remand hearing in Colorado

2026Riding I thus instructed the district court to take new evidence on the parties’ circumstances at the time of the remand hearing and the court’s new orders. ¶ 17 The cases cited in Riding I’s remand directions and the legal standard a remand court must apply when reconsidering 7 maintenance and child support confirms this interpretation. “[W]here a new support order is to be made, both parties must be allowed to show their current circumstances,” In re Marriage of Foss, 30 P.3d 850, 853 (Colo. App. 2001), and “shall be given a full opportunity to present all relevant evidence affecting these f

2026See In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 24 ; In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning M.G.C.-G., 228 P.3d 271, 273 (Colo. App. 2010). ¶ 50 Wife further requests that we foreclose husband from arguing on remand that she is voluntarily underemployed or unemployed because the court declined to make any such finding in its original permanent orders.

2026Likewise, a district court’s reconsideration of child support on remand must be based on “the parties’ present circumstances.” In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning M.G.C.-G., 228 P.3d 271, 273 (Colo. App. 2010). ¶ 19 Wife attempts to save the district court’s remand rulings by arguing that if, as we interpret Riding I’s remand language, the court had to base its decision “on the facts as they existed at the remand hearing[,] the court would be making orders to modify an existing order rather than to justify [its] original order.” But Riding I reversed the court’s original order on mainte

2026See Wright, ¶ 24; M.G.C.-G., 228 P.3d at 273 .

2024See In re Marriage of Simon , 856 P.2d 47, 51 (Colo. App. 11 1993) (awards of maintenance must be based upon the parties’ needs and circumstances at the time of the hearing).

2024See In re Marriage of Simon , 856 P.2d 47, 51 (Colo. App. 11 1993) (awards of maintenance must be based upon the parties’ needs and circumstances at the time of the hearing).

2021See § 14-10-113(1)(c) ; see also In re Marriage of Wells , 850 P.2d 694, 699 (Colo. 1993) ("In determining the circumstances of the parties for purposes of making an equitable award of the couple's marital property, a trial court may properly consider the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time of the permanent orders hearing."); In re Marriage of Morton , 2016 COA 1, ¶ 14 , 369 P.3d 800 ("Because we are reversing the trial court's division of marital property and debts, on remand the court must consider the parties’ economic circumstances at the time of the remand."). ¶ 54 It thus f

2010See In re Marriage of Wells, 850 P.2d 694, 696-99 (Colo.1993).

2015See id. at 1256 n.5. ¶24       Mr. Johnson has not sought a remand hearing at which to rebut this presumption.

2015See id. at 1256 n.5. ¶24       Mr. Johnson has not sought a remand hearing at which to rebut this presumption.

2026Riding I thus instructed the district court to take new evidence on the parties’ circumstances at the time of the remand hearing and the court’s new orders. ¶ 17 The cases cited in Riding I’s remand directions and the legal standard a remand court must apply when reconsidering 7 maintenance and child support confirms this interpretation. “[W]here a new support order is to be made, both parties must be allowed to show their current circumstances,” In re Marriage of Foss, 30 P.3d 850, 853 (Colo. App. 2001), and “shall be given a full opportunity to present all relevant evidence affecting these f

2026See Van Gundy v. Van Gundy, 2012 COA 194, ¶ 12 (the appellate court generally reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear error, meaning that we will not disturb them if they are supported by the record).

2026Riding I thus instructed the district court to take new evidence on the parties’ circumstances at the time of the remand hearing and the court’s new orders. ¶ 17 The cases cited in Riding I’s remand directions and the legal standard a remand court must apply when reconsidering 7 maintenance and child support confirms this interpretation. “[W]here a new support order is to be made, both parties must be allowed to show their current circumstances,” In re Marriage of Foss, 30 P.3d 850, 853 (Colo. App. 2001), and “shall be given a full opportunity to present all relevant evidence affecting these f

2025See C.H., 166 P.3d at 291. ¶ 10 At the termination hearing, father’s counsel elicited testimony from the caseworker establishing father was participating in services required by his community corrections sentence, including employment, monitored sobriety, mental health treatment, and substance abuse groups.

2015See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171-72 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 (rejecting the argument that Wood's remand instruction eliminated the need to show adverse effect). [ 26 Before Mickens, this court concluded that a defendant need not separately show that counsel's performance was adversely affected by a conflict.

2015See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171-72 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 (rejecting the argument that Wood's remand instruction eliminated the need to show adverse effect). [ 26 Before Mickens, this court concluded that a defendant need not separately show that counsel's performance was adversely affected by a conflict.

2014Pathologists, P.C., 851 P.2d 901, 910 (Colo.1993)("In the absence of discretion, a party could compel a trial court to award costs no matter how unreasonable or unnecessary such expenses may have been."). 17 Indeed, the professional corporation's expert acknowledged during the remand hearing that, even though "the agreement says ['lall,['] I also think, as a matter of law in Colorado[,] that the ethics code ... requires [lawyers] to always look at the [Colo. RPC 1.5(a) ] elements on top of the contractual elements...." The expert explained this reasoning, stating that "I personally believe, yo

2009See, e.g., Esko v. Lovvold, 272 Or. 27 , 534 P.2d 510 , 512 n. 2 (1975); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Robinson, 68 So.2d 406, 409 (Fla.1953). [4] Because section 13-21-102(6), C.R.S.2008, prohibits considering a defendant's "income or net worth" when "determining the appropriateness or amount of [exemplary] damages," we decline to weigh Qwest's economic position in our federal due process analysis. [5] The dearth of such cases suggests that Colorado's two-tiered approach to awarding exemplary damages is unusual, if not unique. [6] Qwest may raise PUC Rule 21 at the remand hearing and argue tha

2009See, e.g., Esko v. Lovvold, 272 Or. 27 , 534 P.2d 510 , 512 n. 2 (1975); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Robinson, 68 So.2d 406, 409 (Fla.1953). [4] Because section 13-21-102(6), C.R.S.2008, prohibits considering a defendant's "income or net worth" when "determining the appropriateness or amount of [exemplary] damages," we decline to weigh Qwest's economic position in our federal due process analysis. [5] The dearth of such cases suggests that Colorado's two-tiered approach to awarding exemplary damages is unusual, if not unique. [6] Qwest may raise PUC Rule 21 at the remand hearing and argue tha

2009See, e.g., Esko v. Lovvold, 272 Or. 27 , 534 P.2d 510 , 512 n. 2 (1975); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Robinson, 68 So.2d 406, 409 (Fla.1953). [4] Because section 13-21-102(6), C.R.S.2008, prohibits considering a defendant's "income or net worth" when "determining the appropriateness or amount of [exemplary] damages," we decline to weigh Qwest's economic position in our federal due process analysis. [5] The dearth of such cases suggests that Colorado's two-tiered approach to awarding exemplary damages is unusual, if not unique. [6] Qwest may raise PUC Rule 21 at the remand hearing and argue tha

2009See, e.g., Esko v. Lovvold, 272 Or. 27 , 534 P.2d 510 , 512 n. 2 (1975); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Robinson, 68 So.2d 406, 409 (Fla.1953). [4] Because section 13-21-102(6), C.R.S.2008, prohibits considering a defendant's "income or net worth" when "determining the appropriateness or amount of [exemplary] damages," we decline to weigh Qwest's economic position in our federal due process analysis. [5] The dearth of such cases suggests that Colorado's two-tiered approach to awarding exemplary damages is unusual, if not unique. [6] Qwest may raise PUC Rule 21 at the remand hearing and argue tha

2009See, e.g., Esko v. Lovvold, 272 Or. 27 , 534 P.2d 510 , 512 n. 2 (1975); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Robinson, 68 So.2d 406, 409 (Fla.1953). [4] Because section 13-21-102(6), C.R.S.2008, prohibits considering a defendant's "income or net worth" when "determining the appropriateness or amount of [exemplary] damages," we decline to weigh Qwest's economic position in our federal due process analysis. [5] The dearth of such cases suggests that Colorado's two-tiered approach to awarding exemplary damages is unusual, if not unique. [6] Qwest may raise PUC Rule 21 at the remand hearing and argue tha

2004See In re Marriage of Crowley, supra. Any remedial jail sentence imposed must be indefinite and contain a purge clause.

1992See Christian v. Westmoreland, supra. C We also agree with Indiana’s contention that the trial court must address its claim that Sports Facilities’ pursuit of a tort claim against Indiana was frivolous and groundless.

1990See Hancock v. State, 758 P.2d 1372 (Colo.1988).