remand hearing in District of Columbia

2013"Courts can meet this obligation by appointment of an appropriately qualified bilingual professional or appointment and payment of interpreter services to facilitate the communication process.” American Bar Association Standards for Language Access in Courts, Standard 6.3, Best Practices. ."Realistically, of course, we recognize that counsel’s actual performance at trial will constitute circumstantial evidence on the issue of whether [they were] adequately prepared before trial.” Nelson, supra, 601 A.2d at 592 (citation omitted). . "[P]lacing on the government the burden of persuasion at the r

2013"Courts can meet this obligation by appointment of an appropriately qualified bilingual professional or appointment and payment of interpreter services to facilitate the communication process.” American Bar Association Standards for Language Access in Courts, Standard 6.3, Best Practices. ."Realistically, of course, we recognize that counsel’s actual performance at trial will constitute circumstantial evidence on the issue of whether [they were] adequately prepared before trial.” Nelson, supra, 601 A.2d at 592 (citation omitted). . "[P]lacing on the government the burden of persuasion at the r

1991Nevertheless, placing on the government the burden of persuasion at the remand' hearing “serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), cited with approval in Matthews, supra, 459 A.2d at 1066 .

1991Nevertheless, placing on the government the burden of persuasion at the remand' hearing “serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), cited with approval in Matthews, supra, 459 A.2d at 1066 .

2015Dawkins, 41 A.3d at 1273 . 6 .

2014At that hearing the trial judge is to apply the Dyas criteria along with a voir dire of the proffered expert and either order a new trial, or reinstate the conviction and have another appeal. 43 Russell, 17 A.3d at 589-90 . 22 Remand by the majority permits adherence to the earlier exclusion of the testimony after the Dyas and Benn inquiry and voir dire of Dr. Penrod during which he may be tested on whether his conclusions and those of studies he relies upon remain valid in light of the corroborating and uncontested facts discussed herein.

2013Cf. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535 , 112 S.Ct. 1522 , 118 L.Ed.2d 153 (1992) (holding that parties on appeal are not limited to the precise arguments they made previously). .

2013Cf. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535 , 112 S.Ct. 1522 , 118 L.Ed.2d 153 (1992) (holding that parties on appeal are not limited to the precise arguments they made previously). .

2009At the remand hearing, counsel for Mr. Ingram moved for a new trial on the ground that in failing to turn over the April 2002 grand jury transcripts of Mr. Aleem and another man, Albert Montgomery, before Mr. Ingram’s July 2002 trial, the government had violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).

2009At the remand hearing, counsel for Mr. Ingram moved for a new trial on the ground that in failing to turn over the April 2002 grand jury transcripts of Mr. Aleem and another man, Albert Montgomery, before Mr. Ingram’s July 2002 trial, the government had violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).

2008Under Cole , several factors must be considered to determine whether there is sufficient prejudice to warrant reversal: (1) the portion of the verbatim transcript that is missing; (2) the extent to which the record was able to be reconstructed; (3) whether appellant is able to claim specific error that allegedly *670 occurred within the missing portion of the transcript; (4) whether appellant or his counsel was able to assist in preparing the substitute statements; and (5) whether appellate counsel differs from trial counsel. 478 A.2d at 286-287 .

2007The latter claim is foreclosed by this court’s recent decision in Bausch v. District of Co *805 lumbia Police & Firefighters’ Retirement & Relief Bd., 926 A.2d 125 (D.C.2007), which upheld the Retirement Board’s decision in a remand hearing to compute an annuity using salaries as of the time the petitioner initially was retired on disability rather than as of the later proceedings on remand.

2007The latter claim is foreclosed by this court’s recent decision in Bausch v. District of Co *805 lumbia Police & Firefighters’ Retirement & Relief Bd., 926 A.2d 125 (D.C.2007), which upheld the Retirement Board’s decision in a remand hearing to compute an annuity using salaries as of the time the petitioner initially was retired on disability rather than as of the later proceedings on remand.

2001One of the reasons that prompted us to remand in our first opinion in this appeal is that "it is anomalous that there is no evidence in the record (or even outside the record as revealed by the government at oral argument) of any documentation whatsoever of Dennis Miles’[s] statements to the police." Farley, 694 A.2d at 889 .

2001Farley had subpoenaed Miles for the remand hearing and Miles was present; neither the trial court nor the government chose to question Miles. [8] One of the reasons that prompted us to remand in our first opinion in this appeal is that "it is anomalous that there is no evidence in the record (or even outside the record as revealed by the government at oral argument) of any documentation whatsoever of Dennis Miles'[s] statements to the police." Farley, 694 A.2d at 889 .

2000Precedent for such a remand and hearing in aid of this court’s determination of harmless error vel non is furnished by Davis v. United States, 564 A.2d 31 (D.C.1989) (en banc).

1989After reviewing the record of the remand hearing, conducted before a different judge, a majority of the court concluded that reversal was not warranted because "the presumption of prejudice arising from the law clerk’s report of off-the-record observations has been overcome.” 649 F.2d at 420 .

1986In accordance with our remand directive set forth in Davis, supra, 482 A.2d at 786 , the trial court concluded that although Garvin could not refuse to testify on the ground of self-incrimination, the exclusion of his testimony had no impact upon defendant’s conviction.

1986In accordance with our remand directive set forth in Davis, supra, 482 A.2d at 786 , the trial court concluded that although Garvin could not refuse to testify on the ground of self-incrimination, the exclusion of his testimony had no impact upon defendant’s conviction.