definite warning in Florida

2010"The language of the statute [or ordinance] must provide a definite warning of what conduct is required or prohibited, measured by common understanding and practice." Jones, 800 So.2d at 270 .

2010“The language of the statute [or ordinance] must provide a definite warning of what conduct is required or prohibited, measured by common understanding and practice.” Jones, 800 So.2d at 270 .

2008Way back in 1978, in State v. Gaylord, 356 So.2d 313 (Fla.1978), the Florida Supreme Court held that the term “maliciously punish” used to define aggravated child abuse was not unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, precisely because: “Maliciously” does provide a definite standard of conduct understandable by a person of ordinary intelligence.

2003In contrast, the court in Gaylord previously held that "the term `maliciously' ... provide[s] a definite standard of conduct understandable by a person of ordinary intelligence [and that] [m]alice means ill will, hatred, spite, an evil intent." Gaylord, 356 So.2d at 314 .

1990State v. Bussey, 463 So.2d 1141, 1144 (Fla. 1985); Brunelle v. State, 360 So.2d 70, 71 (Fla. 1978); Zachary v. State, 269 So.2d 669 (Fla. 1972).

1981Applying this standard to the language of section 918.14(3)(a)(l), we conclude that it is sufficiently definite “to convey a definite warning as to the conduct proscribed, measured by common understanding and practice.” Von Edwards v. State, 377 So.2d 684, 685 (Fla.1979); Zachary v. State, 269 So.2d 669 (Fla.1972).

1966The trial court upheld the statute against the attack, and said: "This court in construing United States v. Pertillo, 332 U.S. 1 , 67 S.Ct 1538 , 91 L.Ed. 1877 , is of the opinion that the principle stated therein is applicable to *430 Chapter 317.201 Florida Statute Annotated, wherein stated as follows: `Impossible standards are not required, however, statutory language that conveys a definite warning as to proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices satisfies due process.'" We have jurisdiction under Section 4.2, Article V, Constitution of Florida, F.S.A., and Flor

1966The trial court upheld the statute against the attack, and said: "This court in construing United States v. Pertillo, 332 U.S. 1 , 67 S.Ct 1538 , 91 L.Ed. 1877 , is of the opinion that the principle stated therein is applicable to *430 Chapter 317.201 Florida Statute Annotated, wherein stated as follows: `Impossible standards are not required, however, statutory language that conveys a definite warning as to proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices satisfies due process.'" We have jurisdiction under Section 4.2, Article V, Constitution of Florida, F.S.A., and Flor

1985Zachary v. State, 269 So.2d 669 (Fla. 1972); Brock v. Hardie, 114 Fla. 670 , 154 So. 690 (1934).

1985Zachary v. State, 269 So.2d 669 (Fla. 1972); Brock v. Hardie, 114 Fla. 670 , 154 So. 690 (1934).

1983We have examined that decision as well as other Florida cases[5] passing upon the question of the constitutionality vel non of the enabling act under which the legislative agency performs and find that, `the general rule that a zoning ordinance must prescribe definite standards, in that ... the city council ... properly vested with discretionary rights in granting building permits or variances in exception to the zoning ordinance unless there has been established a definite standard to guide them in the exercise of such power.' North Bay Village v. Blackwell, supra. In other words, if definite

1982We have examined that decision as well as other Florida cases 5 passing upon the question of the constitutionality vel non of the enabling act under which the legislative agency performs and find that, “the general rule is that a zoning ordinance must prescribe definite standards, in that . . . the city council . . . properly vested with discretionary rights in granting building permits or variances in exception to the zoning ordinance unless there has been established a definite standard to guide them in the exercise of such power.” North Bay Village v. Blackwell, supra. In other words, if de

1983Clarke v. Morgan, supra. In the present case, the PAD ordinance provides, in relevant part: (3) USES, DENSITY, OPEN SPACE AND FLOOR AREA RATIO AND OTHER REGULATIONS Within a Planned Area Development, any principal and accessory use, density, open space and floor area ratio and other regulations is permitted which is already permitted in the existing zoning district or districts or PAD Districts as may be determined by the City Commission pursuant to a PAD application, in which such Planned Area Development is located.

1982Clarke v. Morgan, supra. In the present case, the PAD ordinance provides, in relevant part: (3) USES, DENSITY, OPEN SPACE AND FLOOR AREA RATIO AND OTHER REGULATIONS Within a Planned Area Development, any principal and accessory use, density, open space and floor area ratio and other regulations is permitted which is already permitted in the existing zoning district or districts or PAD Districts as may be determined by the City Commission pursuant to a PAD application, in which such Planned Area Development is located.

1983The district court noted that in Lee v. State, 397 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1981), this Court held that section 918.14(3)(a)1 was sufficiently clear to provide a definite warning of the conduct proscribed, measured by common understanding and practice.

1981Without discussing the elements of this offense or mentioning Murray , the Florida Supreme Court in the recent case of Lee v. State, 397 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1981), has held this statute constitutional on the basis that it is sufficiently definite to convey a definite warning as to the conduct proscribed, measured by common understanding and practice.

1973(Smith v. State, 237 So.2d 139 (Fla. 1970); Hunter v. Allen, 422 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir., 1970).)" Accordingly the judgment of the trial court holding Florida Statutes, Section 811.165, F.S.A., to be constitutional is hereby affirmed.

1972(Smith v. State, 237 So.2d 139 (Fla. 1970); Hunter v. Allen, 422 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir., 1970).) The validity of the statutes under attack is sustained by these authorities, for men of common intelligence would understand the evil sought to be remedied by the statutory scheme.

1973(Smith v. State, 237 So.2d 139 (Fla. 1970); Hunter v. Allen, 422 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir., 1970).)" Accordingly the judgment of the trial court holding Florida Statutes, Section 811.165, F.S.A., to be constitutional is hereby affirmed.

1972(Smith v. State, 237 So.2d 139 (Fla. 1970); Hunter v. Allen, 422 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir., 1970).) The validity of the statutes under attack is sustained by these authorities, for men of common intelligence would understand the evil sought to be remedied by the statutory scheme.

1963Plaintiff concedes that the general rule is that one who is having work done on his premises by an independent contractor *657 is obligated only to use ordinary care to provide reasonably safe working conditions for the employees of the independent contractor. [1] Plaintiff, however, relies upon an exception to such general rule, which exception is stated in Ahearn v. Florida Power and Light Company, Fla. App. 1961, 129 So.2d 457, 461 , as follows: "* * *. [W]hile a power company is not required to become an insurer or to provide an absolutely safe place to work, it is under a definite require

1963Plaintiff concedes that the general rule is that one who is having work done on his premises by an independent contractor *657 is obligated only to use ordinary care to provide reasonably safe working conditions for the employees of the independent contractor. [1] Plaintiff, however, relies upon an exception to such general rule, which exception is stated in Ahearn v. Florida Power and Light Company, Fla. App. 1961, 129 So.2d 457, 461 , as follows: "* * *. [W]hile a power company is not required to become an insurer or to provide an absolutely safe place to work, it is under a definite require

2018The language of the statute must provide a definite warning of what conduct is required or prohibited, measured by common understanding and practice.' " State v. Menuto, 912 So. 2d 603 , - 12 - 608 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (citations and internal quotations omitted in Menuto) (quoting Sieniarecki v. State, 756 So. 2d 68, 74 (Fla. 2000)).

2018In addition, "the statute must define the offense in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Brake, 796 So. 2d at 528 .

2001It is constitutionally impermissible for the Legislature to use such vague and broad language that a person of common intelligence must speculate about its meaning and be subjected to arrest and punishment if the guess is wrong. 343 So.2d at 608 ; accord Wyche v. State, 619 So.2d 231, 236 (Fla.1993).

2000Further, the traditional rule is that "a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the Court." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 , 102 S.Ct. 3348 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 , 93 S.Ct. 2908 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)).

2000Further, the traditional rule is that "a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the Court." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 , 102 S.Ct. 3348 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 , 93 S.Ct. 2908 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)).

2000Further, the traditional rule is that "a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the Court." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 , 102 S.Ct. 3348 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 , 93 S.Ct. 2908 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)).

2000Further, the traditional rule is that "a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the Court." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 , 102 S.Ct. 3348 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 , 93 S.Ct. 2908 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)).

1991To this end, a statute must be written "in language which is relevant to today's society." Franklin, 257 So.2d at 23 .

1974Nevertheless, we note Connally v. General Construction Co. (1926), 269 U.S. 385 , 46 S.Ct. 126 , 70 L.Ed. 322 , in which the United States Supreme Court gave constitutional significance to the commonsense requirement that criminal laws convey with specificity a definite warning as to the conduct they proscribe.

1974Nevertheless, we note Connally v. General Construction Co. (1926), 269 U.S. 385 , 46 S.Ct. 126 , 70 L.Ed. 322 , in which the United States Supreme Court gave constitutional significance to the commonsense requirement that criminal laws convey with specificity a definite warning as to the conduct they proscribe.

1972In Melin v. Melin, Fla.App. 1972, 265 So.2d 414 , we considered a case similar in some respects.

1967In Brooks v. Brooks, Fla.1958, 100 So.2d 145 , a case decided before the Appellate Rules were amended, the Supreme Court affirmed a divorce decree which had awarded permanent alimony to the wife and substantial counsel fees to'her solicitor.