release bar in New Mexico

2023A release of a claim is “abandonment, relinquishment or giving up of a right or claim to the person against whom it might have been demanded or enforced and its effect is to extinguish the cause of action.” Id. (omission, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). {15} Valdez squarely supports the district court’s decision that once Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her claim with prejudice against Dr. Montesinos, her claim against Presbyterian was extinguished.

2023A release of a claim is 3 “abandonment, relinquishment or giving up of a right or claim to the person against 4 whom it might have been demanded or enforced and its effect is to extinguish the 5 cause of action.” Id. (omission, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). 6 {15} Valdez squarely supports the district court’s decision that once Plaintiff 7 voluntarily dismissed her claim with prejudice against Dr. Montesinos, her claim 8 against Presbyterian was extinguished.

1995Because the issue of whether the release would bar relief against the City is one that raises factual issues concerning the intent of the parties, see generally Hansen v. Ford Motor Co., 120 N.M. 203 , 900 P.2d 952 (1995), we believe that the City acted too late in first raising the issue after the trial was over and the evidence closed. *735 See SCRA 1986, 12-216(A) (Cum.Supp.1995) (ruling must be fairly invoked); see also State v. Trujillo, 119 N.M. 772, 776 , 895 P.2d 672, 676 (Ct.App.) (preservation requires that timely action be taken), cert. quashed 120 N.M. 394 , 902 P.2d 76 (1995); Woo

1995Because the issue of whether the release would bar relief against the City is one that raises factual issues concerning the intent of the parties, see generally Hansen v. Ford Motor Co., 120 N.M. 203 , 900 P.2d 952 (1995), we believe that the City acted too late in first raising the issue after the trial was over and the evidence closed. *735 See SCRA 1986, 12-216(A) (Cum.Supp.1995) (ruling must be fairly invoked); see also State v. Trujillo, 119 N.M. 772, 776 , 895 P.2d 672, 676 (Ct.App.) (preservation requires that timely action be taken), cert. quashed 120 N.M. 394 , 902 P.2d 76 (1995); Woo

1982This court dispensed of the issue as follows: Since under * * * [the doctrine of respondeat superior] “* * * [t]he liability of the master to a third person for injuries by a servant in the course of his employment and within the scope of his authority, is derivative and secondary, while that of the servant is primary, and absent any delict of the master other than through the servant, exoneration of the servant removes the foundation upon which to impute negligence to the master.” 86 N.M. at 584, 525 P.2d 941 (citing Jacobson v. Parrill, 186 Kan. 467 , 351 P.2d 194 (1960)).

1982This court dispensed of the issue as follows: Since under * * * [the doctrine of respondeat superior] “* * * [t]he liability of the master to a third person for injuries by a servant in the course of his employment and within the scope of his authority, is derivative and secondary, while that of the servant is primary, and absent any delict of the master other than through the servant, exoneration of the servant removes the foundation upon which to impute negligence to the master.” 86 N.M. at 584, 525 P.2d 941 (citing Jacobson v. Parrill, 186 Kan. 467 , 351 P.2d 194 (1960)).

1982This court dispensed of the issue as follows: Since under * * * [the doctrine of respondeat superior] “* * * [t]he liability of the master to a third person for injuries by a servant in the course of his employment and within the scope of his authority, is derivative and secondary, while that of the servant is primary, and absent any delict of the master other than through the servant, exoneration of the servant removes the foundation upon which to impute negligence to the master.” 86 N.M. at 584, 525 P.2d 941 (citing Jacobson v. Parrill, 186 Kan. 467 , 351 P.2d 194 (1960)).

1978The court said: ... [S]uch a release because of the deception practiced upon the claimant must be construed as a settlement of those matters only as to which the minds of the parties met, and may not be considered to be in satisfaction of anything not consented to by the plaintiff. [ 144 P.2d at 352 .] The release in the instant case reflected the intention of the parties.

1978The court said: . [S]uch a release because of the deception practiced upon the claimant must be construed as a settlement of those matters only as to which the minds of the parties met, and may not be considered to be in satisfaction of anything not consented to by the plaintiff. [ 144 P.2d at 352 .] The release in the instant case reflected the intention of the parties.

1976Woods v. City of Hobbs, 75 N.M. 588 , 408 P.2d 508 (1965); Mendenhall v. Vandeventer, 61 N.M. 277 , 299 P.2d 457 (1956).

1976Woods v. City of Hobbs, 75 N.M. 588 , 408 P.2d 508 (1965); Mendenhall v. Vandeventer, 61 N.M. 277 , 299 P.2d 457 (1956).

1976Woods v. City of Hobbs, 75 N.M. 588 , 408 P.2d 508 (1965); Mendenhall v. Vandeventer, 61 N.M. 277 , 299 P.2d 457 (1956).

1976Woods v. City of Hobbs, 75 N.M. 588 , 408 P.2d 508 (1965); Mendenhall v. Vandeventer, 61 N.M. 277 , 299 P.2d 457 (1956).

1938In Nelson v. Railway Co., 61 Minn. 167 , 63 N.W. 486 , where a release of a claim for damages was signed •by the plaintiff on the assurance of the defendant’s physicians that her injuries were temporary, it was held that she could not avoid the release on the ground that the physicians were mistaken.

1938In Nelson v. Railway Co., 61 Minn. 167 , 63 N.W. 486 , where a release of a claim for damages was signed •by the plaintiff on the assurance of the defendant’s physicians that her injuries were temporary, it was held that she could not avoid the release on the ground that the physicians were mistaken.