release hearing in District of Columbia

2001Johnson Co., supra, 693 A.2d at 1122 .

1987Household Finance Co. v. Shamley, supra, 140 A.2d at 184 ; accord, e.g., LeClair v. Wells, 895 A.2d 452 , 453 (Me.1978) (“A release will ... be set aside if shown to be the product of fraud, misrepresentation, or overreaching” (citation omitted)); Page v. Baldon, supra, 437 S.W.2d at 629 . 15 The release may be invalid as to Andrew for two additional, interrelated reasons.

1987Household Finance Co. v. Shamley, supra, 140 A.2d at 184 ; accord, e.g., LeClair v. Wells, 895 A.2d 452 , 453 (Me.1978) (“A release will ... be set aside if shown to be the product of fraud, misrepresentation, or overreaching” (citation omitted)); Page v. Baldon, supra, 437 S.W.2d at 629 . 15 The release may be invalid as to Andrew for two additional, interrelated reasons.

1981M.A.P. v. Ryan, D.C.App., 285 A.2d 310 (1971). [1] The majority maintains that the lesser protections in § 24-301—burden of proof on the acquittee, without right to jury trial—do not alter its equivalence to §§ 21-544 and -545, for the acquittee already has had a right to jury trial on the conduct manifesting insanity, and the shift in burden of proof is justified by a valid evidentiary presumption that the acquittee's insanity at the time of the offense—which he himself asserted—continues to the time of the release hearing.

1980There are three possibilities, not two as we originally perceived: (1) it is wholly rehabilitative (/. e., not at all punitive), in which case an acquitee can be committed indefinitely, without regard to a hypothetical maximum prison sentence, subject only to the periodic review afforded civil commitees, see Jones, supra at 190 ; or, at the other extreme, (2) it is inherently punitive, in which case the release hearing procedure itself is unconstitutional, see Baxstrom, supra; Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 510-11 . 92 S.Ct. 1048 , 31 L.Ed.2d 394 (1972); Brown, supra, 155 U.S.App.D.C. at 409-

1980There are three possibilities, not two as we originally perceived: (1) it is wholly rehabilitative (/. e., not at all punitive), in which case an acquitee can be committed indefinitely, without regard to a hypothetical maximum prison sentence, subject only to the periodic review afforded civil commitees, see Jones, supra at 190 ; or, at the other extreme, (2) it is inherently punitive, in which case the release hearing procedure itself is unconstitutional, see Baxstrom, supra; Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 510-11 . 92 S.Ct. 1048 , 31 L.Ed.2d 394 (1972); Brown, supra, 155 U.S.App.D.C. at 409-

1980There are three possibilities, not two as we originally perceived: (1) it is wholly rehabilitative (/. e., not at all punitive), in which case an acquitee can be committed indefinitely, without regard to a hypothetical maximum prison sentence, subject only to the periodic review afforded civil commitees, see Jones, supra at 190 ; or, at the other extreme, (2) it is inherently punitive, in which case the release hearing procedure itself is unconstitutional, see Baxstrom, supra; Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 510-11 . 92 S.Ct. 1048 , 31 L.Ed.2d 394 (1972); Brown, supra, 155 U.S.App.D.C. at 409-

1980There are three possibilities, not two as we originally perceived: (1) it is wholly rehabilitative (/. e., not at all punitive), in which case an acquitee can be committed indefinitely, without regard to a hypothetical maximum prison sentence, subject only to the periodic review afforded civil commitees, see Jones, supra at 190 ; or, at the other extreme, (2) it is inherently punitive, in which case the release hearing procedure itself is unconstitutional, see Baxstrom, supra; Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 510-11 . 92 S.Ct. 1048 , 31 L.Ed.2d 394 (1972); Brown, supra, 155 U.S.App.D.C. at 409-

1979M., D.C.App., 407 A.2d 617, 620 (1979); Bethea v. United States, D.C.App., 365 A.2d 64 , 94 & n.67 (1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 , 97 S.Ct. 2979 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1095 (1977). [5] When a defendant raises an insanity defense and is acquitted on that ground, the individual is automatically "committed to a hospital for the mentally ill" for up to 50 days, within which period he or she is entitled to a release hearing at which "the person confined shall have the burden of proof" that sanity has been restored.

1979M., D.C.App., 407 A.2d 617, 620 (1979); Bethea v. United States, D.C.App., 365 A.2d 64 , 94 & n.67 (1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 , 97 S.Ct. 2979 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1095 (1977). [5] When a defendant raises an insanity defense and is acquitted on that ground, the individual is automatically "committed to a hospital for the mentally ill" for up to 50 days, within which period he or she is entitled to a release hearing at which "the person confined shall have the burden of proof" that sanity has been restored.

1979M., D.C.App., 407 A.2d 617, 620 (1979); Bethea v. United States, D.C.App., 365 A.2d 64 , 94 & n.67 (1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 , 97 S.Ct. 2979 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1095 (1977). [5] When a defendant raises an insanity defense and is acquitted on that ground, the individual is automatically "committed to a hospital for the mentally ill" for up to 50 days, within which period he or she is entitled to a release hearing at which "the person confined shall have the burden of proof" that sanity has been restored.

1979M., D.C.App., 407 A.2d 617, 620 (1979); Bethea v. United States, D.C.App., 365 A.2d 64 , 94 & n.67 (1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 , 97 S.Ct. 2979 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1095 (1977). [5] When a defendant raises an insanity defense and is acquitted on that ground, the individual is automatically "committed to a hospital for the mentally ill" for up to 50 days, within which period he or she is entitled to a release hearing at which "the person confined shall have the burden of proof" that sanity has been restored.