definite rule in Indiana

1972In either event, to go back of the constitutional authentication would be unauthorised.” (Emphasis supplied.) Commenting upon attacks on an act’s validity in the manner of its enactment, the Supreme Court in State v. Wheeler (1909), 172 Ind. 578, 580 , 89 N. E. 1 , 19 Ann.

1972In either event, to go back of the constitutional authentication would be unauthorised.” (Emphasis supplied.) Commenting upon attacks on an act’s validity in the manner of its enactment, the Supreme Court in State v. Wheeler (1909), 172 Ind. 578, 580 , 89 N. E. 1 , 19 Ann.

2003Id. at 99 .

1981“In order that one may be guilty of ‘wilful misconduct,’ an actual intention to injure need not be shown. [Citations omitted.] ‘Wilful misconduct’ includes a wilful tort, or an intent to injure, but an intent to injure is not a necessary element. ‘Wilful misconduct’ on the part of a motorist, within the contemplation of guest statutes similar to the Ohio guest statute, is either the doing of an act with specific intent to injure his passenger, or, with full knowledge of existing conditions, the intentional execution of a wrongful course of conduct which he knows should not be carried out or th

1981“In order that one may be guilty of ‘wilful misconduct,’ an actual intention to injure need not be shown. [Citations omitted.] ‘Wilful misconduct’ includes a wilful tort, or an intent to injure, but an intent to injure is not a necessary element. ‘Wilful misconduct’ on the part of a motorist, within the contemplation of guest statutes similar to the Ohio guest statute, is either the doing of an act with specific intent to injure his passenger, or, with full knowledge of existing conditions, the intentional execution of a wrongful course of conduct which he knows should not be carried out or th

1981“In order that one may be guilty of ‘wilful misconduct,’ an actual intention to injure need not be shown. [Citations omitted.] ‘Wilful misconduct’ includes a wilful tort, or an intent to injure, but an intent to injure is not a necessary element. ‘Wilful misconduct’ on the part of a motorist, within the contemplation of guest statutes similar to the Ohio guest statute, is either the doing of an act with specific intent to injure his passenger, or, with full knowledge of existing conditions, the intentional execution of a wrongful course of conduct which he knows should not be carried out or th

1981“In order that one may be guilty of ‘wilful misconduct,’ an actual intention to injure need not be shown. [Citations omitted.] ‘Wilful misconduct’ includes a wilful tort, or an intent to injure, but an intent to injure is not a necessary element. ‘Wilful misconduct’ on the part of a motorist, within the contemplation of guest statutes similar to the Ohio guest statute, is either the doing of an act with specific intent to injure his passenger, or, with full knowledge of existing conditions, the intentional execution of a wrongful course of conduct which he knows should not be carried out or th

1981Sausaman v. Leininger, supra; Keck v. Kerbs, (1979) Ind.App., 395 N.E.2d 845 , trans. denied 7 Perhaps the term “wil *679 ful misconduct” as applied to guest statute cases was best defined by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Tighe v. Diamond, (1948) 149 Ohio St. 520 , 80 N.E.2d 122, 127 , wherein the court said: “ ‘Wilful misconduct’ is something more than negligence. ‘Wilful misconduct’ imports a more positive mental condition prompting an act than does the term ‘wanton misconduct.’ ‘Wilful misconduct’ implies an intentional deviation from a clear duty or from a definite rule of conduct, a delibe

1981Sausaman v. Leininger, supra; Keck v. Kerbs, (1979) Ind.App., 395 N.E.2d 845 , trans. denied 7 Perhaps the term “wil *679 ful misconduct” as applied to guest statute cases was best defined by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Tighe v. Diamond, (1948) 149 Ohio St. 520 , 80 N.E.2d 122, 127 , wherein the court said: “ ‘Wilful misconduct’ is something more than negligence. ‘Wilful misconduct’ imports a more positive mental condition prompting an act than does the term ‘wanton misconduct.’ ‘Wilful misconduct’ implies an intentional deviation from a clear duty or from a definite rule of conduct, a delibe

1981Sausaman v. Leininger, supra; Keck v. Kerbs, (1979) Ind.App., 395 N.E.2d 845 , trans. denied 7 Perhaps the term “wil *679 ful misconduct” as applied to guest statute cases was best defined by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Tighe v. Diamond, (1948) 149 Ohio St. 520 , 80 N.E.2d 122, 127 , wherein the court said: “ ‘Wilful misconduct’ is something more than negligence. ‘Wilful misconduct’ imports a more positive mental condition prompting an act than does the term ‘wanton misconduct.’ ‘Wilful misconduct’ implies an intentional deviation from a clear duty or from a definite rule of conduct, a delibe

1907The verdict of the jury was contrary to law, and the unwarranted action of the court could not cure it of such defect.” Both Cromwell v. Wilkinson (1862), 18 Ind. 365 , and Carmichael v. Shiel (1863), 21 Ind. 66 , are cited with apparent approval.

1907The verdict of the jury was contrary to law, and the unwarranted action of the court could not cure it of such defect.” Both Cromwell v. Wilkinson (1862), 18 Ind. 365 , and Carmichael v. Shiel (1863), 21 Ind. 66 , are cited with apparent approval.

1907In the ease of Nickey v. Zonker (1899), 22 Ind. App. 211, 220 , the following language was used: “If it can be said, with certainty, that the verdict as reduced by the allowance of the remittitur is within the conflicting evidence, the appellants have been deprived of their right, which they never consented to forego, to have the judgment of the jury upon the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of evidence upon matters of fact, the decision of which was not within the mere discretion of the triers, uncontrolled by any fixed rule of law, but was subject to a definite rule of measurement

1903This case has been certified to us by the second division of the Appellate Court, with a recommendation that we overrule the case of Stanbrough v. Stanbrough, supra, in respect to the language therein that we have above set out.

1898In Parker v. Hastings, 12 Ind. 654 , the Supreme Court says: “In America, at least in Indiana, a brief, in addition to the statement in the case above mentioned, should contain a summary of the points or questions involved, with a citation of authorities, if authorities are relied on and an argument based upon both.” In Gardner v. Stover, 43 Ind. 356 , the Supreme Court thus defines a brief: “A brief, within the meaning of rule fourteen, is some kind of a statement of the case for the information of the court.

1898In Parker v. Hastings, 12 Ind. 654 , the Supreme Court says: “In America, at least in Indiana, a brief, in addition to the statement in the case above mentioned, should contain a summary of the points or questions involved, with a citation of authorities, if authorities are relied on and an argument based upon both.” In Gardner v. Stover, 43 Ind. 356 , the Supreme Court thus defines a brief: “A brief, within the meaning of rule fourteen, is some kind of a statement of the case for the information of the court.