definite rule in Connecticut

2000In State v. Schriver, 207 Conn. 456, 457 , 542 A.2d 686 (1988), a defendant was convicted of violating § 53-21 for following the thirteen year old victim, grabbing her around her waist and stating, “ ‘Don’t worry, all I want to do is feel you.’ ” In Schriver , our Supreme Court determined that § 53-21 was facially vague because it “fail[ed] to articulate a definite standard for determining whether the conduct of the defendant in this case is permitted or prohibited.” Id., 461.

2000In State v. Schriver, 207 Conn. 456, 457 , 542 A.2d 686 (1988), a defendant was convicted of violating § 53-21 for following the thirteen year old victim, grabbing her around her waist and stating, “ ‘Don’t worry, all I want to do is feel you.’ ” In Schriver , our Supreme Court determined that § 53-21 was facially vague because it “fail[ed] to articulate a definite standard for determining whether the conduct of the defendant in this case is permitted or prohibited.” Id., 461.

1999“A right is fundamental for purposes of equal protection analysis if it is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the constitution.” Zapata v. Burns, 207 Conn. 496, 505 , 542 A.2d 700 (1988).

1999“A right is fundamental for purposes of equal protection analysis if it is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the constitution.” Zapata v. Burns, 207 Conn. 496, 505 , 542 A.2d 700 (1988).

1999General Statutes § 31-324 provides in relevant part: “When, in any case arising under the provisions of this chapter, the [board] is of the opinion that the decision involves principles of law which are not free from reasonable doubt and which public interest requires shall be determined by the Appellate Court, in order that a definite rule be established applicable to future cases, said [board] may, on its own motion and without any agreement or act of the parties or their counsel, reserve such case for the opinion of the Appellate Court. . . .” Pursuant to § 31-324, the board reserved the fo

1999General Statutes § 31-324 provides in relevant part: “When, in any case arising under the provisions of this chapter, the [board] is of the opinion that the decision involves principles of law which are not free from reasonable doubt and which public interest requires shall be determined by the Appellate Court, in order that a definite rule be established applicable to future cases, said [board] may, on its own motion and without any agreement or act of the parties or their counsel, reserve such case for the opinion of the Appellate Court. . . .” Pursuant to § 31-324, the board reserved the fo

1975Budovsky v. Hadhazi, 95 Conn. 388, 398 , 111 A. 179 ; see generally, Maltbie, loc. cit., and cases cited therein.

1975Budovsky v. Hadhazi, 95 Conn. 388, 398 , 111 A. 179 ; see generally, Maltbie, loc. cit., and cases cited therein.

1966In the Fink ease, which we cited with approval in Howell v. Johnson, 147 Conn. 290, 295 , 160 A.2d 486 , it was held (p. 361): “A test or examination, to be competitive, must employ an objective standard or measure. . . . [p. 362] A definite standard may be formulated. . . .

1966In the Fink ease, which we cited with approval in Howell v. Johnson, 147 Conn. 290, 295 , 160 A.2d 486 , it was held (p. 361): “A test or examination, to be competitive, must employ an objective standard or measure. . . . [p. 362] A definite standard may be formulated. . . .

1958The amount returned must be based upon the jury’s application of the rule of fair, just and reasonable compensation which will fully compensate the plaintiff for what he has suffered; Flood v. Smith, 126 Conn. 644, 647 ; since a more specific or definite standard is impossible.

1938As a definite rule of construction it now has arrayed against it such outstanding jurists as Justices Holmes and Cardozo; Dexter v. Inches, 147 Mass. 324, 325 , 17 N. E. 551 ; Matter of Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 213 N. Y. 168, 172 , 107 N. E. 340 ; although in Massachusetts it had support in an earlier decision by Gray, C.

1938As a definite rule of construction it now has arrayed against it such outstanding jurists as Justices Holmes and Cardozo; Dexter v. Inches, 147 Mass. 324, 325 , 17 N. E. 551 ; Matter of Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 213 N. Y. 168, 172 , 107 N. E. 340 ; although in Massachusetts it had support in an earlier decision by Gray, C.

1938As a definite rule of construction it now has arrayed against it such outstanding jurists as Justices Holmes and Cardozo; Dexter v. Inches, 147 Mass. 324, 325 , 17 N. E. 551 ; Matter of Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 213 N. Y. 168, 172 , 107 N. E. 340 ; although in Massachusetts it had support in an earlier decision by Gray, C.

1938As a definite rule of construction it now has arrayed against it such outstanding jurists as Justices Holmes and Cardozo; Dexter v. Inches, 147 Mass. 324, 325 , 17 N. E. 551 ; Matter of Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 213 N. Y. 168, 172 , 107 N. E. 340 ; although in Massachusetts it had support in an earlier decision by Gray, C.

1938Union Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Dudley, 104 Me. 297, 307 , 72 Atl. 166 ; In re Frisf's Estate, 18 Del.

1938Union Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Dudley, 104 Me. 297, 307 , 72 Atl. 166 ; In re Frisf's Estate, 18 Del.

1938Union Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Dudley, 104 Me. 297, 307 , 72 Atl. 166 ; In re Frisf's Estate, 18 Del.

1927Co., 90 Conn. 35, 37 , 86 Atl. 155 .

1923This factor was presented in an illuminating way in Industrial Commission v. Davis, 259 U. S. 182, 187 , 42 Sup. Ct. 489, where the court said: “But equipment out of use, withdrawn for repairs, may or may not partake of that character according to circumstances, and among the circumstances is the time taken for repairs — the duration of the withdrawal from use.