remand hearing in Maryland

2019"Where there is solid evidence in support of disputed factual allegations, it is proper to place the responsibility for resolving such a conflict 'with the trial court, a tribunal which is in a position vastly superior to that of an appellate court to perform this very important task.' " Simpkins v. Ford Motor Credit Co. , 389 Md. 426 , 440, 886 A.2d 126 (2005) (citation omitted).

2019"Where there is solid evidence in support of disputed factual allegations, it is proper to place the responsibility for resolving such a conflict 'with the trial court, a tribunal which is in a position vastly superior to that of an appellate court to perform this very important task.' " Simpkins v. Ford Motor Credit Co. , 389 Md. 426 , 440, 886 A.2d 126 (2005) (citation omitted).

2015Despite Skok’s failure to pursue any of those avenues of relief, we did not conclude that Skok had waived the right to file a petition for the common law writ of error coram nobis; to the contrary, we held that Skok was entitled to a remand for a hearing on the allegations. 10 Id. at 81, 760 A.2d 647 .

2012The Mickens Court described the holding and language of the remand instruction in Wood— that “an actual conflict of interest existed” — as simply “shorthand for the statement in Sullivan that ‘a defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief.’” Id. at 171, 122 S.Ct. 1237 (emphasis in original) (quoting Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 349-50 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 ).

2012The Mickens Court described the holding and language of the remand instruction in Wood— that “an actual conflict of interest existed” — as simply “shorthand for the statement in Sullivan that ‘a defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief.’” Id. at 171, 122 S.Ct. 1237 (emphasis in original) (quoting Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 349-50 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 ).

2012The Mickens Court described the holding and language of the remand instruction in Wood— that “an actual conflict of interest existed” — as simply “shorthand for the statement in Sullivan that ‘a defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief.’” Id. at 171, 122 S.Ct. 1237 (emphasis in original) (quoting Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 349-50 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 ).

1996Mayor of Rockville v. Walker, 100 Md.App. 240, 256 , 640 A.2d 751 (1994) (quoting Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 41 , 382 A.2d 564 (1978)).

1996Mayor of Rockville v. Walker, 100 Md.

1996Mayor of Rockville v. Walker, 100 Md.App. 240, 256 , 640 A.2d 751 (1994) (quoting Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 41 , 382 A.2d 564 (1978)).

1996Mayor of Rockville v. Walker, 100 Md.App. 240, 256 , 640 A.2d 751 (1994) (quoting Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 41 , 382 A.2d 564 (1978)).

1996Langley, 255 Md. at 143 , 257 A.2d 184 (continuance because of counsel's absence is discretionary).

1996Langley, 255 Md. at 143 , 257 A.2d 184 (continuance because of counsel's absence is discretionary).

1989When interpreting statutory language we must consider “ ‘the purposes of the enactment, the ends to be accomplished, [and] the consequences that may result from one meaning rather than from another...." Scherr, 211 Md. at 561 , 128 A.2d at 391 (quoting Upshur v. Baltimore City, 94 Md. 743, 757 , 51 A. 953, 958 (1902)).

1989When interpreting statutory language we must consider “ ‘the purposes of the enactment, the ends to be accomplished, [and] the consequences that may result from one meaning rather than from another...." Scherr, 211 Md. at 561 , 128 A.2d at 391 (quoting Upshur v. Baltimore City, 94 Md. 743, 757 , 51 A. 953, 958 (1902)).

1974Paape v. Grimes, 256 Md. 490, 494 , 260 A. 2d 644 (1970).

1974Paape v. Grimes, 256 Md. 490, 494 , 260 A. 2d 644 (1970).

1972Maryland Rule 871 a permits us where it appears “that the purposes of justice will be advanced by permitting further proceedings in the cause, either through amendment of the pleadings, introduction of additional evidence, making of additional parties, or otherwise” to “order the case to be remanded to the lower court” in lieu “of entering a final order affirming, reversing or modifying the judgment from which the appeal was taken.” Judge Oppenheimer was careful to point out for the Court in Earl v. Anchor Pontiac, 246 Md. 653, 659 , 229 A. 2d 412 (1967), that this rule “is not to be regarded

1972Maryland Rule 871 a permits us where it appears “that the purposes of justice will be advanced by permitting further proceedings in the cause, either through amendment of the pleadings, introduction of additional evidence, making of additional parties, or otherwise” to “order the case to be remanded to the lower court” in lieu “of entering a final order affirming, reversing or modifying the judgment from which the appeal was taken.” Judge Oppenheimer was careful to point out for the Court in Earl v. Anchor Pontiac, 246 Md. 653, 659 , 229 A. 2d 412 (1967), that this rule “is not to be regarded

1968The hearing court erred in that it was clearly erroneous in refusing to hear testimony at the remand hearing, in order to make explicit findings of fact and conclusions of law on the question of whether Hance’s statement was voluntary in light of the single standard governing the admission of extrajudicial statements — that of voluntariness — to be determined by all of the circumstances surrounding the making of such statement consistent with the opinion filed September 29, 1967 by the Court of Special Appeals in State v. Hance, 2 Md.