definite rule in Georgia

1992The best evidence rule in this context is therefore not one which applies only in the absence of “any evidence” or slight information, and it is not a rule which applies only if no one has “opened the door,” (see Mincey, supra), but it applies in the absence of a definite waiver of the requirement to prove the fact by the “best evidence.” See O’Toole, supra. In this case the State’s attorney asked the witness: “You were just sentenced on forgery cases, is that right?” and “When you were sentenced did anybody from my office . . . say anything to you about testifying at a trial?” This questionin

1991Justice Bell cited his own opinion in State v. Mulkey, 252 Ga. 201, 204 , 312 S.E.2d 601 (1984) in Wilkins v. Dept. of Human Resources, 255 Ga. 230, 232 , 337 S.E.2d 20 (1985) when he stated: "In construing statutes we are to look for the intent of the General Assembly and to construe them so as not to result in unreasonable consequences, but to square with common sense and sound reasoning." Additionally this Court in construing the shoplifting statute, OCGA § 16-8-14 stated in Watts v. State, supra, 224 Ga. at 598 , 163 S.E.2d 695 that the statute "conveys a definite warning as to the conduct

1991Justice Bell cited his own opinion in State v. Mulkey, 252 Ga. 201, 204 , 312 S.E.2d 601 (1984) in Wilkins v. Dept. of Human Resources, 255 Ga. 230, 232 , 337 S.E.2d 20 (1985) when he stated: "In construing statutes we are to look for the intent of the General Assembly and to construe them so as not to result in unreasonable consequences, but to square with common sense and sound reasoning." Additionally this Court in construing the shoplifting statute, OCGA § 16-8-14 stated in Watts v. State, supra, 224 Ga. at 598 , 163 S.E.2d 695 that the statute "conveys a definite warning as to the conduct

1991Justice Bell cited his own opinion in State v. Mulkey, 252 Ga. 201, 204 , 312 S.E.2d 601 (1984) in Wilkins v. Dept. of Human Resources, 255 Ga. 230, 232 , 337 S.E.2d 20 (1985) when he stated: "In construing statutes we are to look for the intent of the General Assembly and to construe them so as not to result in unreasonable consequences, but to square with common sense and sound reasoning." Additionally this Court in construing the shoplifting statute, OCGA § 16-8-14 stated in Watts v. State, supra, 224 Ga. at 598 , 163 S.E.2d 695 that the statute "conveys a definite warning as to the conduct

1991Justice Bell cited his own opinion in State v. Mulkey, 252 Ga. 201, 204 , 312 S.E.2d 601 (1984) in Wilkins v. Dept. of Human Resources, 255 Ga. 230, 232 , 337 S.E.2d 20 (1985) when he stated: "In construing statutes we are to look for the intent of the General Assembly and to construe them so as not to result in unreasonable consequences, but to square with common sense and sound reasoning." Additionally this Court in construing the shoplifting statute, OCGA § 16-8-14 stated in Watts v. State, supra, 224 Ga. at 598 , 163 S.E.2d 695 that the statute "conveys a definite warning as to the conduct

1991Justice Bell cited his own opinion in State v. Mulkey, 252 Ga. 201, 204 , 312 S.E.2d 601 (1984) in Wilkins v. Dept. of Human Resources, 255 Ga. 230, 232 , 337 S.E.2d 20 (1985) when he stated: "In construing statutes we are to look for the intent of the General Assembly and to construe them so as not to result in unreasonable consequences, but to square with common sense and sound reasoning." Additionally this Court in construing the shoplifting statute, OCGA § 16-8-14 stated in Watts v. State, supra, 224 Ga. at 598 , 163 S.E.2d 695 that the statute "conveys a definite warning as to the conduct

1991Justice Bell cited his own opinion in State v. Mulkey, 252 Ga. 201, 204 , 312 S.E.2d 601 (1984) in Wilkins v. Dept. of Human Resources, 255 Ga. 230, 232 , 337 S.E.2d 20 (1985) when he stated: "In construing statutes we are to look for the intent of the General Assembly and to construe them so as not to result in unreasonable consequences, but to square with common sense and sound reasoning." Additionally this Court in construing the shoplifting statute, OCGA § 16-8-14 stated in Watts v. State, supra, 224 Ga. at 598 , 163 S.E.2d 695 that the statute "conveys a definite warning as to the conduct

1977I do not know that a definite rule can be gleaned from the decisions....” Nimmons v. City of LaGrange, 94 Ga. App. 511 ( 95 SE2d 314 ) (1956) (Felton, C.

1977I do not know that a definite rule can be gleaned from the decisions....” Nimmons v. City of LaGrange, 94 Ga. App. 511 ( 95 SE2d 314 ) (1956) (Felton, C.

1961It substantially covers those elements which might be considered in determining the credibility of witnesses, and there is no indication of any request to charge more specifically in regard to what could be considered in relation to the credibility of witnesses." Accord Edge v. Dorsey, 78 Ga. App. 70 ( 50 SE2d 227 ).

1961It substantially covers those elements which might be considered in determining the credibility of witnesses, and there is no indication of any request to charge more specifically in regard to what could be considered in relation to the credibility of witnesses." Accord Edge v. Dorsey, 78 Ga. App. 70 ( 50 SE2d 227 ).

1959See Code (Ann.) § 6-901 (Ga. L. 1957, pp. 224, 232); Smith v. State, 125 Ga. 300 ( 54 S. E. 124 ); Pitts v. State, 197 Ga. 317 ( 28 S. E. 2d 864 ); Elliott v. Robinson, 198 Ga. 811 (6) ( 33 S. E. 2d 95 ); Ehrlich v. Mills, 203 Ga. 600 (3) (48 S. E. 2d *53 107).

1959See Code (Ann.) § 6-901 (Ga. L. 1957, pp. 224, 232); Smith v. State, 125 Ga. 300 ( 54 S. E. 124 ); Pitts v. State, 197 Ga. 317 ( 28 S. E. 2d 864 ); Elliott v. Robinson, 198 Ga. 811 (6) ( 33 S. E. 2d 95 ); Ehrlich v. Mills, 203 Ga. 600 (3) (48 S. E. 2d *53 107).

1959See Code (Ann.) § 6-901 (Ga. L. 1957, pp. 224, 232); Smith v. State, 125 Ga. 300 ( 54 S. E. 124 ); Pitts v. State, 197 Ga. 317 ( 28 S. E. 2d 864 ); Elliott v. Robinson, 198 Ga. 811 (6) ( 33 S. E. 2d 95 ); Ehrlich v. Mills, 203 Ga. 600 (3) (48 S. E. 2d *53 107).

1959See Code (Ann.) § 6-901 (Ga. L. 1957, pp. 224, 232); Smith v. State, 125 Ga. 300 ( 54 S. E. 124 ); Pitts v. State, 197 Ga. 317 ( 28 S. E. 2d 864 ); Elliott v. Robinson, 198 Ga. 811 (6) ( 33 S. E. 2d 95 ); Ehrlich v. Mills, 203 Ga. 600 (3) (48 S. E. 2d *53 107).

1959See Code (Ann.) § 6-901 (Ga. L. 1957, pp. 224, 232); Smith v. State, 125 Ga. 300 ( 54 S. E. 124 ); Pitts v. State, 197 Ga. 317 ( 28 S. E. 2d 864 ); Elliott v. Robinson, 198 Ga. 811 (6) ( 33 S. E. 2d 95 ); Ehrlich v. Mills, 203 Ga. 600 (3) (48 S. E. 2d *53 107).

1959See Code (Ann.) § 6-901 (Ga. L. 1957, pp. 224, 232); Smith v. State, 125 Ga. 300 ( 54 S. E. 124 ); Pitts v. State, 197 Ga. 317 ( 28 S. E. 2d 864 ); Elliott v. Robinson, 198 Ga. 811 (6) ( 33 S. E. 2d 95 ); Ehrlich v. Mills, 203 Ga. 600 (3) (48 S. E. 2d *53 107).

1959See Code (Ann.) § 6-901 (Ga. L. 1957, pp. 224, 232); Smith v. State, 125 Ga. 300 ( 54 S. E. 124 ); Pitts v. State, 197 Ga. 317 ( 28 S. E. 2d 864 ); Elliott v. Robinson, 198 Ga. 811 (6) ( 33 S. E. 2d 95 ); Ehrlich v. Mills, 203 Ga. 600 (3) (48 S. E. 2d *53 107).

1941On questions similar to the one that confronts us in this case we find frequently quoted the following language by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller in Riddle v. Whitehill, 135 U. S. 621 (10 Sup. Ct. 924, 34 L. ed. 282) : “We are not prepared to decide that there is a definite rule of law that statutes of limitation commence to run immediately upon the dissolution of a partnership, irrespective of the circumstances of the particular case.

1940Eeducing this general statement to a more definite rule, we may say that, generally speaking, all persons having any material interest, however slight, in the result of the litigation are proper parties respondent to an application for a writ of mandamus; whereas, when a person is shown by the petition in a proceeding for mandamus to have a legal interest in the right or duty sought to be enforced by the writ, and it also appears that the rights of such person will be collaterally determined by the judgment if rendered as prayed in the petition, the cause will not ordinarily be adjudicated unt

1940Eeducing this general statement to a more definite rule, we may say that, generally speaking, all persons having any material interest, however slight, in the result of the litigation are proper parties respondent to an application for a writ of mandamus; whereas, when a person is shown by the petition in a proceeding for mandamus to have a legal interest in the right or duty sought to be enforced by the writ, and it also appears that the rights of such person will be collaterally determined by the judgment if rendered as prayed in the petition, the cause will not ordinarily be adjudicated unt

1940Eeducing this general statement to a more definite rule, we may say that, generally speaking, all persons having any material interest, however slight, in the result of the litigation are proper parties respondent to an application for a writ of mandamus; whereas, when a person is shown by the petition in a proceeding for mandamus to have a legal interest in the right or duty sought to be enforced by the writ, and it also appears that the rights of such person will be collaterally determined by the judgment if rendered as prayed in the petition, the cause will not ordinarily be adjudicated unt

1940Eeducing this general statement to a more definite rule, we may say that, generally speaking, all persons having any material interest, however slight, in the result of the litigation are proper parties respondent to an application for a writ of mandamus; whereas, when a person is shown by the petition in a proceeding for mandamus to have a legal interest in the right or duty sought to be enforced by the writ, and it also appears that the rights of such person will be collaterally determined by the judgment if rendered as prayed in the petition, the cause will not ordinarily be adjudicated unt

1904It is obvious that the amendment changed neither the particular right of the plaintiff, nor the definite violation of such right, as alleged in the original petition. '“ No new and distinct cause of action is added to a petition by an amendment which contains additional matter descriptive of the same wrong pleaded in the original petition, and which does not plead any other or different wrong.” Ibid.

1904It is obvious that the amendment changed neither the particular right of the plaintiff, nor the definite violation of such right, as alleged in the original petition. '“ No new and distinct cause of action is added to a petition by an amendment which contains additional matter descriptive of the same wrong pleaded in the original petition, and which does not plead any other or different wrong.” Ibid.