remand hearing in Oregon

1972ORS 419.533 (1) provides that a child may be remanded for disposition as an adult if: a* * * * % “(a) The child is at the time of the remand 16 years of age or older; and “(b) The child committed or is alleged to have committed a criminal offense or a violation of a municipal ordinance; and “(c) The juvenile court determines that retaining jurisdiction will not serve the best interests of the child and the public.” The statute thus contains no requirement that a factual basis for the petition be established at the remand hearing since it provides that the child may be remanded if he is “* * *

1972At the time of the remand hearing in the first case the deputy district attorney’s argument included the statement that in four months the boy would be 18 and “* '* * certainly at this point in four months’ time there is nothing that can be gained in this [juvenile] court * * And in the second remand hearing, seven weeks later, the court gave as a principal reason for ordering remand that such short term juvenile court placement services as were available were impractical and * * that counseling services in the short duration before he is 18 would not be beneficial or constructive in that time

1985State v. Weidner, 6 Or App 317 , 484 P2d 844 , 487 P2d 1385 (1971).

1972At the time of the remand hearing in the first case the deputy district attorney’s argument included the statement that in four months the boy would be 18 and “* '* * certainly at this point in four months’ time there is nothing that can be gained in this [juvenile] court * * And in the second remand hearing, seven weeks later, the court gave as a principal reason for ordering remand that such short term juvenile court placement services as were available were impractical and * * that counseling services in the short duration before he is 18 would not be beneficial or constructive in that time

2024Cite as 372 Or 589 (2024) 609 conceded that he had not reviewed the supplemental tran- script from Montague.

2020Here, after defendant presented argument at Cite as 304 Or App 607 (2020) 615 the remand hearing regarding foreseeability, the trial court stated that it would take the issues raised at the hearing and in Parsons I under advisement, and later issued the res- titution order.

2016Even if a juvenile were 16 years old at the time of a remand hearing, Cite as 359 Or 559 (2016) 575 the juvenile would have a defense to criminal prosecution for offenses committed when the juvenile was under the age of 14.

1997The state argues, particularly, that the “law of the case” doctrine did not prevent the trial court from considering the state’s additional evidence on remand, because “the legal issue on remand was not the same one already decided by this court.” Thus, the state asserts, given our “sua sponte” consideration of the extra-executive authority issue in Custer I, 126 Or App at 435-36 , “neither the language of this court’s remand nor any other doctrine of law prohibited the trial court from giving the state a fair chance *493 to put on its proof [of extra-executive authority] at the hearing follow

1997It is true that since the amendment of ORS 138.222(5) in 1993 that is the result on direct appeal. 3 However, as defendant points out, and as we recently discussed in State v. Henderson, 146 Or App 81, 84 , 932 P2d 577 (1997), ORS 138.222(5) does not apply to a post-conviction proceeding.

1997It is true that since the amendment of ORS 138.222(5) in 1993 that is the result on direct appeal. 3 However, as defendant points out, and as we recently discussed in State v. Henderson, 146 Or App 81, 84 , 932 P2d 577 (1997), ORS 138.222(5) does not apply to a post-conviction proceeding.

1982See State v. Addicks, 28 Or App 663 , 560 P2d 1095 (1977); see also, State v. McKeen, 33 Or App 343 , 576 P2d 804 (1978); State v. Warren, 31 Or App 1121 , 572 P2d 341 (1977).

1982See State v. Addicks, 28 Or App 663 , 560 P2d 1095 (1977); see also, State v. McKeen, 33 Or App 343 , 576 P2d 804 (1978); State v. Warren, 31 Or App 1121 , 572 P2d 341 (1977).

1981ORS 3.250(2) 3 ; State ex rel Segrest v. Van Hoomissen, 276 Or 1077, 1081 , 557 P2d 661 (1976).

1981ORS 3.250(2) 3 ; State ex rel Segrest v. Van Hoomissen, 276 Or 1077, 1081 , 557 P2d 661 (1976).

1977Dept. v. Johnson, 11 Or App 313 , 501 P2d 1011 (1972), Sup Ct review denied (1973), we held that a remand hearing is a dispositional hearing and that ORS 419.500(2) 1 is applicable, but contends we should narrow that holding to provide that hearsay shall not be admitted in remand hearings unless good cause is shown why the speaker cannot be present.

1977Dept. v. Johnson, 11 Or App 313 , 501 P2d 1011 (1972), Sup Ct review denied (1973), we held that a remand hearing is a dispositional hearing and that ORS 419.500(2) 1 is applicable, but contends we should narrow that holding to provide that hearsay shall not be admitted in remand hearings unless good cause is shown why the speaker cannot be present.

1977The state argues in response that the juvenile may waive his constitutional rights such as that against involuntary self-incrimination, State v. Patterson, 5 Or App 438 , 485 P2d 429 , rev den (1971), and the right to have the truth of the petition proved against him, State ex rel Juv.

1977The state argues in response that the juvenile may waive his constitutional rights such as that against involuntary self-incrimination, State v. Patterson, 5 Or App 438 , 485 P2d 429 , rev den (1971), and the right to have the truth of the petition proved against him, State ex rel Juv.

1977No evidence was heard and no admissions were made. 1 The juvenile argues on appeal that a remand hearing is constitutionally required, Bouge v. Reed, 254 Or 418, 420 , 459 P2d 869 (1969).

1977No evidence was heard and no admissions were made. 1 The juvenile argues on appeal that a remand hearing is constitutionally required, Bouge v. Reed, 254 Or 418, 420 , 459 P2d 869 (1969).

1972ORS 419.533 (1) provides that a child may be remanded for disposition as an adult if: a* * * * % “(a) The child is at the time of the remand 16 years of age or older; and “(b) The child committed or is alleged to have committed a criminal offense or a violation of a municipal ordinance; and “(c) The juvenile court determines that retaining jurisdiction will not serve the best interests of the child and the public.” The statute thus contains no requirement that a factual basis for the petition be established at the remand hearing since it provides that the child may be remanded if he is “* * *

1972ORS 419.533 (1) provides that a child may be remanded for disposition as an adult if: a* * * * % “(a) The child is at the time of the remand 16 years of age or older; and “(b) The child committed or is alleged to have committed a criminal offense or a violation of a municipal ordinance; and “(c) The juvenile court determines that retaining jurisdiction will not serve the best interests of the child and the public.” The statute thus contains no requirement that a factual basis for the petition be established at the remand hearing since it provides that the child may be remanded if he is “* * *

1972ORS 419.533 (1) provides that a child may be remanded for disposition as an adult if: a* * * * % “(a) The child is at the time of the remand 16 years of age or older; and “(b) The child committed or is alleged to have committed a criminal offense or a violation of a municipal ordinance; and “(c) The juvenile court determines that retaining jurisdiction will not serve the best interests of the child and the public.” The statute thus contains no requirement that a factual basis for the petition be established at the remand hearing since it provides that the child may be remanded if he is “* * *

1972ORS 419.533 (1) provides that a child may be remanded for disposition as an adult if: a* * * * % “(a) The child is at the time of the remand 16 years of age or older; and “(b) The child committed or is alleged to have committed a criminal offense or a violation of a municipal ordinance; and “(c) The juvenile court determines that retaining jurisdiction will not serve the best interests of the child and the public.” The statute thus contains no requirement that a factual basis for the petition be established at the remand hearing since it provides that the child may be remanded if he is “* * *