18 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1895–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railroadgreen2 sentences1963Co. 244 Minn. 1, 27 , 68 N. W. (2d) 873, 889 , we said that “by lack of a definite standard we do not forfeit our recourse to common sense and social practicality in given cases” and that judicial care must be exercised to prevent an unreasonable financial burden to be shifted out of sympathy for the plaintiff. 1963Co. 244 Minn. 1, 27 , 68 N. W. (2d) 873, 889 , we said that “by lack of a definite standard we do not forfeit our recourse to common sense and social practicality in given cases” and that judicial care must be exercised to prevent an unreasonable financial burden to be shifted out of sympathy for the plaintiff. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Graygreen2 sentences2008“The U.S. Supreme Court has not adopted a definite test for determining when exigent circumstances exist.” State v. Gray, 456 N.W.2d 251, 256 (Minn.1990). 2008"The U.S. Supreme Court has not adopted a definite test for determining when exigent circumstances exist." State v. Gray, 456 N.W.2d 251, 256 (Minn.1990). | 1 | 1 |
Cornfeldt v. Tongengreen2 sentences1995When we first recognized the negligent nondisclosure claim, in Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 701 (Minn.1977) (Cornfeldt I), we declined to provide a definite standard for the scope of risks subject to disclosure. 1995When we first recognized the negligent nondisclosure claim, in Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 701 (Minn.1977) ( Cornfeldt I ), we declined to provide a definite standard for the scope of risks subject to disclosure. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lindstrom v. County of Ramsey
neutral
2 sentences1953Lindstrom v. County of Ramsey, 136 Minn. 46 , 161 N. W. 222 ; Newman v. County of St. 1953Lindstrom v. County of Ramsey, 136 Minn. 46 , 161 N. W. 222 ; Newman v. County of St. | 2 | 1953–1953 |
Equity Trust Co. Custodian FBO Heather Eisenmenger Ira v. Cole
green
1 sentence2018Under Equity Trust , a receiver is able to pierce the corporate veil and to exercise power over shareholders to collect receivership property. 766 N.W.2d at 342 ; see also Minn. Stat. § 576.23 ("The court has the exclusive authority to direct the receiver and the authority over all receivership property wherever located, including, without limitation, authority to determine all controversies relating to ... receivership property, and all matters otherwise arising in or relating to the receivership, the receivership property, [or] the exercise of the receiver's powers."); Minn. Hotel Co. v. ROS | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Heil v. Standard Chemical Manufacturing Co.
green
2 sentences1999Id. at 326-27 , 223 N.W.2d at 43 . 1999Id. at 326-27 , 223 N.W.2d at 43 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State, Department of Public Safety v. Kneisl
green
2 sentences1984State, Department of Public Safety v. Kneisl, 312 Minn. 281 , 251 N.W.2d 645 (1977), carved out the only definite exception to this telephone/vindication general rule. 1984State, Department of Public Safety v. Kneisl, 312 Minn. 281 , 251 N.W.2d 645 (1977), carved out the only definite exception to this telephone/vindication general rule. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Town of Wells v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences1979Town of Wells v. Sullivan, 125 Minn. 353 , 147 N.W. 244 (1914). 1979Town of Wells v. Sullivan, 125 Minn. 353 , 147 N.W. 244 (1914). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Barrett v. Smith
green
2 sentences1933In Barrett v. Smith, 183 Minn. 431, 440 , 237 N. W. 15, 19 , it was said: “A strict and definite rule is needed. 1933In Barrett v. Smith, 183 Minn. 431, 440 , 237 N. W. 15, 19 , it was said: “A strict and definite rule is needed. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Herron v. Coolsaet Bros.
green
2 sentences1931Herron v. Coolsaet Bros. 158 Minn. 522 , 198 N. W. 134 ; Bosel v. Henderson Holding Co. 167 Minn. 72 , 208 N. W. 421 ; Angell v. White Eagle O. & R. 1931Herron v. Coolsaet Bros. 158 Minn. 522 , 198 N. W. 134 ; Bosel v. Henderson Holding Co. 167 Minn. 72 , 208 N. W. 421 ; Angell v. White Eagle O. & R. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Bosel v. Henderson Holding Co.
neutral
2 sentences1931Herron v. Coolsaet Bros. 158 Minn. 522 , 198 N. W. 134 ; Bosel v. Henderson Holding Co. 167 Minn. 72 , 208 N. W. 421 ; Angell v. White Eagle O. & R. 1931Herron v. Coolsaet Bros. 158 Minn. 522 , 198 N. W. 134 ; Bosel v. Henderson Holding Co. 167 Minn. 72 , 208 N. W. 421 ; Angell v. White Eagle O. & R. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Rideout v. Mars
green
2 sentences1925Rideout v. Mars, 99 Miss. 199 , 54 South. 801 , 35 L. 1925Rideout v. Mars, 99 Miss. 199 , 54 South. 801 , 35 L. | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Voigtmann v. Wilmington Trust Building Corp.
green
1 sentence1915Corp. 78 Atl. 920 (Del.) is opposed to this conclusion, and the authorities in support of it are not entirely satisfactory, but a definite rule is better than one which leaves the question of what is a “reasonable time” to be litigated in each case. | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Smyth v. City of Bangor
green
1 sentence1908A former statute had required the plaintiff to show that the town had “reasonable notice of the defect,” and by the amendment “the legislature manifestly designed to prescribe a more definite requirement respecting notice and impose a more rigorous limitation upon the traveler’s right to recover for an injury received.” See also Rogers v. Inhabitants, 74 Me. 144 ; Smyth v. City, 72 Me. 249 ; Gurney v. Inhabitants, 93 Me. 360 , 45 Atl. 310 . | 1 | 1908–1908 |
Rogers v. Inhabitants of Shirley
green
1 sentence1908A former statute had required the plaintiff to show that the town had “reasonable notice of the defect,” and by the amendment “the legislature manifestly designed to prescribe a more definite requirement respecting notice and impose a more rigorous limitation upon the traveler’s right to recover for an injury received.” See also Rogers v. Inhabitants, 74 Me. 144 ; Smyth v. City, 72 Me. 249 ; Gurney v. Inhabitants, 93 Me. 360 , 45 Atl. 310 . | 1 | 1908–1908 |
Gurney v. Inhabitants of Rockport
neutral
2 sentences1908A former statute had required the plaintiff to show that the town had “reasonable notice of the defect,” and by the amendment “the legislature manifestly designed to prescribe a more definite requirement respecting notice and impose a more rigorous limitation upon the traveler’s right to recover for an injury received.” See also Rogers v. Inhabitants, 74 Me. 144 ; Smyth v. City, 72 Me. 249 ; Gurney v. Inhabitants, 93 Me. 360 , 45 Atl. 310 . 1908A former statute had required the plaintiff to show that the town had “reasonable notice of the defect,” and by the amendment “the legislature manifestly designed to prescribe a more definite requirement respecting notice and impose a more rigorous limitation upon the traveler’s right to recover for an injury received.” See also Rogers v. Inhabitants, 74 Me. 144 ; Smyth v. City, 72 Me. 249 ; Gurney v. Inhabitants, 93 Me. 360 , 45 Atl. 310 . | 1 | 1908–1908 |
Adams v. Scott
green
1 sentence1895In passing on the question, the courts have not, as a rule, gone further than was necessary for the purpose of deciding the particular case under consideration, and hence their decisions do not always lay down a definite rule of universal application; but we have found no case where a court has placed a literal and unlimited construction upon the broad language of statutes of garnishment, except Adams v. Scott, 104 Mass. 164 . | 1 | 1895–1895 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.