definite rule in Alabama

1974In the case of Kaplan v. Coleman, 180 Ala. 267 , 60 So. 885, 886 , Mr. Justice Somerville, speaking for this court, says: ‘A plea in abatement because of another suit pending bears a strong analogy to a plea of res judicata, and a fair test of its sufficiency is whether a final judgment or decree in the prior suit would be conclusive between the parties and operate as a bar to the second.’ ” Bell v. Jones, 223 Ala. 497, 498 , 136 So. 826, 827 .

1974In the case of Kaplan v. Coleman, 180 Ala. 267 , 60 So. 885, 886 , Mr. Justice Somerville, speaking for this court, says: ‘A plea in abatement because of another suit pending bears a strong analogy to a plea of res judicata, and a fair test of its sufficiency is whether a final judgment or decree in the prior suit would be conclusive between the parties and operate as a bar to the second.’ ” Bell v. Jones, 223 Ala. 497, 498 , 136 So. 826, 827 .

2007In Fenderson v. Fenderson , 454 Pa.Super. 412 , 685 A.2d 600 (1996), a case with facts very similar to those in the instant case, three siblings contributed to the purchase price of land, but title was taken in the name of only two of them because the third sibling, Bryan Fenderson, had a personal-injury lawsuit pending against him.

2007In Fenderson v. Fenderson , 454 Pa.Super. 412 , 685 A.2d 600 (1996), a case with facts very similar to those in the instant case, three siblings contributed to the purchase price of land, but title was taken in the name of only two of them because the third sibling, Bryan Fenderson, had a personal-injury lawsuit pending against him.

2002This Court addressed a similar situation in Hill v. Chambless, 757 So.2d 409 (Ala.2000).

1981Our quotation from Collins v. Alabama Power Company, 214 Ala. 643 , 108 So. 868 (1926), caused the trial judge to give the jury only one definition of “danger trees”: “trees which by reason of size or condition and contiguity to the Alabama Power Company right-of-way involved a concrete threat of injury to the Alabama Power Company transmission lines.” In effect, the instructions given the jury and its verdict in response changed this to size and condition.

1981Our quotation from Collins v. Alabama Power Company, 214 Ala. 643 , 108 So. 868 (1926), caused the trial judge to give the jury only one definition of “danger trees”: “trees which by reason of size or condition and contiguity to the Alabama Power Company right-of-way involved a concrete threat of injury to the Alabama Power Company transmission lines.” In effect, the instructions given the jury and its verdict in response changed this to size and condition.

1974In the case of Kaplan v. Coleman, 180 Ala. 267 , 60 So. 885, 886 , Mr. Justice Somerville, speaking for this court, says: ‘A plea in abatement because of another suit pending bears a strong analogy to a plea of res judicata, and a fair test of its sufficiency is whether a final judgment or decree in the prior suit would be conclusive between the parties and operate as a bar to the second.’ ” Bell v. Jones, 223 Ala. 497, 498 , 136 So. 826, 827 .

1974In the case of Kaplan v. Coleman, 180 Ala. 267 , 60 So. 885, 886 , Mr. Justice Somerville, speaking for this court, says: ‘A plea in abatement because of another suit pending bears a strong analogy to a plea of res judicata, and a fair test of its sufficiency is whether a final judgment or decree in the prior suit would be conclusive between the parties and operate as a bar to the second.’ ” Bell v. Jones, 223 Ala. 497, 498 , 136 So. 826, 827 .

1972In State v. Hooten, Fla.App., 122 So.2d 336 , we find the following pertinent1 language : “. . . [Statutory language 1 which conveys a definite warning as to proscribed conduct, when measured by common understanding and practices, satisfies due process of law.” We deem a person of ordinary intelligence and understanding as being apprised and given fair notice that to unlawfully sell the drug in question — Phencyclidine Hydrochloride — constitutes a criminal offense under this statute.

1934Rideout v. Mars, 99 Miss. 199 , 54 So. 801 , 35 L.

1934Rideout v. Mars, 99 Miss. 199 , 54 So. 801 , 35 L.

1931In the case of Kaplan v. Coleman, 180 Ala. 267 , 60 So. 885, 886 , Mr. Justice Somerville, speaking for this court, says: “A plea in abatement because of another suit pending bears a strong analogy to a plea of res judicata, and a fair test of its sufficiency is whether a final judgment or decree in the prior suit would be conclusive between the parties and operate as a bar to the second.” This rule was again reaffirmed in Harris v. Town of Tarrant City, 221 Ala. 558, 559 , 130 So. 83, 84 , saying: “The test is sometimes said to be whether a final judgment in the prior suit would be conclusive

1931In the case of Kaplan v. Coleman, 180 Ala. 267 , 60 So. 885, 886 , Mr. Justice Somerville, speaking for this court, says: “A plea in abatement because of another suit pending bears a strong analogy to a plea of res judicata, and a fair test of its sufficiency is whether a final judgment or decree in the prior suit would be conclusive between the parties and operate as a bar to the second.” This rule was again reaffirmed in Harris v. Town of Tarrant City, 221 Ala. 558, 559 , 130 So. 83, 84 , saying: “The test is sometimes said to be whether a final judgment in the prior suit would be conclusive

1891However, to bring it within the mischief which the statute proposes to suppress, it must partake of publicity to some extent, a publicity defined by the qualifying words, “ where people resort.” The only definite rule established by our decisions is, that parties going once to an out-house, for the purpose of playing cards, does not, in the absence of proof that they or other persons had gone before, for such or any other purpose, constitute such house an out-house where people resort, within the meaning of the statute. —Cain v. State, 30 Ala. 534 .