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31 California opinions name it 3 courts 1907–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dalehite v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1988Dist., supra, 55 Cal.2d 224, 230 , ‘it may not be possible to set forth a definite rule which would determine in every instance whether a governmental agency is liable.’ A workable definition nevertheless will be one that recognizes that ‘[m]uch of what is done by officers and employees of the government must remain beyond the range of judicial inquiry.’ (3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (1958) § 25.11, p. 484); obviously ‘it is not a tort for government to govern’ (Dalehite v. United States (1953) 346 U.S. 15, 57 [ 97 L.Ed. 1427, 1452 , 73 S.Ct. 956 ] (Jackson, J., dis.)). 1988Dist., supra, 55 Cal.2d 224, 230 , ‘it may not be possible to set forth a definite rule which would determine in every instance whether a governmental agency is liable.’ A workable definition nevertheless will be one that recognizes that ‘[m]uch of what is done by officers and employees of the government must remain beyond the range of judicial inquiry.’ (3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (1958) § 25.11, p. 484); obviously ‘it is not a tort for government to govern’ (Dalehite v. United States (1953) 346 U.S. 15, 57 [ 97 L.Ed. 1427, 1452 , 73 S.Ct. 956 ] (Jackson, J., dis.)). | 4 | 4 |
Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Districtred2 sentences2024Dist. [1961] 55 Cal.2d 224, 230 , ‘it may not be possible to set forth a definite rule which would determine in every instance whether a governmental agency is liable.’ A workable definition nevertheless will be one that recognizes that ‘[m]uch of what is done by officers and employees of the government must remain beyond the range of judicial inquiry’ [citation]; obviously ‘it is not a tort for government to govern’ [citation]. 1988Dist., supra, 55 Cal.2d 224, 230 , ‘it may not be possible to set forth a definite rule which would determine in every instance whether a governmental agency is liable.’ A workable definition nevertheless will be one that recognizes that ‘[m]uch of what is done by officers and employees of the government must remain beyond the range of judicial inquiry.’ (3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (1958) § 25.11, p. 484); obviously ‘it is not a tort for government to govern’ (Dalehite v. United States (1953) 346 U.S. 15, 57 [ 97 L.Ed. 1427, 1452 , 73 S.Ct. 956 ] (Jackson, J., dis.)). | 2 | 7 |
Griffiths v. Johnsongreen2 sentences1962This presumption is stated in Estate of Sweetman, 185 Cal. 27, 28 [ 195 P. 918 ], as follows: ‘A will last seen and known to have been in the possession of the decedent, which cannot be found after his death, will be presumed to have been detroyed by him and with an intention of revoking it, since the law always presumes in favor of the innocence of an act, and any other inference would involve a finding of a wrongful or fraudulent destruction of the will by a third person. ’ ” (Estate of LeSure, 21 Cal.App.2d 73, 80 [ 68 P.2d 313 ].) “It was established beyond question that the will was last 1962This presumption is stated in Estate of Sweetman, 185 Cal. 27, 28 [ 195 P. 918 ], as follows: ‘A will last seen and known to have been in the possession of the decedent, which cannot be found after his death, will be presumed to have been detroyed by him and with an intention of revoking it, since the law always presumes in favor of the innocence of an act, and any other inference would involve a finding of a wrongful or fraudulent destruction of the will by a third person. ’ ” (Estate of LeSure, 21 Cal.App.2d 73, 80 [ 68 P.2d 313 ].) “It was established beyond question that the will was last | 2 | 2 |
Damele v. MacK Trucks, Inc.green2 sentences1998(Damele v. Mack Trucks, Inc. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 29, 38 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 197 ].) It was for the jury to assess the various witnesses’ credibility concerning the injuries suffered by plaintiff and the degree of her pain. 1998(Damele v. Mack Trucks, Inc. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 29, 38 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 197 ].) It was for the jury to assess the various witnesses’ credibility concerning the injuries suffered by plaintiff and the degree of her pain. | 1 | 1 |
Zuber v. Allengreen2 sentences1971It stated, “To the extent that the Legislature considers a given problem and determines the best method of dealing with it, it may specifically include its resolution of the matter in statutory law; in sections 62484 and 24871, for example, the Legislature considered the relationship between quantity discounts and the marketing of milk and wine, respectively, and described with particularity the administrator’s power.” ( 69 Cal.2d at p. 182 ; italics added.) In Zuber v. Allen, supra, the court stated, “Congress has spoken with particularity and provided specifically enumerated differentials, . 1971It stated, “To the extent that the Legislature considers a given problem and determines the best method of dealing with it, it may specifically include its resolution of the matter in statutory law; in sections 62484 and 24871, for example, the Legislature considered the relationship between quantity discounts and the marketing of milk and wine, respectively, and described with particularity the administrator’s power.” ( 69 Cal.2d at p. 182 ; italics added.) In Zuber v. Allen, supra, the court stated, “Congress has spoken with particularity and provided specifically enumerated differentials, . | 1 | 1 |
Hymes v. Pollockgreen2 sentences1963The Council are agreed that the Caveat should go out, and the definite rule of non-liability should be stated." (Italics added.) [8] Recognition of this reality disposes of the argument, advanced by amici curiae, that the general rule of nonliability in the situation now before us should be abandoned in order to achieve "consistency" with the so-called "rescuer" cases (e.g., Henshaw v. Belyea (1934) 220 Cal. 458, 469 [2] [ 31 P.2d 348 ]; Hymes v. Pollock (1952) 108 Cal. App.2d 536, 538 [2] [ 238 P.2d 1056 ]). 1963The Council are agreed that the Caveat should go out, and the definite rule of non-liability should be stated." (Italics added.) [8] Recognition of this reality disposes of the argument, advanced by amici curiae, that the general rule of nonliability in the situation now before us should be abandoned in order to achieve "consistency" with the so-called "rescuer" cases (e.g., Henshaw v. Belyea (1934) 220 Cal. 458, 469 [2] [ 31 P.2d 348 ]; Hymes v. Pollock (1952) 108 Cal. App.2d 536, 538 [2] [ 238 P.2d 1056 ]). | 1 | 1 |
Henshaw v. Belyeagreen2 sentences1963The Council are agreed that the Caveat should go out, and the definite rule of non-liability should be stated." (Italics added.) [8] Recognition of this reality disposes of the argument, advanced by amici curiae, that the general rule of nonliability in the situation now before us should be abandoned in order to achieve "consistency" with the so-called "rescuer" cases (e.g., Henshaw v. Belyea (1934) 220 Cal. 458, 469 [2] [ 31 P.2d 348 ]; Hymes v. Pollock (1952) 108 Cal. App.2d 536, 538 [2] [ 238 P.2d 1056 ]). 1963The Council are agreed that the Caveat should go out, and the definite rule of non-liability should be stated." (Italics added.) [8] Recognition of this reality disposes of the argument, advanced by amici curiae, that the general rule of nonliability in the situation now before us should be abandoned in order to achieve "consistency" with the so-called "rescuer" cases (e.g., Henshaw v. Belyea (1934) 220 Cal. 458, 469 [2] [ 31 P.2d 348 ]; Hymes v. Pollock (1952) 108 Cal. App.2d 536, 538 [2] [ 238 P.2d 1056 ]). | 1 | 1 |
Lockwood v. LeSuregreen2 sentences1962This presumption is stated in Estate of Sweetman, 185 Cal. 27, 28 [ 195 P. 918 ], as follows: ‘A will last seen and known to have been in the possession of the decedent, which cannot be found after his death, will be presumed to have been detroyed by him and with an intention of revoking it, since the law always presumes in favor of the innocence of an act, and any other inference would involve a finding of a wrongful or fraudulent destruction of the will by a third person. ’ ” (Estate of LeSure, 21 Cal.App.2d 73, 80 [ 68 P.2d 313 ].) “It was established beyond question that the will was last 1962This presumption is stated in Estate of Sweetman, 185 Cal. 27, 28 [ 195 P. 918 ], as follows: ‘A will last seen and known to have been in the possession of the decedent, which cannot be found after his death, will be presumed to have been detroyed by him and with an intention of revoking it, since the law always presumes in favor of the innocence of an act, and any other inference would involve a finding of a wrongful or fraudulent destruction of the will by a third person. ’ ” (Estate of LeSure, 21 Cal.App.2d 73, 80 [ 68 P.2d 313 ].) “It was established beyond question that the will was last | 1 | 1 |
Graner v. Hogsettgreen2 sentences1957(Bank of America v. Hill, 9 Cal.2d 495, 499 [ 71 P.2d 258 ]; Los Angeles Drug Co. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal.2d 71, 74 [ 63 P.2d 1124 ] ; Graner v. Hogsett, 84 Cal.App.2d 657, 661 [ 191 P.2d 497 ].) “ ‘According to the well established principles of law, where a wrongful act is both a tort and a breach of contract, the plaintiff may waive the tort and sue in contract. 1957(Bank of America v. Hill, 9 Cal.2d 495, 499 [ 71 P.2d 258 ]; Los Angeles Drug Co. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal.2d 71, 74 [ 63 P.2d 1124 ] ; Graner v. Hogsett, 84 Cal.App.2d 657, 661 [ 191 P.2d 497 ].) “ ‘According to the well established principles of law, where a wrongful act is both a tort and a breach of contract, the plaintiff may waive the tort and sue in contract. | 1 | 1 |
Los Angeles Drug Co. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1957(Bank of America v. Hill, 9 Cal.2d 495, 499 [ 71 P.2d 258 ]; Los Angeles Drug Co. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal.2d 71, 74 [ 63 P.2d 1124 ] ; Graner v. Hogsett, 84 Cal.App.2d 657, 661 [ 191 P.2d 497 ].) “ ‘According to the well established principles of law, where a wrongful act is both a tort and a breach of contract, the plaintiff may waive the tort and sue in contract. 1957(Bank of America v. Hill, 9 Cal.2d 495, 499 [ 71 P.2d 258 ]; Los Angeles Drug Co. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal.2d 71, 74 [ 63 P.2d 1124 ] ; Graner v. Hogsett, 84 Cal.App.2d 657, 661 [ 191 P.2d 497 ].) “ ‘According to the well established principles of law, where a wrongful act is both a tort and a breach of contract, the plaintiff may waive the tort and sue in contract. | 1 | 1 |
Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Hillgreen2 sentences1957(Bank of America v. Hill, 9 Cal.2d 495, 499 [ 71 P.2d 258 ]; Los Angeles Drug Co. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal.2d 71, 74 [ 63 P.2d 1124 ] ; Graner v. Hogsett, 84 Cal.App.2d 657, 661 [ 191 P.2d 497 ].) “ ‘According to the well established principles of law, where a wrongful act is both a tort and a breach of contract, the plaintiff may waive the tort and sue in contract. 1957(Bank of America v. Hill, 9 Cal.2d 495, 499 [ 71 P.2d 258 ]; Los Angeles Drug Co. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal.2d 71, 74 [ 63 P.2d 1124 ] ; Graner v. Hogsett, 84 Cal.App.2d 657, 661 [ 191 P.2d 497 ].) “ ‘According to the well established principles of law, where a wrongful act is both a tort and a breach of contract, the plaintiff may waive the tort and sue in contract. | 1 | 1 |
Estate of McNuttgreen2 sentences1949(Woodbine v. Van Horn, supra, 29 Cal.2d 95, 104 .) [7] Moreover, such determination accords with the rule that marriage settlement agreements must be strictly construed, for "it is a definite doctrine of the law that courts will not enlarge [their] language ... 'so as to deprive either spouse of such rights unless there is a clear and unmistakable intention to barter them away and to reach such conclusion the contract must not be of doubtful interpretation but must by express terms or by necessary implication, clearly so provide.' (Girard v. Girard, 29 N.M. 189 [ 221 P. 801 , 35 A.L.R. 1493 ]. 1949(Woodbine v. Van Horn, supra, 29 Cal.2d 95, 104 .) [7] Moreover, such determination accords with the rule that marriage settlement agreements must be strictly construed, for "it is a definite doctrine of the law that courts will not enlarge [their] language ... 'so as to deprive either spouse of such rights unless there is a clear and unmistakable intention to barter them away and to reach such conclusion the contract must not be of doubtful interpretation but must by express terms or by necessary implication, clearly so provide.' (Girard v. Girard, 29 N.M. 189 [ 221 P. 801 , 35 A.L.R. 1493 ]. | 1 | 1 |
| In Re City and County of San Franciscogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gorman v. Taylorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| First Church of Christ v. Gilbertgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Estate of Johnstongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Clark v. Bennettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Morgan
green
2 sentences2018The Institute states in its opening appellate brief that although it "continues to contend that all of the grounds previously stated for the unconstitutionality of the Statute are meritorious, it wishes to focus this appeal on why its provisions are so vague as to render it unconstitutional on its face." Other specified exemptions include state and federal law enforcement activities (§ 2022, subd. (c)(1) ) and sale or possession for educational or scientific purposes by bona fide educational and scientific institutions. (§ 2022, subd. (c)(5).) In addition to holding that a criminal statute mus 2018The Institute states in its opening appellate brief that although it "continues to contend that all of the grounds previously stated for the unconstitutionality of the Statute are meritorious, it wishes to focus this appeal on why its provisions are so vague as to render it unconstitutional on its face." Other specified exemptions include state and federal law enforcement activities (§ 2022, subd. (c)(1) ) and sale or possession for educational or scientific purposes by bona fide educational and scientific institutions. (§ 2022, subd. (c)(5).) In addition to holding that a criminal statute mus | 3 | 2018–2018 |
Evangelatos v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2018The Institute states in its opening appellate brief that although it "continues to contend that all of the grounds previously stated for the unconstitutionality of the Statute are meritorious, it wishes to focus this appeal on why its provisions are so vague as to render it unconstitutional on its face." Other specified exemptions include state and federal law enforcement activities (§ 2022, subd. (c)(1) ) and sale or possession for educational or scientific purposes by bona fide educational and scientific institutions. (§ 2022, subd. (c)(5).) In addition to holding that a criminal statute mus 2018The Institute states in its opening appellate brief that although it "continues to contend that all of the grounds previously stated for the unconstitutionality of the Statute are meritorious, it wishes to focus this appeal on why its provisions are so vague as to render it unconstitutional on its face." Other specified exemptions include state and federal law enforcement activities (§ 2022, subd. (c)(1) ) and sale or possession for educational or scientific purposes by bona fide educational and scientific institutions. (§ 2022, subd. (c)(5).) In addition to holding that a criminal statute mus | 3 | 2018–2018 |
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018The Institute states in its opening appellate brief that although it "continues to contend that all of the grounds previously stated for the unconstitutionality of the Statute are meritorious, it wishes to focus this appeal on why its provisions are so vague as to render it unconstitutional on its face." Other specified exemptions include state and federal law enforcement activities (§ 2022, subd. (c)(1) ) and sale or possession for educational or scientific purposes by bona fide educational and scientific institutions. (§ 2022, subd. (c)(5).) In addition to holding that a criminal statute mus 2018The Institute states in its opening appellate brief that although it "continues to contend that all of the grounds previously stated for the unconstitutionality of the Statute are meritorious, it wishes to focus this appeal on why its provisions are so vague as to render it unconstitutional on its face." Other specified exemptions include state and federal law enforcement activities (§ 2022, subd. (c)(1) ) and sale or possession for educational or scientific purposes by bona fide educational and scientific institutions. (§ 2022, subd. (c)(5).) In addition to holding that a criminal statute mus | 3 | 2018–2018 |
Johnson v. United States
green
2 sentences2018The Institute contends that the "vague in all its applications" standard is no longer good law in light of Johnson v. United States (2015) 576 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2551 , 192 L.Ed.2d 569 ( Johnson ). 2018The Institute contends that the "vague in all its applications" standard is no longer good law in light of Johnson v. United States (2015) 576 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2551 , 192 L.Ed.2d 569 ( Johnson ). | 3 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Hall
green
2 sentences2018(Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 503 .)5 5 In addition to holding that a criminal statute must provide a definite standard of conduct for the public, law enforcement, and the ascertainment of guilt, the Morgan court also said that a statute is not unconstitutional if it is vague in some of its applications, but must instead be vague in all of its applications. ( Morgan, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 605–606.) The genesis of this standard seems to lie in Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates (1982) 455 U.S. 489, 497 , which was cited for that proposition in Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 4 2018(Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 503 .)5 5 In addition to holding that a criminal statute must provide a definite standard of conduct for the public, law enforcement, and the ascertainment of guilt, the Morgan court also said that a statute is not unconstitutional if it is vague in some of its applications, but must instead be vague in all of its applications. ( Morgan, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 605–606.) The genesis of this standard seems to lie in Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates (1982) 455 U.S. 489, 497 , which was cited for that proposition in Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 4 | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Girard v. Girard
green
2 sentences1949(Woodbine v. Van Horn, supra, 29 Cal.2d 95, 104 .) [7] Moreover, such determination accords with the rule that marriage settlement agreements must be strictly construed, for "it is a definite doctrine of the law that courts will not enlarge [their] language ... 'so as to deprive either spouse of such rights unless there is a clear and unmistakable intention to barter them away and to reach such conclusion the contract must not be of doubtful interpretation but must by express terms or by necessary implication, clearly so provide.' (Girard v. Girard, 29 N.M. 189 [ 221 P. 801 , 35 A.L.R. 1493 ]. 1949(Woodbine v. Van Horn, supra, 29 Cal.2d 95, 104 .) [7] Moreover, such determination accords with the rule that marriage settlement agreements must be strictly construed, for "it is a definite doctrine of the law that courts will not enlarge [their] language ... 'so as to deprive either spouse of such rights unless there is a clear and unmistakable intention to barter them away and to reach such conclusion the contract must not be of doubtful interpretation but must by express terms or by necessary implication, clearly so provide.' (Girard v. Girard, 29 N.M. 189 [ 221 P. 801 , 35 A.L.R. 1493 ]. | 2 | 1940–1949 |
Kinoshita v. Horio
green
1 sentence2014A definite rule is necessary to reduce both the temptation to file dilatory appeals and the compulsion to file protective ones.” (Kinoshita v. Horio (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 959, 967-968 .) Because the trial court has yet to enter a final appealable judgment, we need not consider defendants’ contentions that plaintiffs have forfeited their statutory rights to file postjudgment motions for new trial and for judgment notwithstanding a verdict. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Ingram
green
1 sentence1983Bank of Arenzville (1980) 81 Ill.App.3d 199 [ 400 N.E.2d 1057, 1060 ]; International Harvester Credit v. Ingram (Tenn.App. 1981) 619 S.W.2d 134, 138 .) It should be noted that section 9504, subdivision (3) of the California code differs from Uniform Commercial Code, section 9-504, subdivision (3), in that the California Legislature in adopting the former set forth a specific time period for giving notice, while the latter requires only “reasonable notice.” The change was made in the California statute “to avoid controversy in each case as to whether the notice was reasonable by substituting a | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Spillers v. First National Bank
green
2 sentences1983Bank of Arenzville (1980) 81 Ill.App.3d 199 [ 400 N.E.2d 1057, 1060 ]; International Harvester Credit v. Ingram (Tenn.App. 1981) 619 S.W.2d 134, 138 .) It should be noted that section 9504, subdivision (3) of the California code differs from Uniform Commercial Code, section 9-504, subdivision (3), in that the California Legislature in adopting the former set forth a specific time period for giving notice, while the latter requires only “reasonable notice.” The change was made in the California statute “to avoid controversy in each case as to whether the notice was reasonable by substituting a 1983Bank of Arenzville (1980) 81 Ill.App.3d 199 [ 400 N.E.2d 1057, 1060 ]; International Harvester Credit v. Ingram (Tenn.App. 1981) 619 S.W.2d 134, 138 .) It should be noted that section 9504, subdivision (3) of the California code differs from Uniform Commercial Code, section 9-504, subdivision (3), in that the California Legislature in adopting the former set forth a specific time period for giving notice, while the latter requires only “reasonable notice.” The change was made in the California statute “to avoid controversy in each case as to whether the notice was reasonable by substituting a | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Campbell v. TALLADEGA CITY. BD. OF ED.
green
2 sentences1982Bd. of Ed., supra, 518 F.Supp. 47 , at p. 52), and the case law has not settled upon a definite standard. 1982Bd. of Ed., supra, 518 F.Supp. 47 , at p. 52), and the case law has not settled upon a definite standard. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Reimel
green
2 sentences1971The same opinion notes, “The cost justification alluded to by plaintiffs could not be the obvious one that it is cheaper to sell in larger quantities, as section 4357 itself recognizes this saving, clearly defining the director’s authority in permissive terms only and prescribing a definite standard for the discount’s application.’’ (Id., second italics added.) Similarly in Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Reimel, supra, 69 Cal.2d 172 the court, in ruling that the rules governing the sale of beer could deal with the subject of quantity *446 discounts without any express reference thereto in the governing 1971The same opinion notes, “The cost justification alluded to by plaintiffs could not be the obvious one that it is cheaper to sell in larger quantities, as section 4357 itself recognizes this saving, clearly defining the director’s authority in permissive terms only and prescribing a definite standard for the discount’s application.’’ (Id., second italics added.) Similarly in Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Reimel, supra, 69 Cal.2d 172 the court, in ruling that the rules governing the sale of beer could deal with the subject of quantity *446 discounts without any express reference thereto in the governing | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Bowman v. Williams
green
2 sentences1963The answer must be reached by balancing the social interests involved in order to ascertain how far defendant's duty and plaintiff's right may justly and expediently be extended.' ( Waube v. Warrington (1935) 216 Wis. 603 [ 258 N.W. 497, 501 ].) Cf. Resavage v. Davies (1952) 199 Md. 479 [ 86 A.2d 879 ], limiting, and in part, rejecting the earlier Maryland case of Bowman v. Williams (1933) 164 Md. 397 [ 165 A. 182 ], and citing Waube ; but see the dissenting opinion of Judge Markell in Resavage." [8] "The court, in King v. Phillips [1953] 1 Q.B. 429, dismissed an appeal from a ruling against a 1963The answer must be reached by balancing the social interests involved in order to ascertain how far defendant's duty and plaintiff's right may justly and expediently be extended.' ( Waube v. Warrington (1935) 216 Wis. 603 [ 258 N.W. 497, 501 ].) Cf. Resavage v. Davies (1952) 199 Md. 479 [ 86 A.2d 879 ], limiting, and in part, rejecting the earlier Maryland case of Bowman v. Williams (1933) 164 Md. 397 [ 165 A. 182 ], and citing Waube ; but see the dissenting opinion of Judge Markell in Resavage." [8] "The court, in King v. Phillips [1953] 1 Q.B. 429, dismissed an appeal from a ruling against a | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Waube v. Warrington
green
2 sentences1963The answer must be reached by balancing the social interests involved in order to ascertain how far defendant's duty and plaintiff's right may justly and expediently be extended.' ( Waube v. Warrington (1935) 216 Wis. 603 [ 258 N.W. 497, 501 ].) Cf. Resavage v. Davies (1952) 199 Md. 479 [ 86 A.2d 879 ], limiting, and in part, rejecting the earlier Maryland case of Bowman v. Williams (1933) 164 Md. 397 [ 165 A. 182 ], and citing Waube ; but see the dissenting opinion of Judge Markell in Resavage." [8] "The court, in King v. Phillips [1953] 1 Q.B. 429, dismissed an appeal from a ruling against a 1963The answer must be reached by balancing the social interests involved in order to ascertain how far defendant's duty and plaintiff's right may justly and expediently be extended.' ( Waube v. Warrington (1935) 216 Wis. 603 [ 258 N.W. 497, 501 ].) Cf. Resavage v. Davies (1952) 199 Md. 479 [ 86 A.2d 879 ], limiting, and in part, rejecting the earlier Maryland case of Bowman v. Williams (1933) 164 Md. 397 [ 165 A. 182 ], and citing Waube ; but see the dissenting opinion of Judge Markell in Resavage." [8] "The court, in King v. Phillips [1953] 1 Q.B. 429, dismissed an appeal from a ruling against a | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Resavage v. Davies
green
2 sentences1963The answer must be reached by balancing the social interests involved in order to ascertain how far defendant's duty and plaintiff's right may justly and expediently be extended.' ( Waube v. Warrington (1935) 216 Wis. 603 [ 258 N.W. 497, 501 ].) Cf. Resavage v. Davies (1952) 199 Md. 479 [ 86 A.2d 879 ], limiting, and in part, rejecting the earlier Maryland case of Bowman v. Williams (1933) 164 Md. 397 [ 165 A. 182 ], and citing Waube ; but see the dissenting opinion of Judge Markell in Resavage." [8] "The court, in King v. Phillips [1953] 1 Q.B. 429, dismissed an appeal from a ruling against a 1963The answer must be reached by balancing the social interests involved in order to ascertain how far defendant's duty and plaintiff's right may justly and expediently be extended.' ( Waube v. Warrington (1935) 216 Wis. 603 [ 258 N.W. 497, 501 ].) Cf. Resavage v. Davies (1952) 199 Md. 479 [ 86 A.2d 879 ], limiting, and in part, rejecting the earlier Maryland case of Bowman v. Williams (1933) 164 Md. 397 [ 165 A. 182 ], and citing Waube ; but see the dissenting opinion of Judge Markell in Resavage." [8] "The court, in King v. Phillips [1953] 1 Q.B. 429, dismissed an appeal from a ruling against a | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Holderby v. International Union of Operating Engineers
green
2 sentences1956Whatever confusion there may have been in this state as to the right of a trade union member to appeal to the courts for redress from his union’s action, without first exhausting all remedies provided by its constitution and by-laws, such confusion has been resolved and a definite rule established in the recently decided Holderby v. International Union etc. Engineers, 45 Cal.2d 843 [ 291 P.2d 463 ]. 1956Whatever confusion there may have been in this state as to the right of a trade union member to appeal to the courts for redress from his union’s action, without first exhausting all remedies provided by its constitution and by-laws, such confusion has been resolved and a definite rule established in the recently decided Holderby v. International Union etc. Engineers, 45 Cal.2d 843 [ 291 P.2d 463 ]. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Swift v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1952In final argument Contestants shall open and close. ’ ’ The procedure agreed upon by the parties is substantially in accord with that prescribed by our Supreme Court in the very recent case of Swift v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.2d 358, at page 364 [ 247 P.2d 6 ], as follows: “In the interest of establishing a definite rule of procedure to be followed under such circumstances, we believe that it is appropriate for this court to declare that when a will is contested before probate and either party demands a jury trial of any issue as to which the right to a jury trial exists (Prob. 1952In final argument Contestants shall open and close. ’ ’ The procedure agreed upon by the parties is substantially in accord with that prescribed by our Supreme Court in the very recent case of Swift v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.2d 358, at page 364 [ 247 P.2d 6 ], as follows: “In the interest of establishing a definite rule of procedure to be followed under such circumstances, we believe that it is appropriate for this court to declare that when a will is contested before probate and either party demands a jury trial of any issue as to which the right to a jury trial exists (Prob. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Woodbine v. Van Horn
green
2 sentences1949(Woodbine v. Van Horn, supra, 29 Cal.2d 95, 104 .) [7] Moreover, such determination accords with the rule that marriage settlement agreements must be strictly construed, for "it is a definite doctrine of the law that courts will not enlarge [their] language ... 'so as to deprive either spouse of such rights unless there is a clear and unmistakable intention to barter them away and to reach such conclusion the contract must not be of doubtful interpretation but must by express terms or by necessary implication, clearly so provide.' (Girard v. Girard, 29 N.M. 189 [ 221 P. 801 , 35 A.L.R. 1493 ]. 1949(Wood bine v. Van Horn, supra, 29 Cal.2d 95, 104 .) Moreover, such determination accords with the rule that marriage settlement agreements must be strictly construed, for “it is a definite doctrine of the law that courts will not enlarge [their] language ... ‘so as to deprive either spouse of such rights unless there is a clear and unmistakable intention to barter them away and to reach such conclusion the contract must not be of doubtful interpretation but must by express terms or by necessary implication, clearly so provide. ’ (Girard v. Girard, 29 N.M. 189 [ 221 P. 801 , 35 A.L.R. 1493 ].)” | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Linforth v. S.F. Gas and Electric Co.
green
2 sentences1947(Linforth, v. S. F. Gas & Electric Co., 156 Cal. 58 [ 103 P. 320 , 19 Ann.Cas. 1230] ; De Fries v. Market St. 1947(Linforth, v. S. F. Gas & Electric Co., 156 Cal. 58 [ 103 P. 320 , 19 Ann.Cas. 1230] ; De Fries v. Market St. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| People v. Mayne green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| People v. Walker green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Allan green | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Mooney v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Marini v. Southern Pacific Co. neutral | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| People v. Sánchez Bonilla neutral | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Brecheen v. Riley green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Riley v. Chambers green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Miller & Lux Inc. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Herbert v. Southern Pacific Co. green | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.