release claim in Texas

2024Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex.1993).

2020A release of a claim “operates to extinguish the claim . . . and is an absolute bar to any right of action on the released matter.” Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1993).

2018Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Brady, 811 S.W.2d 931, 938 (Tex. 1991).

2014See, e.g., id. at 938 (general categorical releases are to be narrowly construed).

2014See Williams v. Glash, 789 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex. 1990) (explaining that burden of proving that a claim was unknown, once defense of release of known claims is shown and there is evidence that the parties agreed to release known claims, is on the party attempting to avoid the release under a claim of mutual mistake).

1995The court concluded that “in narrow circumstances a party may raise a fact issue for the trier of fact to set aside a release under the doctrine of mutual mistake.” Id. (emphasis added).

2023A divided court of appeals reversed, rendered judgment that the release did not bar Headington’s claims against Finley, and remanded for further proceedings.6 The court held that (1) categorical releases must be narrowly construed; (2) the meaning of “predecessors” is contextually constrained by words unambiguously “describ[ing] predecessors within the corporate composition or structure of Petro Canyon and its affiliates”; (3) neither parol evidence nor surrounding circumstances could broaden the release’s narrower use of the term; and (4) Finley was not a released party because it was neither

2023A divided court of appeals reversed, rendered judgment that the release did not bar Headington’s claims against Finley, and remanded for further proceedings.6 The court held that (1) categorical releases must be narrowly construed; (2) the meaning of “predecessors” is contextually constrained by words unambiguously “describ[ing] predecessors within the corporate composition or structure of Petro Canyon and its affiliates”; (3) neither parol evidence nor surrounding circumstances could broaden the release’s narrower use of the term; and (4) Finley was not a released party because it was neither

2015See Seminole Pipeline Co. v. Broad Leaf Partners, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 730, 740 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) *710 (recognizing one requirement for a judicial admission is that it be a deliberate, clear, and unequivocal admission).

2015See Seminole Pipeline Co. v. Broad Leaf Partners, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 730, 740 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (recognizing one requirement for a judicial admission is that it be a deliberate, clear, and unequivocal admission).

2006See id. at 175, 178 .

2006Schlumberger, 959 S.W.2d at 177-81 .

2022In particular, Payne argued that the 2017 Release was not effective in releasing unknown future claims under Babbitt v. Norfolk & Western Railway Company, 104 F.3d 89, 93 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that release given as part of a settlement of an existing FELA claim is enforceable as to injuries known to exist at the time of the settlement but not unknown future injuries).

2022The release would bar the plaintiffs’ claims only if it “was clearly executed as a settlement for” their “specific injuries in controversy.” Id.

2024Co. v. Butler, 137 S.W.3d 199, 219 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (holding that a release and waiver listing “affiliated companies [and] parent companies” sufficiently identified the parent so that the parent was also released).

2024“The unconditional release of a judgment operates as a total relinquishment of all the creditor’s rights in the judgment and a complete discharge of the debt created by the judgment.” Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Reavis, 627 S.W.3d 713 , 740 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2021, pet. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.) (citing Rapp v. Mandell & Wright, P.C., 123 S.W.3d 431, 435 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied)).

2024See Keszler, 943 S.W.2d at 435 (concluding claim was mentioned in the release where Keszler agreed to release all claims relating to his relationship with Memorial, and his claim for toxic exposure –27– during his employment at Memorial was related to his relationship with Memorial).

2023Trust Beneficiary’s Statutory Right to “Full Information” In Slay v. Burnett Trust, we confirmed the “established rule” governing when a beneficiary’s “consent to an act of his trustee which would constitute a violation of the duty of loyalty precludes him from holding the trustee liable for the consequences of the act.” 187 S.W.2d 377, 390 (Tex. 1945).

2021See Jacobs v. Satterwhite, 65 S.W.3d 653 , 655–56 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam) (reasoning that an appellate court should affirm the trial court’s summary judgment on unchallenged claims). 14 C.

2018We think it an untenable reading to include the Fleming Firm within the definition of “Released Parties.” Appellants could not “attempt to assert any claim” against the firm “related in any way to the alleged ingestion of Diet Drugs.” No doubt, “[t]he phrase ‘relates to’ . . . is recognized as a very broad term.” RSR Corp. v. Siegmund, 309 S.W.3d 686, 701 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (internal quotation omitted).

2018When construing the release, we give its terms “their plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meaning unless the instrument shows that the parties used them in a technical or different sense.” Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. 1996). 6 In arguing that the scope of the release did not include claims arising from Keystone’s failure to restore the surface of the farm, Geheb ignores the release clause and focuses on the sentence that precedes it.

2017“Generally, a release is a bar to any right of action growing out of the matter discharged, conclusively estopping the releasor from making further efforts to enforce the claim released.” Franks v. Brookshire Bros., Inc., 986 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1999, no pet.) (citing Hart v. Traders & Gen.

2015See Staff Indus., Inc. v. Hallmark Contracting, Inc., 846 S.W.2d 542, 547-48 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).

2014"Generally, a cause of action accrues when a wrongful act causes a legal injury." Etan Indus., Inc. v. Lehmann, 359 S.W.3d 620, 623 (Tex. 2011) (citing Provident Life & Accident Ins.

2011See Wagner v. NutraSweet Co., 95 F.3d 527, 531-34 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that several former employees were barred from asserting certain claims in class action against defendant company based on allegedly discriminatory employment practices because they previously released the claims in connection with severance from the company).

2011See Bair v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex.1992) (stating that res judicata “prevents the relitigation of a claim or cause of action that has been finally adjudicated, as well as related matters that, with the use of diligence, should have been litigated in the prior suit”).