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18 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1937–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chauvlier v. Booth Creek Ski Holdings, Inc.green1 sentence2014He fails to explain how the circumstances of his signing interfered with his ability 10 No. 31531-2-111 DeAsis v. YMCA to understand the agreement; he has presented no evidence that he was denied the opportunity to read it or was misled about its terms. "[A] person who signs an agreement without reading it is bound by its terms as long as there was' ample opportunity to examine the contract in as great a detail as he cared, and he failed to do so for his own personal reasons.'" Chauvlier, 109 Wn. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Coy Ray Phelpsgreen1 sentence2010The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, in determining that it was acceptable to shift the burden of proof onto the defendant at an insanity acquiteee's release hearing, held that "[t]he state's interest in preventing the premature release of individuals who have already demonstrated their dangerousness to society by committing a criminal act outweighed the acquittee's interest in avoiding continued confinement." United States v. Phelps, 955 F.2d 1258, 1267 (9th Cir.1992). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Redinggreen2 sentences1994See, e.g., State v. Reding, 119 Wn.2d 685, 690-96 , 835 P.2d 1019 (1992) (when a motorist commits one of the more serious traffic offenses listed in RCW 10.31.100(3), custodial arrest is authorized; this is a matter of legislative, not constitutional, limitation). 1994See, e.g., State v. Reding, 119 Wn.2d 685, 690-96 , 835 P.2d 1019 (1992) (when a motorist commits one of the more serious traffic offenses listed in RCW 10.31.100(3), custodial arrest is authorized; this is a matter of legislative, not constitutional, limitation). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re the Detention of Petersen
green
2 sentences2009Petersen, 145 Wn.2d at 799 . 2009Rather, these elements must be proved at the release hearing."). [6] Petersen, 145 Wash.2d at 799 , 42 P.3d 952 . [7] In re Det. of Brock, 99 Wash.App. 722, 724 , 995 P.2d 111 (2000). [8] Laws of 2001, ch. 286, § 4. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Frank J. Pettinelli v. Edmund R. Danzig
green
2 sentences2004Pettinelli, 722 F.2d at 710 In Jankovich , the plaintiffs/stockholders and defendant corporation executed a Settlement and Release Agreement ("Agreement") following disputes over the transfer of stock. 2004Pettinelli, 722 F.2d at 710 . | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Ornelas v. United States
green
2 sentences2002Id. 2002Id. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Boyce v. West
green
2 sentences2026This is because such a release or waiver “is a contract in which one party agrees to abandon or relinquish a claim, obligation or cause of action against another party” and “[a]s a contract, a release is to be construed according to the legal principles applicable to contracts.” Boyce v. West, 71 Wn. 2026This is because such a release or waiver “is a contract in which one party agrees to abandon or relinquish a claim, obligation or cause of action against another party” and “[a]s a contract, a release is to be construed according to the legal principles applicable to contracts.” Boyce v. West, 71 Wn. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
In re Pers. Restraint of Dodge
neutral
1 sentence2025Relevant here, Day argued the ISRB failed to “actually consider[] release conditions, or the likelihood that Day would follow such conditions.” In response, the ISRB conceded its decision did not comply with our Supreme Court’s recent opinion in In re Personal Restraint of Dodge, 198 Wn.2d 826 , 844, 502 P.3d 349 (2022), because it “does not make it apparent ‘that the ISRB meaningfully considered . . . whether any conditions of release would sufficiently mitigate [Day’s] risk level.’” Because the ISRB had already scheduled 4 No. 85705-3-I a new release hearing to remedy the error, which would | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Jones v. United States
green
1 sentence2017Id. at 3 7 4 ("In support of his petition for release, Mr. McCuistion submitted a declaration from an expert stating that he had never qualified as an SVP."). 10 The McCuistion court also rejected McCuistion's facial challenge to the "change" prerequisite, explaining that substantive due process is facially satisfied by two other features of the SVP commitment statute: (1) the State's burden to prove 10 Moreover, as authority for its conclusion that the right to a release hearing is purely statutory, the McCuistion majority cited only one case, Jones, 463 U.S. at 368 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort
green
1 sentence2014Id. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Barton v. Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences2014Barton v. Dep't o/Transp., 178 Wn.2d 193,208 , 308 P.3d 597 (2013). 2014Barton v. Dep't o/Transp., 178 Wn.2d 193,208 , 308 P.3d 597 (2013). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Shields v. Sta-Fit, Inc.
green
1 sentence2014Whether a release and waiver is included in an adhesion contract is one of the Wagenblast factors considered in determining whether it violates public policy; in Shields, this court held that the health club membership contract in that case was "clearly one of adhesion," 79 Wn. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Parris
green
1 sentence2014RCW 9. 94A.631; State v. Parris, 163 Wn. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Heath v. Uraga
green
1 sentence2013Heath v. Uraga, 106 Wn. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Lacey Nursing Center, Inc. v. Department of Revenue
green
2 sentences2009The legislature amended the LRA definition in 2001 by adding the phrase "which satisfies the conditions set forth in RCW 71.09.092." [9] Laws of 2005, ch. 344, § 2. [10] State v. Ransleben, 135 Wash.App. 535, 538 , 144 P.3d 397 (2006) (citing Lacey Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 128 Wash.2d 40, 53 , 905 P.2d 338 (1995)). [11] Ransleben, 135 Wash.App. at 538 , 144 P.3d 397 (citing Waste Mgmt. of Seattle, Inc., v. Util. & Transp. 2009The legislature amended the LRA definition in 2001 by adding the phrase "which satisfies the conditions set forth in RCW 71.09.092." [9] Laws of 2005, ch. 344, § 2. [10] State v. Ransleben, 135 Wash.App. 535, 538 , 144 P.3d 397 (2006) (citing Lacey Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 128 Wash.2d 40, 53 , 905 P.2d 338 (1995)). [11] Ransleben, 135 Wash.App. at 538 , 144 P.3d 397 (citing Waste Mgmt. of Seattle, Inc., v. Util. & Transp. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Ransleben
neutral
2 sentences2009The legislature amended the LRA definition in 2001 by adding the phrase "which satisfies the conditions set forth in RCW 71.09.092." [9] Laws of 2005, ch. 344, § 2. [10] State v. Ransleben, 135 Wash.App. 535, 538 , 144 P.3d 397 (2006) (citing Lacey Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 128 Wash.2d 40, 53 , 905 P.2d 338 (1995)). [11] Ransleben, 135 Wash.App. at 538 , 144 P.3d 397 (citing Waste Mgmt. of Seattle, Inc., v. Util. & Transp. 2009The legislature amended the LRA definition in 2001 by adding the phrase "which satisfies the conditions set forth in RCW 71.09.092." [9] Laws of 2005, ch. 344, § 2. [10] State v. Ransleben, 135 Wash.App. 535, 538 , 144 P.3d 397 (2006) (citing Lacey Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 128 Wash.2d 40, 53 , 905 P.2d 338 (1995)). [11] Ransleben, 135 Wash.App. at 538 , 144 P.3d 397 (citing Waste Mgmt. of Seattle, Inc., v. Util. & Transp. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
In Re the Detention of Brock
neutral
2 sentences2009Rather, these elements must be proved at the release hearing."). [6] Petersen, 145 Wash.2d at 799 , 42 P.3d 952 . [7] In re Det. of Brock, 99 Wash.App. 722, 724 , 995 P.2d 111 (2000). [8] Laws of 2001, ch. 286, § 4. 2009Rather, these elements must be proved at the release hearing."). [6] Petersen, 145 Wash.2d at 799 , 42 P.3d 952 . [7] In re Det. of Brock, 99 Wash.App. 722, 724 , 995 P.2d 111 (2000). [8] Laws of 2001, ch. 286, § 4. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Detention of Petersen v. State
green
1 sentence2009Rather, these elements must be proved at the release hearing."). [6] Petersen, 145 Wash.2d at 799 , 42 P.3d 952 . [7] In re Det. of Brock, 99 Wash.App. 722, 724 , 995 P.2d 111 (2000). [8] Laws of 2001, ch. 286, § 4. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
In re the Detention of Ransleben
green
2 sentences2009The legislature amended the LRA definition in 2001 by adding the phrase "which satisfies the conditions set forth in RCW 71.09.092." [9] Laws of 2005, ch. 344, § 2. [10] State v. Ransleben, 135 Wash.App. 535, 538 , 144 P.3d 397 (2006) (citing Lacey Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 128 Wash.2d 40, 53 , 905 P.2d 338 (1995)). [11] Ransleben, 135 Wash.App. at 538 , 144 P.3d 397 (citing Waste Mgmt. of Seattle, Inc., v. Util. & Transp. 2009The legislature amended the LRA definition in 2001 by adding the phrase "which satisfies the conditions set forth in RCW 71.09.092." [9] Laws of 2005, ch. 344, § 2. [10] State v. Ransleben, 135 Wash.App. 535, 538 , 144 P.3d 397 (2006) (citing Lacey Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 128 Wash.2d 40, 53 , 905 P.2d 338 (1995)). [11] Ransleben, 135 Wash.App. at 538 , 144 P.3d 397 (citing Waste Mgmt. of Seattle, Inc., v. Util. & Transp. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Housing Authority of Birmingham Dist. v. Morris
green
2 sentences1967The Pennsylvania court did not give much consideration to the argument, however, and dismissed it rather summarily in a brief paragraph. *80 In Housing Authority of Birmingham v. Morris, 244 Ala. 557 , 14 So.2d 527 (1943), the Supreme Court of Alabama held that a disclaimer of liability by a housing authority is not effective to insulate it from liability to its tenants for its own negligence. 1967The Pennsylvania court did not give much consideration to the argument, however, and dismissed it rather summarily in a brief paragraph. *80 In Housing Authority of Birmingham v. Morris, 244 Ala. 557 , 14 So.2d 527 (1943), the Supreme Court of Alabama held that a disclaimer of liability by a housing authority is not effective to insulate it from liability to its tenants for its own negligence. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Wampler v. Beinert
green
2 sentences1948“The status of property, when once fixed, remains so in character until changed by deed, by agreement of the parties, by operation of law, or by the working of some form of estoppel.” In Wampler v. Beinert, 125 Wash. 494 , 216 Pac. 855 , an action for damages because of personal injuries incurred by the wife, we held that the husband, having abandoned the wife, did not have authority, as the manager of the community, to enter into a settlement and a release of the claim for damages. 1948“The status of property, when once fixed, remains so in character until changed by deed, by agreement of the parties, by operation of law, or by the working of some form of estoppel.” In Wampler v. Beinert, 125 Wash. 494 , 216 Pac. 855 , an action for damages because of personal injuries incurred by the wife, we held that the husband, having abandoned the wife, did not have authority, as the manager of the community, to enter into a settlement and a release of the claim for damages. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Totti v. Fernández
neutral
1 sentence1937Co., 11 Wash. 653 , 40 Pac. 609 , a release of a claim for $2,500 under a fire insurance policy was procured upon payment of $119.75 by falsely representing that the policy was void. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Sanford v. Royal Insurance
green
1 sentence1937Co., 11 Wash. 653 , 40 Pac. 609 , a release of a claim for $2,500 under a fire insurance policy was procured upon payment of $119.75 by falsely representing that the policy was void. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.