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23 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1927–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Clark v. Stategreen2 sentences1986In Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629, 643-646 (5) ( 266 SE2d 466 ) (1980), we held that a defendant’s insanity acquittal established that he met the criteria for civil commitment at the time of the crime, and that such a finding, pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-21, raised a presumption of insanity which continued until the de fendant’s release hearing. 1986In Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629, 643-646 (5) ( 266 SE2d 466 ) (1980), we held that a defendant’s insanity acquittal established that he met the criteria for civil commitment at the time of the crime, and that such a finding, pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-21, raised a presumption of insanity which continued until the de fendant’s release hearing. | 3 | 3 |
Langley v. Mp Spring Lake, LLCgreen1 sentence2020Cooney, P.C. v. Rowland, 240 Ga. App. 703, 705 ( 524 SE2d 730 ) (1999) (“[Parties] should be permitted to enter into contracts that may actually be unreasonable or which may lead to hardship.”). 19 Thomas 245 Ga. App. at 196; accord Rome Healthcare LLC v. Peach Healthcare Sys., Inc., 264 Ga. App. 265, 272 (4) ( 590 SE2d 235 ) (2003); see Langley 10 the absence of a showing that Noah “was fraudulently induced into signing the . . . v. MP Spring Lake, LLC, 307 Ga. 321 , 329 n.4 ( 834 SE2d 800 ) (2019) (“Georgia law recognizes and protects the freedom of parties to contract even though parties ma | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. T & T Straw, Inc.green2 sentences2020An unconscionable contract is “abhorrent to good morals and conscience”16 and is an agreement in which “one of the parties takes a fraudulent advantage of another.”17 But an agreement is not unconscionable merely because it appears to favor one party over another or may lead to hardship.18 Indeed, we have repeatedly emphasized that parties should “be entitled to contract on their own terms without the courts saving one side or another from the effects of a bad bargain.”19 As a result, in electronic signature to gain entry could not void the contract under the defense of infancy because “the ch 2020An unconscionable contract is “abhorrent to good morals and conscience”16 and is an agreement in which “one of the parties takes a fraudulent advantage of another.”17 But an agreement is not unconscionable merely because it appears to favor one party over another or may lead to hardship.18 Indeed, we have repeatedly emphasized that parties should “be entitled to contract on their own terms without the courts saving one side or another from the effects of a bad bargain.”19 As a result, in electronic signature to gain entry could not void the contract under the defense of infancy because “the ch | 1 | 1 |
Rome Healthcare, LLC v. Peach Healthcare System, Inc.green2 sentences2020Cooney, P.C. v. Rowland, 240 Ga. App. 703, 705 ( 524 SE2d 730 ) (1999) (“[Parties] should be permitted to enter into contracts that may actually be unreasonable or which may lead to hardship.”). 19 Thomas 245 Ga. App. at 196; accord Rome Healthcare LLC v. Peach Healthcare Sys., Inc., 264 Ga. App. 265, 272 (4) ( 590 SE2d 235 ) (2003); see Langley 10 the absence of a showing that Noah “was fraudulently induced into signing the . . . v. MP Spring Lake, LLC, 307 Ga. 321 , 329 n.4 ( 834 SE2d 800 ) (2019) (“Georgia law recognizes and protects the freedom of parties to contract even though parties ma 2020Cooney, P.C. v. Rowland, 240 Ga. App. 703, 705 ( 524 SE2d 730 ) (1999) (“[Parties] should be permitted to enter into contracts that may actually be unreasonable or which may lead to hardship.”). 19 Thomas 245 Ga. App. at 196; accord Rome Healthcare LLC v. Peach Healthcare Sys., Inc., 264 Ga. App. 265, 272 (4) ( 590 SE2d 235 ) (2003); see Langley 10 the absence of a showing that Noah “was fraudulently induced into signing the . . . v. MP Spring Lake, LLC, 307 Ga. 321 , 329 n.4 ( 834 SE2d 800 ) (2019) (“Georgia law recognizes and protects the freedom of parties to contract even though parties ma | 1 | 1 |
William J. Cooney, P.C. v. Rowlandgreen2 sentences2020Cooney, P.C. v. Rowland, 240 Ga. App. 703, 705 ( 524 SE2d 730 ) (1999) (“[Parties] should be permitted to enter into contracts that may actually be unreasonable or which may lead to hardship.”). 19 Thomas 245 Ga. App. at 196; accord Rome Healthcare LLC v. Peach Healthcare Sys., Inc., 264 Ga. App. 265, 272 (4) ( 590 SE2d 235 ) (2003); see Langley 10 the absence of a showing that Noah “was fraudulently induced into signing the . . . v. MP Spring Lake, LLC, 307 Ga. 321 , 329 n.4 ( 834 SE2d 800 ) (2019) (“Georgia law recognizes and protects the freedom of parties to contract even though parties ma 2020Cooney, P.C. v. Rowland, 240 Ga. App. 703, 705 ( 524 SE2d 730 ) (1999) (“[Parties] should be permitted to enter into contracts that may actually be unreasonable or which may lead to hardship.”). 19 Thomas 245 Ga. App. at 196; accord Rome Healthcare LLC v. Peach Healthcare Sys., Inc., 264 Ga. App. 265, 272 (4) ( 590 SE2d 235 ) (2003); see Langley 10 the absence of a showing that Noah “was fraudulently induced into signing the . . . v. MP Spring Lake, LLC, 307 Ga. 321 , 329 n.4 ( 834 SE2d 800 ) (2019) (“Georgia law recognizes and protects the freedom of parties to contract even though parties ma | 1 | 1 |
Nagel v. Stategreen2 sentences1994“The [trial] court must consider expert and other evidence presented at the release hearing, and contained in the trial record, on the issue of sanity or insanity.” Nagel v. State, supra at 892 (2) (b). 1994"The [trial] court must consider expert and other evidence presented at the release hearing, and contained in the trial record, on the issue of sanity or insanity." Nagel v. State, supra at 892 (2) (b). | 1 | 1 |
Eig v. Savagegreen2 sentences1993As said in Eig v. Savage, 177 Ga. App. 514, 516 ( 339 SE2d 752 ) (1986): “An individual can have no vested right in a current state of the law which is subject to change, either by the legislature or the courts, without some act in reliance upon that law. [Cits.]” When they raised the release as a bar, the bar no longer existed due to the holding in Posey , which was in keeping with the court’s then-best understanding of the law. 1993As said in Eig v. Savage, 177 Ga. App. 514, 516 ( 339 SE2d 752 ) (1986): “An individual can have no vested right in a current state of the law which is subject to change, either by the legislature or the courts, without some act in reliance upon that law. [Cits.]” When they raised the release as a bar, the bar no longer existed due to the holding in Posey , which was in keeping with the court’s then-best understanding of the law. | 1 | 1 |
Arnold v. Stategreen2 sentences1988See Arnold v. State, 173 Ga. App. 839 ( 328 SE2d 572 ). 1988See Arnold v. State, 173 Ga. App. 839 ( 328 SE2d 572 ). | 1 | 1 |
Moses v. Stategreen2 sentences1988See Moses v. State, 167 Ga. App. 556, 558 ( 307 SE2d 35 ) (burden of proof in a release hearing, in view of presumption of continued insanity is upon the applicant). 1988See Moses v. State, 167 Ga. App. 556, 558 ( 307 SE2d 35 ) (burden of proof in a release hearing, in view of presumption of continued insanity is upon the applicant). | 1 | 1 |
Cox v. Adamsgreen2 sentences1985Co. of the Southeast v. Trimm, 252 Ga. 95 ( 311 SE2d 460 ) (1984), the Florida law controls the effect of the release under the rule of lex loci contractus. 1 QUESTION TWO: “Under the choice of law rules of the State of Georgia, what state’s substantive law governs the admissibility of extrinsic evidence establishing the intent of the contracting parties who executed a release in the State of Florida that, by its terms, forever discharged ‘all. . . persons, firms or corporations . . . from any and all claims, demands, actions, causes of actions or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever’ arisin 1985Co. of the Southeast v. Trimm, 252 Ga. 95 ( 311 SE2d 460 ) (1984), the Florida law controls the effect of the release under the rule of lex loci contractus. [1] QUESTION TWO: "Under the choice of law rules of the State of Georgia, what state's substantive law governs the admissibility of extrinsic evidence establishing the intent of the contracting parties who executed a release in the State of Florida that, by its terms, forever *302 discharged `all . . . persons, firms or corporations . . . from any and all claims, demands, actions, causes of actions or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever | 1 | 1 |
Kennedy v. Batemangreen2 sentences1980The great weight of authority supports the doctrine that a release of a claim for personal injuries cannot be avoided merely because the injuries have proved more serious than the releasor, at the time of executing the release, believed them to be, or because the releasor made a bad bargain on account of a wrong estimate of the damages which would accrue.’ [Cit.]” Kennedy v. Bateman, 217 Ga. 458, 461 ( 123 SE2d 656 ) (1961). 1980The great weight of authority supports the doctrine that a release of a claim for personal injuries cannot be avoided merely because the injuries have proved more serious than the releasor, at the time of executing the release, believed them to be, or because the releasor made a bad bargain on account of a wrong estimate of the damages which would accrue.’ [Cit.]” Kennedy v. Bateman, 217 Ga. 458, 461 ( 123 SE2d 656 ) (1961). | 1 | 1 |
Dubose v. Stategreen2 sentences1979See Dubose v. State, 148 Ga. App. 9 ( 251 SE2d 15 ). 1979See Dubose v. State, 148 Ga. App. 9 ( 251 SE2d 15 ). | 1 | 1 |
Gilson v. Mitchellgreen2 sentences1978See also Gilson v. Mitchell, 131 Ga. App. 321 ( 205 SE2d 421 ) (1974), affd. sub nom Mitchell v. Gilson, 233 Ga. 453 ( 211 SE2d 744 ) (1975); Zimmerman’s, Inc. v. McDonough Const. Co., 240 Ga. 317 , supra. We conclude that the trial court correctly held that the instrument was a release discharging all the joint tortfeasors from liability, it being without serious question that the rust stain damage was a "single injury” for which there is no "rational basis” to apportion the loss, to which the release rule applies. 1978See also Gilson v. Mitchell, 131 Ga. App. 321 ( 205 SE2d 421 ) (1974), affd. sub nom Mitchell v. Gilson, 233 Ga. 453 ( 211 SE2d 744 ) (1975); Zimmerman’s, Inc. v. McDonough Const. Co., 240 Ga. 317 , supra. We conclude that the trial court correctly held that the instrument was a release discharging all the joint tortfeasors from liability, it being without serious question that the rust stain damage was a "single injury” for which there is no "rational basis” to apportion the loss, to which the release rule applies. | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. Gilsongreen2 sentences1978See also Gilson v. Mitchell, 131 Ga. App. 321 ( 205 SE2d 421 ) (1974), affd. sub nom Mitchell v. Gilson, 233 Ga. 453 ( 211 SE2d 744 ) (1975); Zimmerman’s, Inc. v. McDonough Const. Co., 240 Ga. 317 , supra. We conclude that the trial court correctly held that the instrument was a release discharging all the joint tortfeasors from liability, it being without serious question that the rust stain damage was a "single injury” for which there is no "rational basis” to apportion the loss, to which the release rule applies. 1978See also Gilson v. Mitchell, 131 Ga. App. 321 ( 205 SE2d 421 ) (1974), affd. sub nom Mitchell v. Gilson, 233 Ga. 453 ( 211 SE2d 744 ) (1975); Zimmerman’s, Inc. v. McDonough Const. Co., 240 Ga. 317 , supra. We conclude that the trial court correctly held that the instrument was a release discharging all the joint tortfeasors from liability, it being without serious question that the rust stain damage was a "single injury” for which there is no "rational basis” to apportion the loss, to which the release rule applies. | 1 | 1 |
Branan & Schmitz Realty, Inc. v. Ballardgreen2 sentences1976See also Branan & Schmitz Realty, Inc. v. Ballard,, 117 Ga. App. 758 ( 162 SE2d 16 ). (3) The release clause is not sufficiently definite. 1976See also Branan & Schmitz Realty, Inc. v. Ballard,, 117 Ga. App. 758 ( 162 SE2d 16 ). (3) The release clause is not sufficiently definite. | 1 | 1 |
A-1 Bonding Service, Inc. v. Huntergreen2 sentences1973See A-1 Bonding Service, Inc. v. Hunter, 125 Ga. App. 173 (1) *841 ( 186 SE2d 566 ); National Advertising Co. v. North American Ins. &c. 1973See A-1 Bonding Service, Inc. v. Hunter, 125 Ga. App. 173 (1) *841 ( 186 SE2d 566 ); National Advertising Co. v. North American Ins. &c. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pennewell v. State
green
2 sentences1985Accordingly, it has been held in Pennewell v. State, 148 Ga. App. 611 (1) ( 251 SE2d 832 ) (1979); Pitts v. State, 151 Ga. App. 691 ( 261 SE2d 435 ) (1979) . . . that where a defendant who has been acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity is ordered committed to a mental hospital under Code Ann. § 27-1503 (a) [now OCGA § 17-7-131 (e)] and files an application for release under Code Ann. § 27-1503 (b) [now OCGA § 17-7-131 (f)], there is a continuing presumption of insanity at the time of the release hearing.” Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629, 631 ( 266 SE2d 466 ). 1985Accordingly, it has been held in Pennewell v. State, 148 Ga. App. 611 (1) ( 251 SE2d 832 ) (1979); Pitts v. State, 151 Ga. App. 691 ( 261 SE2d 435 ) (1979) . . . that where a defendant who has been acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity is ordered committed to a mental hospital under Code Ann. § 27-1503 (a) [now OCGA § 17-7-131 (e)] and files an application for release under Code Ann. § 27-1503 (b) [now OCGA § 17-7-131 (f)], there is a continuing presumption of insanity at the time of the release hearing.” Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629, 631 ( 266 SE2d 466 ). | 4 | 1979–1985 |
Pitts v. State
green
2 sentences1985Accordingly, it has been held in Pennewell v. State, 148 Ga. App. 611 (1) ( 251 SE2d 832 ) (1979); Pitts v. State, 151 Ga. App. 691 ( 261 SE2d 435 ) (1979) . . . that where a defendant who has been acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity is ordered committed to a mental hospital under Code Ann. § 27-1503 (a) [now OCGA § 17-7-131 (e)] and files an application for release under Code Ann. § 27-1503 (b) [now OCGA § 17-7-131 (f)], there is a continuing presumption of insanity at the time of the release hearing.” Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629, 631 ( 266 SE2d 466 ). 1985Accordingly, it has been held in Pennewell v. State, 148 Ga. App. 611 (1) ( 251 SE2d 832 ) (1979); Pitts v. State, 151 Ga. App. 691 ( 261 SE2d 435 ) (1979) . . . that where a defendant who has been acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity is ordered committed to a mental hospital under Code Ann. § 27-1503 (a) [now OCGA § 17-7-131 (e)] and files an application for release under Code Ann. § 27-1503 (b) [now OCGA § 17-7-131 (f)], there is a continuing presumption of insanity at the time of the release hearing.” Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629, 631 ( 266 SE2d 466 ). | 3 | 1980–1985 |
Nelson v. State Farm Life Insurance
green
1 sentence1997While it recited that Cravey suffered significant injuries to his knees, face, and one arm, that he took pain medication approximately every two or three hours, and that he was on that medication when he signed the release, this evidence alone does not show that he was unable to read and under stand the release under the standard of Nelson, supra, when he signed it. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Kinsey v. Elrod
green
2 sentences1993Kinsey v. Elrod, 206 Ga. App. 375 ( 425 SE2d 395 ) (1992), does not hold that the determinative time for rule application is when the release is signed. 1993Kinsey v. Elrod, 206 Ga. App. 375 ( 425 SE2d 395 ) (1992), does not hold that the determinative time for rule application is when the release is signed. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Rose v. Hamilton Medical Center, Inc.
green
1 sentence1992Center, 184 Ga. App. 182, 183 , supra. The “plain language” explanation of the subrogation provision at issue states: “The Health Plan will no longer pay benefits which have the effect of duplicating benefits paid to a member from a third-party source — personal injury coverage, for example, or a policy of liability insurance. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) Under the definition stated in the Plan booklet the term “member” is limited to “an eligible employee or teacher who has joined the [Plan] and is paying the proper premiums for coverage.” While some or all of the $1,000 payment received by Jer | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Pope v. State
green
2 sentences1988C.f., Pope v. State, 172 Ga. App. 396 ( 323 SE2d 268 ) (it does not violate due process or equal protection to require an insanity acquittee to bear the burden of proving fitness for release). 2. 1988C.f., Pope v. State, 172 Ga. App. 396 ( 323 SE2d 268 ) (it does not violate due process or equal protection to require an insanity acquittee to bear the burden of proving fitness for release). 2. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
General Telephone Co. of Southeast v. Trimm
green
2 sentences1985Co. of the Southeast v. Trimm, 252 Ga. 95 ( 311 SE2d 460 ) (1984), the Florida law controls the effect of the release under the rule of lex loci contractus. 1 QUESTION TWO: “Under the choice of law rules of the State of Georgia, what state’s substantive law governs the admissibility of extrinsic evidence establishing the intent of the contracting parties who executed a release in the State of Florida that, by its terms, forever discharged ‘all. . . persons, firms or corporations . . . from any and all claims, demands, actions, causes of actions or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever’ arisin 1985Co. of the Southeast v. Trimm, 252 Ga. 95 ( 311 SE2d 460 ) (1984), the Florida law controls the effect of the release under the rule of lex loci contractus. 1 QUESTION TWO: “Under the choice of law rules of the State of Georgia, what state’s substantive law governs the admissibility of extrinsic evidence establishing the intent of the contracting parties who executed a release in the State of Florida that, by its terms, forever discharged ‘all. . . persons, firms or corporations . . . from any and all claims, demands, actions, causes of actions or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever’ arisin | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Porubiansky v. Emory University
green
2 sentences1981Appellants contend that reversal is mandated by the recent decision of this court in Porubiansky v. Emory University, 156 Ga. App. 602 ( 275 SE2d 163 ) (1980), affd., Emory University v. *388 Porubiansky, 248 Ga. 391 ( 282 SE2d 903 ) (1981), which held that a release clause similar to the one in the instant case was violative of public policy and would not shield a dental clinic from its negligent acts in furnishing medical services. 1981Appellants contend that reversal is mandated by the recent decision of this court in Porubiansky v. Emory University, 156 Ga. App. 602 ( 275 SE2d 163 ) (1980), affd., Emory University v. *388 Porubiansky, 248 Ga. 391 ( 282 SE2d 903 ) (1981), which held that a release clause similar to the one in the instant case was violative of public policy and would not shield a dental clinic from its negligent acts in furnishing medical services. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
In the Matter of Reily
green
2 sentences1981Appellants contend that reversal is mandated by the recent decision of this court in Porubiansky v. Emory University, 156 Ga. App. 602 ( 275 SE2d 163 ) (1980), affd., Emory University v. *388 Porubiansky, 248 Ga. 391 ( 282 SE2d 903 ) (1981), which held that a release clause similar to the one in the instant case was violative of public policy and would not shield a dental clinic from its negligent acts in furnishing medical services. 1981Appellants contend that reversal is mandated by the recent decision of this court in Porubiansky v. Emory University, 156 Ga. App. 602 ( 275 SE2d 163 ) (1980), affd., Emory University v. *388 Porubiansky, 248 Ga. 391 ( 282 SE2d 903 ) (1981), which held that a release clause similar to the one in the instant case was violative of public policy and would not shield a dental clinic from its negligent acts in furnishing medical services. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Turner v. Kraft
neutral
2 sentences1980Appellant’s reliance upon Turner v. Kraft, 95 Ga. App. 543 ( 98 SE2d 204 ) (1957) and Bass v. Seaboard Airline R. 1980Appellant’s reliance upon Turner v. Kraft, 95 Ga. App. 543 ( 98 SE2d 204 ) (1957) and Bass v. Seaboard Airline R. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Zimmerman's, Inc. v. McDonough Construction Co.
green
2 sentences1978See also Gilson v. Mitchell, 131 Ga. App. 321 ( 205 SE2d 421 ) (1974), affd. sub nom Mitchell v. Gilson, 233 Ga. 453 ( 211 SE2d 744 ) (1975); Zimmerman’s, Inc. v. McDonough Const. Co., 240 Ga. 317 , supra. We conclude that the trial court correctly held that the instrument was a release discharging all the joint tortfeasors from liability, it being without serious question that the rust stain damage was a "single injury” for which there is no "rational basis” to apportion the loss, to which the release rule applies. 1978See also Gilson v. Mitchell, 131 Ga. App. 321 ( 205 SE2d 421 ) (1974), affd. sub nom Mitchell v. Gilson, 233 Ga. 453 ( 211 SE2d 744 ) (1975); Zimmerman’s, Inc. v. McDonough Const. Co., 240 Ga. 317 , supra. We conclude that the trial court correctly held that the instrument was a release discharging all the joint tortfeasors from liability, it being without serious question that the rust stain damage was a "single injury” for which there is no "rational basis” to apportion the loss, to which the release rule applies. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Knight v. Lowery
green
2 sentences1978Knight v. Lowery, 228 Ga. 452 ( 185 SE2d 915 ) (1971), does not indicate a contrary result since the rationale of that decision was that the tortfeasors were not joint tortfeasors within the meaning of the release rule. 1978Knight v. Lowery, 228 Ga. 452 ( 185 SE2d 915 ) (1971), does not indicate a contrary result since the rationale of that decision was that the tortfeasors were not joint tortfeasors within the meaning of the release rule. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Allstate Insurance v. Hill
green
1 sentence1963Co. v. Hill, 218 Ga. 430 , supra. This being true, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Aetna would not be permitted to plead the release to bar the cross-action filed by Garden Lakes to the action brought by Mrs. Brooks against Spector and Garden Lakes, even though the effect of such pleading would be, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, to bar Mrs. Brooks’ action against Spector and Garden Lakes as the settlement by her agent with Spector and Garden Lakes also settled her claim against them. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Cochran v. Bell
green
2 sentences1963Cochran v. Bell, 102 Ga. App. 617 (1) ( 117 SE2d 645 ). 1963Cochran v. Bell, 102 Ga. App. 617 (1) ( 117 SE2d 645 ). | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Brown v. Hall green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Martin v. Monroe green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Arnold v. Johnston green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Petroyeanis v. Pirola green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| George N. Pierce Co. v. Wells, Fargo & Co. green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Gibson v. Alford green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Carter v. Anderson neutral | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.