges,, unless he states, in the order itself, not only the fact that he is acting as agent for another, but also the name of his principal.” It is not essential to the disposition of the present case to consider whether the charges here involved are such “additional charges” as are referred to in the Newton Amendment of 1927 to the Tran

1938Co. v. Rothstein et al., 116 Pa. Superior Ct. 156, 161 , 176 A. 861 , we said: “In order to crystallize the rulings of our earlier cases, we now state the definite rule that a diversion or reconsignment order obligates the one signing it for the payment of freight *583 charges, unless he states, in the order itself, not only the fact that he is acting as agent for another, but also the name of his principal.” Having exercised dominion over these cars, the appellants became liable for the freight and transportation charges: P. & R.

2012Colgan, 194 Pa. at 242 , 45 A. at 121 . *276 Thus, with regard to what constitutes a reasonable time period by which to determine whether a well is profitable, we decline to establish a definite rule.

2012Colgan, 194 Pa. at 242 , 45 A. at 121 . *276 Thus, with regard to what constitutes a reasonable time period by which to determine whether a well is profitable, we decline to establish a definite rule.

1986Thus, as recently as 1981, this court adopted as a definite rule the converse implication which we had left as assumed, but undecided, in Walker, 27 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 524 , 367 A.2d at 368 .

1986Thus, as recently as 1981, this court adopted as a definite rule the converse implication which we had left as assumed, but undecided, in Walker, 27 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 524 , 367 A.2d at 368 .

1979The speedy trial guarantee is “concerned with limiting the period of ‘anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation.’ United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 , 86 S.Ct. 773, 776 , 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1966).” Commonwealth v. Leaming, 442 Pa. 223, 225 , 275 A.2d 43, 44 (1971).

1979The speedy trial guarantee is “concerned with limiting the period of ‘anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation.’ United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 , 86 S.Ct. 773, 776 , 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1966).” Commonwealth v. Leaming, 442 Pa. 223, 225 , 275 A.2d 43, 44 (1971).

1979Absent a definite rule such as Rule 1100, and because “the right to speedy trial is a more vague concept than other procedural rights,” it is “impossible to determine with precision when the right has been denied.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 , 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2187 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).

1979Absent a definite rule such as Rule 1100, and because “the right to speedy trial is a more vague concept than other procedural rights,” it is “impossible to determine with precision when the right has been denied.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 , 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2187 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).

1965Justice Musmanno concludes the opinion with this statement: “ ‘Since the sole matter involved is the right to hold a public office, quo warranto is the only appropriate method of determining the question: Com. v. James ( 214 Pa. 319 , 63 A. 743 ), supra; see Com. v. Wherry ( 302 Pa. 134 , 152 A. 846 ), supra’ ”.

1965Justice Musmanno concludes the opinion with this statement: “ ‘Since the sole matter involved is the right to hold a public office, quo warranto is the only appropriate method of determining the question: Com. v. James ( 214 Pa. 319 , 63 A. 743 ), supra; see Com. v. Wherry ( 302 Pa. 134 , 152 A. 846 ), supra’ ”.

1951Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 266 (1931).

1951Sometimes the courts are able to gather a definite standard or criterion for the guidance of an administrative agency by resorting to the context of the entire act: Texas et al. v. United States et al., 292 U. S. 522 (1934); Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros.

1950Considering the origin of the phrase and the reasons attending its use (see Lord Hale’s Essay, De Jure Maris, De Portibus Maris, Hargrave Law Tracts, pages 77, 78; McAllister, 43 Harvard Law Review 759; Hamilton, 39 Yale Law Journal 1089, and Keezer, 25 Michigan Law Review 596), it is difficult to find here a criterion for price fixing or even a clear cut rule of law, but the phrase was given vitality as a technical term belonging to the vocabulary of constitutional interpretation in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (where an act regulating the charges of grain elevators was upheld), and attaine

1950Considering the origin of the phrase and the reasons attending its use (see Lord Hale’s Essay, De Jure Maris, De Portibus Maris, Hargrave Law Tracts, pages 77, 78; McAllister, 43 Harvard Law Review 759; Hamilton, 39 Yale Law Journal 1089, and Keezer, 25 Michigan Law Review 596), it is difficult to find here a criterion for price fixing or even a clear cut rule of law, but the phrase was given vitality as a technical term belonging to the vocabulary of constitutional interpretation in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (where an act regulating the charges of grain elevators was upheld), and attaine

1937Thus in Fritz v. British America Assurance Co., 208 Pa. 268 , 57 A. 573 , where on demand of the insurer for an appraisement, in accordance with a provision of the policy, appraisers were appointed but made no award, and the insured brought suit within sixty days after the appraisal was abandoned, but over two years after the fire, the Supreme Court said, speaking through Mr. Justice Mestrezat : “The company having required an appraisement by reason of its inability to agree with the insured as to the amount of the loss must be regarded as having waived its right to enforce the limitation clau

1937Thus in Fritz v. British America Assurance Co., 208 Pa. 268 , 57 A. 573 , where on demand of the insurer for an appraisement, in accordance with a provision of the policy, appraisers were appointed but made no award, and the insured brought suit within sixty days after the appraisal was abandoned, but over two years after the fire, the Supreme Court said, speaking through Mr. Justice Mestrezat : “The company having required an appraisement by reason of its inability to agree with the insured as to the amount of the loss must be regarded as having waived its right to enforce the limitation clau

1936The appellant has called to our attention the case of Alabama Grocery Co. v. Hammond, 285 Fed. 723, 725 , (C.

1936A definite standard is set for determining the price, and hence the maxim id certum est quod certum reddi potest is applicable, as in effect, is shown by Van Horn v. Kemena, 281 Pa. 579 .” As Mr. Justice Sadler pointed out in York Metal & Alloys Co. v. Cyclops Steel Co., 280 Pa. 585 , 590: “When there is an agreement founded on a consideration, it is not invalid for want of mutuality because one party has an option while the other has not, or, in other words, because it is obligatory on one and optional with the other.” The principle has also received the approval of this Court in the followin

1936A definite standard is set for determining the price, and hence the maxim id certum est quod certum reddi potest is applicable, as in effect, is shown by Van Horn v. Kemena, 281 Pa. 579 .” As Mr. Justice Sadler pointed out in York Metal & Alloys Co. v. Cyclops Steel Co., 280 Pa. 585 , 590: “When there is an agreement founded on a consideration, it is not invalid for want of mutuality because one party has an option while the other has not, or, in other words, because it is obligatory on one and optional with the other.” The principle has also received the approval of this Court in the followin

1936A definite standard is set for determining the price, and hence the maxim id certum est quod certum reddi potest is applicable, as in effect, is shown by Van Horn v. Kemena, 281 Pa. 579 .” As Mr. Justice Sadler pointed out in York Metal & Alloys Co. v. Cyclops Steel Co., 280 Pa. 585 , 590: “When there is an agreement founded on a consideration, it is not invalid for want of mutuality because one party has an option while the other has not, or, in other words, because it is obligatory on one and optional with the other.” The principle has also received the approval of this Court in the followin

1936A definite standard is set for determining the price, and hence the maxim id certum est quod certum reddi potest is applicable, as in effect, is shown by Van Horn v. Kemena, 281 Pa. 579 .” As Mr. Justice Sadler pointed out in York Metal & Alloys Co. v. Cyclops Steel Co., 280 Pa. 585 , 590: “When there is an agreement founded on a consideration, it is not invalid for want of mutuality because one party has an option while the other has not, or, in other words, because it is obligatory on one and optional with the other.” The principle has also received the approval of this Court in the followin

1936A definite standard is set for determining the price, and hence the maxim id certum est quod certum reddi potest is applicable, as in effect, is shown by Van Horn v. Kemena, 281 Pa. 579 .” As Mr. Justice Sadler pointed out in York Metal & Alloys Co. v. Cyclops Steel Co., 280 Pa. 585 , 590: “When there is an agreement founded on a consideration, it is not invalid for want of mutuality because one party has an option while the other has not, or, in other words, because it is obligatory on one and optional with the other.” The principle has also received the approval of this Court in the followin

1935The reason why quo warranto should be adhered to as the proper remedy to oust public officers has been fully set forth in Com. v. Schermer, 311 Pa. 341, 344 , and need not be repeated except to state that it is a matter in which the public is vitally concerned, and -the prosecution should be instituted at the instance of the attorney general or district attorney.

1919In attempting to reduce a general legal principle to a definite rule of action we prefer to adopt the language of the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking by a jurist of much experience and ability, Mr. Justice Harlan, in Insurance Co. v. Davey, 123 U. S. 739 : “If the substantial cause of the death of the insured was an excessive use of alcoholic stimulants......his health was impaired by intemperance within the meaning of the words ‘so far intemperate as to impair his health.’ ” This expression was after-wards repeated, with approval, in the opinion of Mr. Justice Lamar when the same

1919In attempting to reduce a general legal principle to a definite rule of action we prefer to adopt the language of the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking by a jurist of much experience and ability, Mr. Justice Harlan, in Insurance Co. v. Davey, 123 U. S. 739 : “If the substantial cause of the death of the insured was an excessive use of alcoholic stimulants......his health was impaired by intemperance within the meaning of the words ‘so far intemperate as to impair his health.’ ” This expression was after-wards repeated, with approval, in the opinion of Mr. Justice Lamar when the same