release test in Iowa

1970The modern view repudiates the common-law rule under which the release of one tort-feasor automatically discharges the liability of the others, and makes the intention of the parties to the release the test of whether it effects the release of other tortfeasors who are not parties thereto.’ ” (Loc. cit.' 147 N.W.2d at pages 16, 17.) Finally, we noted but did not quote from, “McKenna v. Austin, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 228 , 134 F.2d 659 , 148 A.L.R. 1253 (opinion by Mr. Justice Rutledge, then Associate Justice of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia), Breen v. Peck, 28 N.J. 3

1970The modern view repudiates the common-law rule under which the release of one tort-feasor automatically discharges the liability of the others, and makes the intention of the parties to the release the test of whether it effects the release of other tortfeasors who are not parties thereto.’ ” (Loc. cit.' 147 N.W.2d at pages 16, 17.) Finally, we noted but did not quote from, “McKenna v. Austin, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 228 , 134 F.2d 659 , 148 A.L.R. 1253 (opinion by Mr. Justice Rutledge, then Associate Justice of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia), Breen v. Peck, 28 N.J. 3

1970The modern view repudiates the common-law rule under which the release of one tort-feasor automatically discharges the liability of the others, and makes the intention of the parties to the release the test of whether it effects the release of other tortfeasors who are not parties thereto.’ ” (Loc. cit.' 147 N.W.2d at pages 16, 17.) Finally, we noted but did not quote from, “McKenna v. Austin, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 228 , 134 F.2d 659 , 148 A.L.R. 1253 (opinion by Mr. Justice Rutledge, then Associate Justice of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia), Breen v. Peck, 28 N.J. 3

1970The modern view repudiates the common-law rule under which the release of one tort-feasor automatically discharges the liability of the others, and makes the intention of the parties to the release the test of whether it effects the release of other tortfeasors who are not parties thereto.'" (Loc. cit. 147 N.W.2d at pages 16, 17.) Finally, we noted but did not quote from, "McKenna v. Austin, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 228 , 134 F.2d 659 , 148 A.L.R. 1253 (opinion by Mr. Justice Rutledge, then Associate Justice of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia), Breen v. Peck, 28 N.J. 351

1970The modern view repudiates the common-law rule under which the release of one tort-feasor automatically discharges the liability of the others, and makes the intention of the parties to the release the test of whether it effects the release of other tortfeasors who are not parties thereto.’ ” (Loc. cit.' 147 N.W.2d at pages 16, 17.) Finally, we noted but did not quote from, “McKenna v. Austin, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 228 , 134 F.2d 659 , 148 A.L.R. 1253 (opinion by Mr. Justice Rutledge, then Associate Justice of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia), Breen v. Peck, 28 N.J. 3

1970The modern view repudiates the common-law rule under which the release of one tort-feasor automatically discharges the liability of the others, and makes the intention of the parties to the release the test of whether it effects the release of other tortfeasors who are not parties thereto.’ ” (Loc. cit.' 147 N.W.2d at pages 16, 17.) Finally, we noted but did not quote from, “McKenna v. Austin, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 228 , 134 F.2d 659 , 148 A.L.R. 1253 (opinion by Mr. Justice Rutledge, then Associate Justice of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia), Breen v. Peck, 28 N.J. 3

1965In Tewksbury v. Fellsway Laundry, Inc., 319 Mass. 386, 389 , 65 N.E.2d 918, 919 , is this language: “The great weight of authority supports the view that a release of a claim for personal injuries cannot be avoided merely because the injuries proved more serious than the releasor believed them' tó be at the time of executing the release, and that, in order to invalidate a release on account of mutual mistake, the mistake must relate to a past or present fact material to the contract and not *761 to cm opinion respecting future conditions as a result of present facts.” Pass v. MeClareu Rubber.

1965In Tewksbury v. Fellsway Laundry, Inc., 319 Mass. 386, 389 , 65 N.E.2d 918, 919 , is this language: “The great weight of authority supports the view that a release of a claim for personal injuries cannot be avoided merely because the injuries proved more serious than the releasor believed them' tó be at the time of executing the release, and that, in order to invalidate a release on account of mutual mistake, the mistake must relate to a past or present fact material to the contract and not *761 to cm opinion respecting future conditions as a result of present facts.” Pass v. MeClareu Rubber.

1965Co., 198 N. C. 123, 128 , 150 S.E. 709, 711 , also contains pertinent language: “Plaintiff having chosen to settle his claim before the full extent of his injury had been ascertained, thereby taking the risk that his damages might exceed the sum paid to him in settlement of his claim, must abide his contract.” II.

1965Co., 198 N. C. 123, 128 , 150 S.E. 709, 711 , also contains pertinent language: “Plaintiff having chosen to settle his claim before the full extent of his injury had been ascertained, thereby taking the risk that his damages might exceed the sum paid to him in settlement of his claim, must abide his contract.” II.

1961R.2d) One of the supporting precedents cited is Jordan v. Brady Transfer & Storage Co., 226 Iowa 137, 143 , 284 N.W. 73 , which says of similar statements from an earlier annotation in 48 A. L.

1961R.2d) One of the supporting precedents cited is Jordan v. Brady Transfer & Storage Co., 226 Iowa 137, 143 , 284 N.W. 73 , which says of similar statements from an earlier annotation in 48 A. L.

1959See Restatement of Contracts, section 575; In re Estate of Turner, 250 Iowa 795 , 96 N.W.2d 481 .

1959See Restatement of Contracts, section 575; In re Estate of Turner, 250 Iowa 795 , 96 N.W.2d 481 .

1949This rule is applicable in the case of contracts whereby in consideration of the release of a claim of damages the employer promises the employee employment, but the employee does- not agree to serve.” In Kirkley v. Roberts Co., 268 Mass. 246, 251 , 167 N. E. 289, 290 , plaintiff was promised a written contract if he would leave his then employer and go with the company— “He decided so to do, and received this written agreement.

1949This rule is applicable in the case of contracts whereby in consideration of the release of a claim of damages the employer promises the employee employment, but the employee does- not agree to serve.” In Kirkley v. Roberts Co., 268 Mass. 246, 251 , 167 N. E. 289, 290 , plaintiff was promised a written contract if he would leave his then employer and go with the company— “He decided so to do, and received this written agreement.

1932For example, if the defendant pleads a release as a defense to the action, the plaintiff may prove either that no release was ever given, or that it was executed under duress, or obtained by fraud, or any other facts to defeat its effect. * * * Neither was it necessary for the plaintiff to amend his petition so as to set up fraud as a defense to the answer of the defendant. * * * The law supplies the appropriate pleading for the admission of any competent evidence, either negative or affirmative, tending to defeat the effect of new matter pleaded in the answer as a defense.” Whether the princi

1930Having made these covenants in a deed reconveying this land, we think it must be held, as a matter of law, that they operate as a release of his claim, and that he is estopped from recovering anything thereon.” *1352 See, also, Silverman v. Loomis, 104 Ill. 137 .

1915That question is set at rest by the recent case of Beddington v. Blue & Raftery, 168 Iowa 34 .