definite standard in Texas

2023Res. & Conservation, 78 P.3d 857, 875 (Mont. 2003) (noting the lack of “a definite standard by which to calculate compensation for mental pain and suffering”); Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 872 (Mo. 1993) (stating that a jury has “virtually unfettered” discretion to award damages as long as they are within the “large range between the damage extremes of inadequacy and excessiveness” (quoting Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., 693 S.W.2d 83, 98 (Mo. 1985))); Vajda v. Tusla, 572 A.2d 998, 1003 (Conn. 1990) (“Not only are damages for pain and suffering peculiarly for the trier of

2023Res. & Conservation, 78 P.3d 857, 875 (Mont. 2003) (noting the lack of “a definite standard by which to calculate compensation for mental pain and suffering”); Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 872 (Mo. 1993) (stating that a jury has “virtually unfettered” discretion to award damages as long as they are within the “large range between the damage extremes of inadequacy and excessiveness” (quoting Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., 693 S.W.2d 83, 98 (Mo. 1985))); Vajda v. Tusla, 572 A.2d 998, 1003 (Conn. 1990) (“Not only are damages for pain and suffering peculiarly for the trier of

2023Res. & Conservation, 78 P.3d 857, 875 (Mont. 2003) (noting the lack of “a definite standard by which to calculate compensation for mental pain and suffering”); Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 872 (Mo. 1993) (stating that a jury has “virtually unfettered” discretion to award damages as long as they are within the “large range between the damage extremes of inadequacy and excessiveness” (quoting Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., 693 S.W.2d 83, 98 (Mo. 1985))); Vajda v. Tusla, 572 A.2d 998, 1003 (Conn. 1990) (“Not only are damages for pain and suffering peculiarly for the trier of

2023Res. & Conservation, 78 P.3d 857, 875 (Mont. 2003) (noting the lack of “a definite standard by which to calculate compensation for mental pain and suffering”); Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 872 (Mo. 1993) (stating that a jury has “virtually unfettered” discretion to award damages as long as they are within the “large range between the damage extremes of inadequacy and excessiveness” (quoting Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., 693 S.W.2d 83, 98 (Mo. 1985))); Vajda v. Tusla, 572 A.2d 998, 1003 (Conn. 1990) (“Not only are damages for pain and suffering peculiarly for the trier of

2023Res. & Conservation, 78 P.3d 857, 875 (Mont. 2003) (noting the lack of “a definite standard by which to calculate compensation for mental pain and suffering”); Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 872 (Mo. 1993) (stating that a jury has “virtually unfettered” discretion to award damages as long as they are within the “large range between the damage extremes of inadequacy and excessiveness” (quoting Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., 693 S.W.2d 83, 98 (Mo. 1985))); Vajda v. Tusla, 572 A.2d 998, 1003 (Conn. 1990) (“Not only are damages for pain and suffering peculiarly for the trier of

2023Res. & Conservation, 78 P.3d 857, 875 (Mont. 2003) (noting the lack of “a definite standard by which to calculate compensation for mental pain and suffering”); Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 872 (Mo. 1993) (stating that a jury has “virtually unfettered” discretion to award damages as long as they are within the “large range between the damage extremes of inadequacy and excessiveness” (quoting Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., 693 S.W.2d 83, 98 (Mo. 1985))); Vajda v. Tusla, 572 A.2d 998, 1003 (Conn. 1990) (“Not only are damages for pain and suffering peculiarly for the trier of

2023Res. & Conservation, 78 P.3d 857, 875 (Mont. 2003) (noting the lack of “a definite standard by which to calculate compensation for mental pain and suffering”); Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 872 (Mo. 1993) (stating that a jury has “virtually unfettered” discretion to award damages as long as they are within the “large range between the damage extremes of inadequacy and excessiveness” (quoting Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., 693 S.W.2d 83, 98 (Mo. 1985))); Vajda v. Tusla, 572 A.2d 998, 1003 (Conn. 1990) (“Not only are damages for pain and suffering peculiarly for the trier of

2023Res. & Conservation, 78 P.3d 857, 875 (Mont. 2003) (noting the lack of “a definite standard by which to calculate compensation for mental pain and suffering”); Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 872 (Mo. 1993) (stating that a jury has “virtually unfettered” discretion to award damages as long as they are within the “large range between the damage extremes of inadequacy and excessiveness” (quoting Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., 693 S.W.2d 83, 98 (Mo. 1985))); Vajda v. Tusla, 572 A.2d 998, 1003 (Conn. 1990) (“Not only are damages for pain and suffering peculiarly for the trier of

2023Res. & Conservation, 78 P.3d 857, 875 (Mont. 2003) (noting the lack of “a definite standard by which to calculate compensation for mental pain and suffering”); Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 872 (Mo. 1993) (stating that a jury has “virtually unfettered” discretion to award damages as long as they are within the “large range between the damage extremes of inadequacy and excessiveness” (quoting Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., 693 S.W.2d 83, 98 (Mo. 1985))); Vajda v. Tusla, 572 A.2d 998, 1003 (Conn. 1990) (“Not only are damages for pain and suffering peculiarly for the trier of

2023Res. & Conservation, 78 P.3d 857, 875 (Mont. 2003) (noting the lack of “a definite standard by which to calculate compensation for mental pain and suffering”); Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 872 (Mo. 1993) (stating that a jury has “virtually unfettered” discretion to award damages as long as they are within the “large range between the damage extremes of inadequacy and excessiveness” (quoting Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., 693 S.W.2d 83, 98 (Mo. 1985))); Vajda v. Tusla, 572 A.2d 998, 1003 (Conn. 1990) (“Not only are damages for pain and suffering peculiarly for the trier of

2023Res. & Conservation, 78 P.3d 857, 875 (Mont. 2003) (noting the lack of “a definite standard by which to calculate compensation for mental pain and suffering”); Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 872 (Mo. 1993) (stating that a jury has “virtually unfettered” discretion to award damages as long as they are within the “large range between the damage extremes of inadequacy and excessiveness” (quoting Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., 693 S.W.2d 83, 98 (Mo. 1985))); Vajda v. Tusla, 572 A.2d 998, 1003 (Conn. 1990) (“Not only are damages for pain and suffering peculiarly for the trier of

2023Res. & Conservation, 78 P.3d 857, 875 (Mont. 2003) (noting the lack of “a definite standard by which to calculate compensation for mental pain and suffering”); Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 872 (Mo. 1993) (stating that a jury has “virtually unfettered” discretion to award damages as long as they are within the “large range between the damage extremes of inadequacy and excessiveness” (quoting Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., 693 S.W.2d 83, 98 (Mo. 1985))); Vajda v. Tusla, 572 A.2d 998, 1003 (Conn. 1990) (“Not only are damages for pain and suffering peculiarly for the trier of

2023Compensation for pain and suffering must be left to the sound discretion of a trial jury and the conclusion reached by it should not be disturbed unless the award is clearly excessive.” (internal citation omitted)); Sheraden v. Black, 752 P.2d 791, 796 (N.M. 1988) (“There is no standard fixed by law for measuring the value of pain and suffering; rather, the amount to be awarded is left to the fact finder’s judgment.”); Holmes Cnty.

2023Compensation for pain and suffering must be left to the sound discretion of a trial jury and the conclusion reached by it should not be disturbed unless the award is clearly excessive.” (internal citation omitted)); Sheraden v. Black, 752 P.2d 791, 796 (N.M. 1988) (“There is no standard fixed by law for measuring the value of pain and suffering; rather, the amount to be awarded is left to the fact finder’s judgment.”); Holmes Cnty.

2021The Estates Code does not define “creditor.” As our sister court has observed, however, in legal parlance, “creditor” includes “[a] person or entity with a definite claim against another, especially a claim that is capable of adjustment and liquidation.” In re Davidson, 485 S.W.3d 927, 930 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2016, no pet.) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)).

2013However, in Chicago Bridge, London challenged the trial court’s findings that London waived compliance with the condition requiring CB & I to “ ‘make a definite claim for any loss for which the Underwriters may be liable under the policy within twelve ... months after the Assured shall have paid an amount of ultimate net loss in excess of the [$100,000 SIR].’ ” Chicago Bridge, 797 N.E.2d at 446 .

2013However, in Chicago Bridge, London challenged the trial court’s findings that London waived compliance with the condition requiring CB & I to “ ‘make a definite claim for any loss for which the Underwriters may be liable under the policy within twelve ... months after the Assured shall have paid an amount of ultimate net loss in excess of the [$100,000 SIR].’ ” Chicago Bridge, 797 N.E.2d at 446 .

2013See Di Leo, 200 N.E.2d at 410-11 ; see also Chicago Bridge, 797 N.E.2d at 446 .

2008Exch. v. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d 842 , 843 n. 2 (Tex. 1994) ("The duty of an insurer to exercise ordinary care in the settlement of claims to protect its insureds against judgments in excess of policy limits is generically referred to in Texas as the Stowers duty."); Stowers Furniture Co. v. Am.

2007See Weidner v. Sanchez, 14 S.W.3d 353, 372 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (noting that "measure of damages in a personal injury case is not subject to precise mathematical calculation."); J.

1990See Southern Pacific Communications Co. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 740 F.2d 980, 1006 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005 , 105 S.Ct. 1359 , 84 L.Ed.2d 380 (1985); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Ginnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 231-36 (1st Cir.1983); MCI Communications Corp. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 708 F.2d 1081 , 1123 n. 59 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 , 104 S.Ct. 234 , 78 L.Ed.2d 226 (1983); O.

1990See Southern Pacific Communications Co. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 740 F.2d 980, 1006 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005 , 105 S.Ct. 1359 , 84 L.Ed.2d 380 (1985); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Ginnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 231-36 (1st Cir.1983); MCI Communications Corp. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 708 F.2d 1081 , 1123 n. 59 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 , 104 S.Ct. 234 , 78 L.Ed.2d 226 (1983); O.

1990See Southern Pacific Communications Co. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 740 F.2d 980, 1006 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005 , 105 S.Ct. 1359 , 84 L.Ed.2d 380 (1985); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Ginnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 231-36 (1st Cir.1983); MCI Communications Corp. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 708 F.2d 1081 , 1123 n. 59 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 , 104 S.Ct. 234 , 78 L.Ed.2d 226 (1983); O.

1990See Southern Pacific Communications Co. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 740 F.2d 980, 1006 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005 , 105 S.Ct. 1359 , 84 L.Ed.2d 380 (1985); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Ginnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 231-36 (1st Cir.1983); MCI Communications Corp. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 708 F.2d 1081 , 1123 n. 59 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 , 104 S.Ct. 234 , 78 L.Ed.2d 226 (1983); O.

1990See Southern Pacific Communications Co. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 740 F.2d 980, 1006 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005 , 105 S.Ct. 1359 , 84 L.Ed.2d 380 (1985); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Ginnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 231-36 (1st Cir.1983); MCI Communications Corp. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 708 F.2d 1081 , 1123 n. 59 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 , 104 S.Ct. 234 , 78 L.Ed.2d 226 (1983); O.

1990See Southern Pacific Communications Co. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 740 F.2d 980, 1006 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005 , 105 S.Ct. 1359 , 84 L.Ed.2d 380 (1985); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Ginnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 231-36 (1st Cir.1983); MCI Communications Corp. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 708 F.2d 1081 , 1123 n. 59 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 , 104 S.Ct. 234 , 78 L.Ed.2d 226 (1983); O.

1990See Southern Pacific Communications Co. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 740 F.2d 980, 1006 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005 , 105 S.Ct. 1359 , 84 L.Ed.2d 380 (1985); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Ginnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 231-36 (1st Cir.1983); MCI Communications Corp. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 708 F.2d 1081 , 1123 n. 59 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 , 104 S.Ct. 234 , 78 L.Ed.2d 226 (1983); O.

1990See Southern Pacific Communications Co. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 740 F.2d 980, 1006 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005 , 105 S.Ct. 1359 , 84 L.Ed.2d 380 (1985); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Ginnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 231-36 (1st Cir.1983); MCI Communications Corp. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 708 F.2d 1081 , 1123 n. 59 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 , 104 S.Ct. 234 , 78 L.Ed.2d 226 (1983); O.

1990See Southern Pacific Communications Co. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 740 F.2d 980, 1006 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005 , 105 S.Ct. 1359 , 84 L.Ed.2d 380 (1985); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Ginnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 231-36 (1st Cir.1983); MCI Communications Corp. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 708 F.2d 1081 , 1123 n. 59 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 , 104 S.Ct. 234 , 78 L.Ed.2d 226 (1983); O.

1990See Southern Pacific Communications Co. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 740 F.2d 980, 1006 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005 , 105 S.Ct. 1359 , 84 L.Ed.2d 380 (1985); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Ginnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 231-36 (1st Cir.1983); MCI Communications Corp. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 708 F.2d 1081 , 1123 n. 59 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 , 104 S.Ct. 234 , 78 L.Ed.2d 226 (1983); O.