release hearing in Colorado

1984See, e.g., Jeffrey v. District Court, 626 P.2d 631 (Colo.1981) (a plea of guilty followed by a deferred sentence and judgment is a conviction for purposes of implicating the double jeopardy clause); People v. Jacquez, 196 Colo. 569 , 588 P.2d 871 (1979) ( see exhaustive recitation of cases cited in n. 2).

1984See, e.g., Jeffrey v. District Court, 626 P.2d 631 (Colo.1981) (a plea of guilty followed by a deferred sentence and judgment is a conviction for purposes of implicating the double jeopardy clause); People v. Jacquez, 196 Colo. 569 , 588 P.2d 871 (1979) ( see exhaustive recitation of cases cited in n. 2).

1998People v. Armstrong, 919 P.2d 826 (Colo.App.1995).

1985On appeal this judgment was affirmed in People v. Howell, 196 Colo. 408 , 586 P.2d 27 (1978).

1985On appeal this judgment was affirmed in People v. Howell, 196 Colo. 408 , 586 P.2d 27 (1978).

1984The court is empowered, for example, to order a release hearing, and may grant a full or conditional release, and “may order any additional or supplemental examination, investigation, or study which it deems necessary to a proper consideration of the question of eligibility for release.” §§ 16-8-115(1) & (2), 8 C.R.S. (1983 Supp.); cf. Parks v. District Court, 180 Colo. 202 , 503 P.2d 1029 (1972) (court which commits a person adjudged incompetent to stand trial retains jurisdiction to oversee his commitment and to protect his constitutional rights).

1984The court is empowered, for example, to order a release hearing, and may grant a full or conditional release, and “may order any additional or supplemental examination, investigation, or study which it deems necessary to a proper consideration of the question of eligibility for release.” §§ 16-8-115(1) & (2), 8 C.R.S. (1983 Supp.); cf. Parks v. District Court, 180 Colo. 202 , 503 P.2d 1029 (1972) (court which commits a person adjudged incompetent to stand trial retains jurisdiction to oversee his commitment and to protect his constitutional rights).

1981If the defendant’s eligibility for release is contested, then “the burden of submitting evidence and the burden of proof by a preponderance of evidence shall be on the party contesting the report of the chief officer of the institution having custody of the defendant.” Section 16-8-115(2), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8). 18 The United States Supreme Court in Addington v. Texas, supra, 441 U.S. at 423 , 99 S.Ct. at 1808 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 329 , noted that the function of a standard of proof is “to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to t

1981E. g., United States v. Ecker, supra; People v. Logan, supra; People v. Howell, supra; State v. Alto, supra; In the Matter of Lewis, supra. The trial court in this case expressly concluded at the release hearing that the defendant continues to suffer from a mental disease and as a result “constitutes an imminent threat to himself and others.” With such a determination section 16-8-115(3), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8), requires the court to recommit the defendant. 25 *1055 The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the district court with directions to proceed in accordance with the

1981See In re Franklin, supra; cf. Bolton v. Harris, supra (90 day term of temporary commitment before hearing on present mental condition upheld); People v. McQuillan, supra (judicially authorized term of 60 days for examination pending enactment of specific legislation establishing a definite period).

1981E. g., United States v. Ecker, supra; People v. Logan, supra; People v. Howell, supra; State v. Alto, supra; In the Matter of Lewis, supra. The trial court in this case expressly concluded at the release hearing that the defendant continues to suffer from a mental disease and as a result “constitutes an imminent threat to himself and others.” With such a determination section 16-8-115(3), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8), requires the court to recommit the defendant. 25 *1055 The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the district court with directions to proceed in accordance with the

1981If the defendant’s eligibility for release is contested, then “the burden of submitting evidence and the burden of proof by a preponderance of evidence shall be on the party contesting the report of the chief officer of the institution having custody of the defendant.” Section 16-8-115(2), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8). 18 The United States Supreme Court in Addington v. Texas, supra, 441 U.S. at 423 , 99 S.Ct. at 1808 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 329 , noted that the function of a standard of proof is “to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to t

1981E. g., United States v. Ecker, supra; People v. Logan, supra; People v. Howell, supra; State v. Alto, supra; In the Matter of Lewis, supra. The trial court in this case expressly concluded at the release hearing that the defendant continues to suffer from a mental disease and as a result “constitutes an imminent threat to himself and others.” With such a determination section 16-8-115(3), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8), requires the court to recommit the defendant. 25 *1055 The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the district court with directions to proceed in accordance with the

1972Viersen & Cochran Drilling Co. v. Ford, 425 P.2d 965 (Okl.); American Steel Foundries v. Industrial Commission, 361 Ill. 582 , 198 N.E. 687 .

1972Viersen & Cochran Drilling Co. v. Ford, 425 P.2d 965 (Okl.); American Steel Foundries v. Industrial Commission, 361 Ill. 582 , 198 N.E. 687 .

1972Viersen & Cochran Drilling Co. v. Ford, 425 P.2d 965 (Okl.); American Steel Foundries v. Industrial Commission, 361 Ill. 582 , 198 N.E. 687 .

1960D.C. 228, 134 F.2d 659, 662 , 148 A.L.R. 1253 , is the leading authority which holds that the release rule is ill-founded and should be repudiated.

1960D.C. 228, 134 F.2d 659, 662 , 148 A.L.R. 1253 , is the leading authority which holds that the release rule is ill-founded and should be repudiated.

1960Speaking through Justice Brennan the Court noted that the release rule is "rooted in the sound and just principle that there may be but one satisfaction for a tortious wrong, * * *." [ 17 N.J. 67 , 110 A.2d 32 .] In the Breen case the New Jersey Court went even further in that there the document was an outright release but the court refused to construe it as a discharge of the remaining tort feasors since it failed to express this intent.