remand hearing in Louisiana

2003The Supreme Court's remand with instruction to consider this appeal under our supervisory jurisdiction reminds us, as this Court noted in Livingston Downs Racing Association, Inc. v. Louisiana State Racing Commission, 96-1215, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/5/96), 675 So.2d 1214 , 1216 that: the difference between supervisory jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction is that the former is discretionary on the part of the appellate court while the latter is invocable by the litigant as a matter of right.

2001The Supreme Court's remand with instruction to consider this appeal under our supervisory jurisdiction reminds us, as this Court noted in Livingston Downs Racing Association, Inc. v. Louisiana State Racing Commission, 96-1215, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/5/96), 675 So.2d 1214 , 1216 that: the difference between supervisory jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction is *1195 that the former is discretionary on the part of the appellate court while the latter is invocable by the litigant as a matter of right.

1998Keith v. Louisiana State Office of Risk Management, 516 So.2d 440 (La.App. 1st Cir.1987).

1996Keith v. Louisiana State Office of Risk Management, 516 So.2d 440 (La.App. 1st Cir.1987).

2012Defendant does not allege any specific actions counsel took or failed to take as a result of the potential conflict of interest; instead, he contends the risk of a potential conflict was great, such that the trial court inadequately inquired into the conflict and failed to obtain a valid waiver of conflicted counsel pursuant to State v. Cisco, 01-2732 (La.12/3/03), 861 So.2d 118 . 2 He thus asserts the trial court’s failure violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and necessitates either reversal of the conviction and sentence or, alternatively, a remand for a hearing to determine whether

2010In considering the remand instruction, the Court determined that “ ‘an actual conflict of interest’ meant precisely a conflict that affected counsel’s performance — as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties.” 535 U.S. at 171 , 122 S.Ct. at 1243 .

2010In considering the remand instruction, the Court determined that “ ‘an actual conflict of interest’ meant precisely a conflict that affected counsel’s performance — as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties.” 535 U.S. at 171 , 122 S.Ct. at 1243 .

2005State v. Hebert, 02-1252 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/8/03) , 846 So.2d 60, 66 .

2002Louisiana Associated General Contractors , 95-2105 at p. 12, 669 So.2d at 1194-1195 . |KWe observe initially that the hearing during which Robinson’s case was declared moot was a remand hearing ordered by the Supreme Court for the specific purpose of expanding the record and admitting additional evidence on the pending case.

1994Should the trial judge determine the failure to comply with the discovery order was caused by "willfulness, bad faith, or fault" on the part of the defendants, as opposed to their counsel, then under Allen v. Smith, 390 So.2d 1300 (La. 1980) and its progeny, the trial court will not be found to have abused its discretion if it renders a default liability judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. [1] *205 In any case, however, I do not believe a remand for a hearing is necessary.

1991At the conclusion of the remand hearing, the trial court noted that the hearing had been held in accordance with the supreme court’s order in State v. Davis, 552 So.2d 373 (La.1989), and that, in resentencing defendant, it would consider both aggravating and mitigating circumstances in conformity with that order.

1990Noting disagreement among the federal circuits on this issue, we chose the approach adopted by the U.S. Second Circuit in U.S. v. Mastrangelo, supra. Defendant argues that the trial court failed to address the issue of whether the state knew or should have known of the evidence sought to be introduced at the remand hearing and to make a determination of whether the state waived its right to address the waiver issue on remand.

1987State v. Kakey, supra; State v. Edwards, supra. Moreover, at the remand hearing, defense counsel testified that he did not think that his dual representation of both defendant and Jenkins adversely affected his performance at defendant’s trial.