18 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1966–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State Ex Rel. Collins v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2002The court found the mandatory 230 day provision violated due process because the statute provided no possibility of a release hearing, before the 230 days passed, to determine if the person was still insane. 150 Ariz. at 299 , 723 P.2d at 648 . 2002The court found the mandatory 230 day provision violated due process because the statute provided no possibility of a release hearing, before the 230 days passed, to determine if the person was still insane. 150 Ariz. at 299 , 723 P.2d at 648 . | 1 | 2 |
Dansby v. Buckgreen2 sentences1994In Dansby v. Buck, the seminal Arizona case on this issue, the supreme court held that a release may be avoided if at the time of the settlement, the parties did not contemplate injuries unknown either as to nature or extent, but the release would bar an action to recover merely for the consequences of known injuries. 92 Ariz. 1, 12 , 373 P.2d 1, 8 (1962). 1994In Dansby v. Buck, the seminal Arizona case on this issue, the supreme court held that a release may be avoided if at the time of the settlement, the parties did not contemplate injuries unknown either as to nature or extent, but the release would bar an action to recover merely for the consequences of known injuries. 92 Ariz. 1, 12 , 373 P.2d 1, 8 (1962). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Bomargreen1 sentence2019See Beyer, 287 Wis. 2d at 33, ¶ 53 (holding that delayed review of SVP’s status under Wisconsin’s sexually violent persons statutes does not justify SVP’s discharge when he “continues to be a sexually violent person, [because] the cost to the public of releasing him into society would simply be too high and would be contrary to [the statutes’] treatment objective”); see also State v. Bomar, 199 Ariz. 472 , 478-79, ¶ 23 (App. 2001) (holding, in case of commitment of guilty-except-insane person under A.R.S. § 13-3994, that “[n]o provision of the federal or state 7 IN RE FREDERICK B. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Beyergreen1 sentence2019See Beyer, 287 Wis. 2d at 33, ¶ 53 (holding that delayed review of SVP’s status under Wisconsin’s sexually violent persons statutes does not justify SVP’s discharge when he “continues to be a sexually violent person, [because] the cost to the public of releasing him into society would simply be too high and would be contrary to [the statutes’] treatment objective”); see also State v. Bomar, 199 Ariz. 472 , 478-79, ¶ 23 (App. 2001) (holding, in case of commitment of guilty-except-insane person under A.R.S. § 13-3994, that “[n]o provision of the federal or state 7 IN RE FREDERICK B. | 1 | 1 |
Mendez v. Robertsongreen2 sentences2017See e.g., Mendaz v. Robertson, 202 Ariz. 128, 130, ¶ 8 , 42 P.3d 14, 16 (App. 2002) (rejecting a defendant’s “claim that a victim whose rights are protected by the Victims’ Bill of Rights and related statutes and procedural rules may be required to testify at a release hearing”). 2017See e.g., Mendaz v. Robertson, 202 Ariz. 128, 130, ¶ 8 , 42 P.3d 14, 16 (App. 2002) (rejecting a defendant’s “claim that a victim whose rights are protected by the Victims’ Bill of Rights and related statutes and procedural rules may be required to testify at a release hearing”). | 1 | 1 |
4501 NORTHPOINT LP v. Maricopa Countygreen2 sentences2007See 4501 Northpoint LP v. Maricopa County, 212 Ariz. 98, ¶ 26 , 128 P.3d 215, 220 (2006) (“Issue preclusion, in contrast [to claim preclusion], applies only as to issues that have in fact been litigated and were essential to a prior judgment.”). 10 workmanship shall be admissible.” AFX contends this ruling improperly limited its claim for breach of the settlement agreement “only to defective work that was done after the date of the Settlement Agreement.” The trial court based its ruling “on [Evergreen’s] judgment for its contract claim in the prior case.” As we have explained, claim preclusion 2007See 4501 Northpoint LP v. Maricopa County, 212 Ariz. 98, ¶ 26 , 128 P.3d 215, 220 (2006) (“Issue preclusion, in contrast [to claim preclusion], applies only as to issues that have in fact been litigated and were essential to a prior judgment.”). 10 workmanship shall be admissible.” AFX contends this ruling improperly limited its claim for breach of the settlement agreement “only to defective work that was done after the date of the Settlement Agreement.” The trial court based its ruling “on [Evergreen’s] judgment for its contract claim in the prior case.” As we have explained, claim preclusion | 1 | 1 |
Long Island Lighting Co. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.green1 sentence2007A trial 7 Accordingly, we need not address AFX’s argument that the release clause is unenforceable as a matter of public policy and void because Evergreen breached the settlement agreement. 12 court should only grant a motion for summary judgment “if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Orme Sch., 166 Ariz. at 309 , 802 P.2d at 1008 . ¶20 AFX argues “Evergreen’s fraud and bad faith made the contra | 1 | 1 |
Potlatch Corp. v. Beloit Corp.green2 sentences2007In Potlatch Corp. v. Beloit Corp., 132 Idaho 712 , 979 P.2d 114, 117-18 (1999), the Idaho Supreme Court distinguished Long Island Lighting Co., stating it "provide[d] no support for [the plaintiffs] argument seeking to allege bad faith in soliciting the contract as a basis for recovery of contract damages.” But cf. Amer. 2007In Potlatch Corp. v. Beloit Corp., 132 Idaho 712 , 979 P.2d 114, 117-18 (1999), the Idaho Supreme Court distinguished Long Island Lighting Co., stating it "provide[d] no support for [the plaintiffs] argument seeking to allege bad faith in soliciting the contract as a basis for recovery of contract damages.” But cf. Amer. | 1 | 1 |
State v. McDonaldgreen2 sentences2002We consider the legislature to have adopted the construction Helffrich gave to the present version of § 13-3994. *126 ¶ 27 Given Helffrich and our duty to construe a statute so as to render it constitutional if reasonably possible, McDonald, 191 Ariz. at 120, ¶ 12 , 952 P.2d at 1190 , and to avoid an “otherwise acceptable construction of a statute [that may] raise serious constitutional problems,” DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 575 , 108 S.Ct. 1392 , we reject petitioner’s argument that a “new release hearing” means one after an initial release hearing. 2002We consider the legislature to have adopted the construction Helffrich gave to the present version of § 13-3994. *126 ¶ 27 Given Helffrich and our duty to construe a statute so as to render it constitutional if reasonably possible, McDonald, 191 Ariz. at 120, ¶ 12 , 952 P.2d at 1190 , and to avoid an “otherwise acceptable construction of a statute [that may] raise serious constitutional problems,” DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 575 , 108 S.Ct. 1392 , we reject petitioner’s argument that a “new release hearing” means one after an initial release hearing. | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Dean v. City Court of City of Tucsongreen2 sentences2002Dean v. City Court, 173 Ariz. 515, 516 , 844 P.2d 1165, 1166 (App.1993), that the Victims’ Bill of Rights does not give victims “an absolute right not to be exposed to contact with defendants or their attorneys until the time of trial” and that they can be compelled to testify at certain pretrial hearings, we did not hold that a release hearing is one of them, nor do we conclude that it should be. 2002Dean v. City Court, 173 Ariz. 515, 516 , 844 P.2d 1165, 1166 (App.1993), that the Victims’ Bill of Rights does not give victims “an absolute right not to be exposed to contact with defendants or their attorneys until the time of trial” and that they can be compelled to testify at certain pretrial hearings, we did not hold that a release hearing is one of them, nor do we conclude that it should be. | 1 | 1 |
State v. LeMattygreen2 sentences1993See State v. LeMatty, 121 Ariz. 333, 337 , 590 P.2d 449, 453 (1979) (“[A] practical construction is preferred to one which is absurd, and a practical construction is required if a technical construction would lead to mischief or absurdity.”). 1993See State v. LeMatty, 121 Ariz. 333, 337 , 590 P.2d 449, 453 (1979) (“[A] practical construction is preferred to one which is absurd, and a practical construction is required if a technical construction would lead to mischief or absurdity.”). | 1 | 1 |
Application of Downinggreen2 sentences1992The court also cited Application of Downing, 103 Idaho 689 , 652 P.2d 193, 201 (1982), in which case a statute providing that an application for release “ ‘need [not] be considered until [the acquittee] has been confined for a period of not less than six (6) months was held to be constitutional. 150 Ariz. at 297 , 723 P.2d at 646 ; I.C. § 18-214(5). 1992The court also cited Application of Downing, 103 Idaho 689 , 652 P.2d 193, 201 (1982), in which case a statute providing that an application for release “ ‘need [not] be considered until [the acquittee] has been confined for a period of not less than six (6) months was held to be constitutional. 150 Ariz. at 297 , 723 P.2d at 646 ; I.C. § 18-214(5). | 1 | 1 |
Hewitt v. Helmsred2 sentences1992See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72 , 103 S.Ct. 864, 871 , 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (statute’s use of words "shall,” "will” and "must” establishes mandatory directive). 6 . 1992See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72 , 103 S.Ct. 864, 871 , 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (statute’s use of words "shall,” "will” and "must” establishes mandatory directive). 6 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Chavezgreen2 sentences1986People v. Chavez, 629 P.2d 1040 (Colo. 1981). 1986Furthermore, an expedited release by the hospital authority is authorized when it determines the defendant no longer requires hospitalization.” Id. at 1049 (emphasis in original); Colo.Rev.Stat. § 16-8-115, -116 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Cronic
green
2 sentences2023And regardless of Traverso’s psychological state, the expert testified a Donald advisement given during the release hearing under the circumstances of this case, without an earlier settlement conference, was unlikely to achieve its intended goal of “mak[ing] sure the defendant understands the plea.” ¶65 After the evidentiary hearing, the superior court found, despite the State presenting its plea offer to Traverso’s trial counsel on three separate occasions, those attorneys never “gave it to [Traverso], advised him of it, or explained the mandatory sentencing range he faced if convicted versus 2023And regardless of Traverso’s psychological state, the expert testified a Donald advisement given during the release hearing under the circumstances of this case, without an earlier settlement conference, was unlikely to achieve its intended goal of “mak[ing] sure the defendant understands the plea.” ¶65 After the evidentiary hearing, the superior court found, despite the State presenting its plea offer to Traverso’s trial counsel on three separate occasions, those attorneys never “gave it to [Traverso], advised him of it, or explained the mandatory sentencing range he faced if convicted versus | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Odom v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona
green
1 sentence2023Id. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Bishop v. SUPERIOR COURT, IN & FOR PIMA CTY.
green
1 sentence2017In the event circumstances arise calling a defendant’s competence into question, due process requires the court “to raise the issue and hold [a] hearing sua sponte.” Bishop, 150 Ariz. at 407 . ¶11 The basis for Tepper’s argument that the charges should have been dismissed is that the superior court should have concluded his conduct at the release hearing showed he was not competent to stand trial and was not restorable to competency. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Orme School v. Reeves
green
2 sentences2007A trial 7 Accordingly, we need not address AFX’s argument that the release clause is unenforceable as a matter of public policy and void because Evergreen breached the settlement agreement. 12 court should only grant a motion for summary judgment “if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Orme Sch., 166 Ariz. at 309 , 802 P.2d at 1008 . ¶20 AFX argues “Evergreen’s fraud and bad faith made the contra 2007A trial 7 Accordingly, we need not address AFX’s argument that the release clause is unenforceable as a matter of public policy and void because Evergreen breached the settlement agreement. 12 court should only grant a motion for summary judgment “if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Orme Sch., 166 Ariz. at 309 , 802 P.2d at 1008 . ¶20 AFX argues “Evergreen’s fraud and bad faith made the contra | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Helffrich
green
2 sentences2002Helffrich did not limit the right to request a hearing to any time after a prior release hearing; rather, Helffrich held that the provision allowed the treatment agency to request a hearing at any time. 174 Ariz. at 6 , 846 P.2d at 156 . 2002Helffrich did not limit the right to request a hearing to any time after a prior release hearing; rather, Helffrich held that the provision allowed the treatment agency to request a hearing at any time. 174 Ariz. at 6 , 846 P.2d at 156 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council
green
2 sentences2002We consider the legislature to have adopted the construction Helffrich gave to the present version of § 13-3994. *126 ¶ 27 Given Helffrich and our duty to construe a statute so as to render it constitutional if reasonably possible, McDonald, 191 Ariz. at 120, ¶ 12 , 952 P.2d at 1190 , and to avoid an “otherwise acceptable construction of a statute [that may] raise serious constitutional problems,” DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 575 , 108 S.Ct. 1392 , we reject petitioner’s argument that a “new release hearing” means one after an initial release hearing. 2002We consider the legislature to have adopted the construction Helffrich gave to the present version of § 13-3994. *126 ¶ 27 Given Helffrich and our duty to construe a statute so as to render it constitutional if reasonably possible, McDonald, 191 Ariz. at 120, ¶ 12 , 952 P.2d at 1190 , and to avoid an “otherwise acceptable construction of a statute [that may] raise serious constitutional problems,” DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 575 , 108 S.Ct. 1392 , we reject petitioner’s argument that a “new release hearing” means one after an initial release hearing. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1992The state, citing State v. Johnson, 156 Ariz. 464 , 753 P.2d 154 (1988), responds that the order was appropriate because Helffrich’s dangerous condition has not been cured but is merely in remission due to treatment and medication. 1992The state, citing State v. Johnson, 156 Ariz. 464 , 753 P.2d 154 (1988), responds that the order was appropriate because Helffrich’s dangerous condition has not been cured but is merely in remission due to treatment and medication. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Jones v. United States
green
2 sentences1986In Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 , 103 S.Ct. 3043 , 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983), the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a District of Columbia statute similar to A.R.S. § 13-3994(B), providing for a release hearing within fifty days of commitment after an insanity acquittal. 1986In Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 , 103 S.Ct. 3043 , 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983), the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a District of Columbia statute similar to A.R.S. § 13-3994(B), providing for a release hearing within fifty days of commitment after an insanity acquittal. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of the Interior v. Battle Mountain Company
green
1 sentence1971We are referring in particular to the case of Udall v. Battle Mountain Company, supra. In that case Battle Mountain Company was the assignee of Forest Lieu Selection Rights. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
LeBaron v. Crismon
green
2 sentences1969In the contract was a release clause: “ * * * cash payment made in addition to the regular annual installments, upon request of the buyers.” The court held: “ * * * the release clause contained in the escrow instruction is sufficient to create a binding obligation between the parties.” 100 Ariz., at 210 , 412 P.2d at 707 . 1969In the contract was a release clause: “ * * * cash payment made in addition to the regular annual installments, upon request of the buyers.” The court held: “ * * * the release clause contained in the escrow instruction is sufficient to create a binding obligation between the parties.” 100 Ariz., at 210 , 412 P.2d at 707 . | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Young v. Bishop
green
2 sentences1966Cf. Young v. Bishop, 88 Ariz. 140 , 353 P.2d 1017 ; Bradley v. Industrial Commission, 51 Ariz. 291 , 76 P.2d 745 . 1966Cf. Young v. Bishop, 88 Ariz. 140 , 353 P.2d 1017 ; Bradley v. Industrial Commission, 51 Ariz. 291 , 76 P.2d 745 . | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Bradley v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1966Cf. Young v. Bishop, 88 Ariz. 140 , 353 P.2d 1017 ; Bradley v. Industrial Commission, 51 Ariz. 291 , 76 P.2d 745 . 1966Cf. Young v. Bishop, 88 Ariz. 140 , 353 P.2d 1017 ; Bradley v. Industrial Commission, 51 Ariz. 291 , 76 P.2d 745 . | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Jamison v. Franklin Life Insurance
green
2 sentences1966Co., 60 Ariz. 308 , 136 P.2d 265 . *210 Defendant further contends that the release clause contained in the escrow instructions was an agreement to contract in the future and not subject to specific performance. 1966Co., 60 Ariz. 308 , 136 P.2d 265 . *210 Defendant further contends that the release clause contained in the escrow instructions was an agreement to contract in the future and not subject to specific performance. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.