remand hearing in Michigan

2018JANSEN, P.J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part) While I agree with the majority that defendant received due process of law, I disagree that a remand for a hearing pursuant to People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 ; 212 NW2d 992 (1973), is necessary.

2018JANSEN, P.J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part) While I agree with the majority that defendant received due process of law, I disagree that a remand for a hearing pursuant to People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 ; 212 NW2d 992 (1973), is necessary.

2024However, “a court’s jurisdiction to try an accused person cannot be challenged on the ground that physical custody of the accused was obtained in an unlawful manner.” People v Burrill, 391 Mich 124, 133 ; 214 NW2d 823 (1974).

2024However, “a court’s jurisdiction to try an accused person cannot be challenged on the ground that physical custody of the accused was obtained in an unlawful manner.” People v Burrill, 391 Mich 124, 133 ; 214 NW2d 823 (1974).

2018This statement was not “necessary to a finding of probable cause,” and therefore defendants are not entitled to a remand for a hearing pursuant to Franks v Delaware, 438 US 154 ; 98 S Ct 2674 ; 57 L Ed 2d 667 (1978).

2018This statement was not “necessary to a finding of probable cause,” and therefore defendants are not entitled to a remand for a hearing pursuant to Franks v Delaware, 438 US 154 ; 98 S Ct 2674 ; 57 L Ed 2d 667 (1978).

2025The trial court acknowledged the factors to be considered under Wood v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 413 Mich 573 ; 321 NW2d 653 (1982), and the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) 1.5(a), when determining whether to award attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a), but the trial court did not apply those factors to plaintiff’s motion, noting that “[t]he reasonableness of the attorney fees analysis has been done by the trial court during the remand hearing” in January 2019, and concluding that “there are satisfactory facts and foundational evidence provided to the Court to determine the a

2025The trial court acknowledged the factors to be considered under Wood v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 413 Mich 573 ; 321 NW2d 653 (1982), and the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) 1.5(a), when determining whether to award attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a), but the trial court did not apply those factors to plaintiff’s motion, noting that “[t]he reasonableness of the attorney fees analysis has been done by the trial court during the remand hearing” in January 2019, and concluding that “there are satisfactory facts and foundational evidence provided to the Court to determine the a

2024US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20; United States v Cronic, 466 US 648, 654 ; 104 S Ct 2039 ; 80 L Ed 2d 657 (1984).

2024US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20; United States v Cronic, 466 US 648, 654 ; 104 S Ct 2039 ; 80 L Ed 2d 657 (1984).

2024He thus requested that the circuit court “quash the bindover and dismiss the information or remand to the district court.” (Emphasis added.) Now on appeal, defendant argues that the remand was in error and, instead, the circuit court should have dismissed the charges entirely. “[A] party may not harbor error at trial and then use that error as an appellate parachute[.]” People v Szalma, 487 Mich 708, 726 ; 790 NW2d 662 (2010).

2024He thus requested that the circuit court “quash the bindover and dismiss the information or remand to the district court.” (Emphasis added.) Now on appeal, defendant argues that the remand was in error and, instead, the circuit court should have dismissed the charges entirely. “[A] party may not harbor error at trial and then use that error as an appellate parachute[.]” People v Szalma, 487 Mich 708, 726 ; 790 NW2d 662 (2010).

2018Second, the Second Circuit considered production of the defendant to be important to the perceived integrity of the resentencing decision, explaining as follows: [A]lthough the production of a defendant may not be essential to the perceived integrity of a Crosby remand handled by the original sentencing judge, see United States v. Crosby , 397 F.3d at 120 (holding that defendant's presence in court is not required on remand to decide if resentencing is necessary), when a Crosby remand is reassigned to a judge who has never dealt with the defendant, both the parties' and the public's perception

2018Second, the Second Circuit considered production of the defendant to be important to the perceived integrity of the resentencing decision, explaining as follows: [A]lthough the production of a defendant may not be essential to the perceived integrity of a Crosby remand handled by the original sentencing judge, see United States v. Crosby , 397 F.3d at 120 (holding that defendant's presence in court is not required on remand to decide if resentencing is necessary), when a Crosby remand is reassigned to a judge who has never dealt with the defendant, both the parties' and the public's perception

2015The trial court made specific factual findings regarding the factors set forth in Myland v Myland, 290 Mich App 691, 695 ; 804 NW2d 124 (2010), in determining that a spousal support award in the amount of $525.00 per month for a period of three years was warranted.

2015The trial court made specific factual findings regarding the factors set forth in Myland v Myland, 290 Mich App 691, 695 ; 804 NW2d 124 (2010), in determining that a spousal support award in the amount of $525.00 per month for a period of three years was warranted.

2015People v Odom, 276 Mich App 407, 415 ; 740 NW2d 557 (2007). 1 A fourth issue, involving $1,200 court costs for prosecuting defendant’s case, was resolved in defendant’s favor at a remand hearing. -2- We need not consider the first prong of the Strickland test because, even assuming that counsel’s performance was deficient, defendant failed to show prejudice from counsel’s alleged serious errors and deficient performance.

2015People v Odom, 276 Mich App 407, 415 ; 740 NW2d 557 (2007). 1 A fourth issue, involving $1,200 court costs for prosecuting defendant’s case, was resolved in defendant’s favor at a remand hearing. -2- We need not consider the first prong of the Strickland test because, even assuming that counsel’s performance was deficient, defendant failed to show prejudice from counsel’s alleged serious errors and deficient performance.

2015Accordingly, our Court affirmed the trial court’s findings on the existence of statutory grounds for termination, vacated the termination order, and remanded the case only for further consideration on the best interests of the children.4 1 The violent boyfriend is the father of the infant he abused. 2 In re McCollough/Gallentine, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued May 22, 2014 (Docket No. 318140) (McCollough/Gallentine I), p 1. 3 Id. 4 Id. at *4-5. -1- In June 2014, the trial court held a remand hearing to determine whether termination of respondent’s parental right

2014“A party may not claim as error on appeal an issue that the party deemed proper in the trial court because doing so would permit the party to harbor error as an appellate parachute.” Bates Assoc, LLC v 132 Assoc, LLC, 290 Mich App 52, 64 ; 799 NW2d 177 (2010).

2014“A party may not claim as error on appeal an issue that the party deemed proper in the trial court because doing so would permit the party to harbor error as an appellate parachute.” Bates Assoc, LLC v 132 Assoc, LLC, 290 Mich App 52, 64 ; 799 NW2d 177 (2010).

2007Id. *181 II.

2007Defendant was, however, sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 3 to 15 years of imprisonment for his CSC II convictions. [3] Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued January 13, 2005 (Docket No. 248094), 2005 WL 77117 . [4] 474 Mich. 1099 , 711 N.W.2d 83 (2006). [5] People v. Schaefer, 473 Mich. 418, 427 , 703 N.W.2d 774 (2005). [6] People v. Koonce, 466 Mich. 515, 518 , 648 N.W.2d 153 (2002). [7] Subsection 2 provides different rules regarding lesser included offenses when a defendant is charged with a major controlled substance offense. [8] MCL 750.520b.

2007Defendant was, however, sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 3 to 15 years of imprisonment for his CSC II convictions. [3] Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued January 13, 2005 (Docket No. 248094), 2005 WL 77117 . [4] 474 Mich. 1099 , 711 N.W.2d 83 (2006). [5] People v. Schaefer, 473 Mich. 418, 427 , 703 N.W.2d 774 (2005). [6] People v. Koonce, 466 Mich. 515, 518 , 648 N.W.2d 153 (2002). [7] Subsection 2 provides different rules regarding lesser included offenses when a defendant is charged with a major controlled substance offense. [8] MCL 750.520b.

2007Defendant was, however, sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 3 to 15 years of imprisonment for his CSC II convictions. [3] Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued January 13, 2005 (Docket No. 248094), 2005 WL 77117 . [4] 474 Mich. 1099 , 711 N.W.2d 83 (2006). [5] People v. Schaefer, 473 Mich. 418, 427 , 703 N.W.2d 774 (2005). [6] People v. Koonce, 466 Mich. 515, 518 , 648 N.W.2d 153 (2002). [7] Subsection 2 provides different rules regarding lesser included offenses when a defendant is charged with a major controlled substance offense. [8] MCL 750.520b.

2007Defendant was, however, sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 3 to 15 years of imprisonment for his CSC II convictions. [3] Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued January 13, 2005 (Docket No. 248094), 2005 WL 77117 . [4] 474 Mich. 1099 , 711 N.W.2d 83 (2006). [5] People v. Schaefer, 473 Mich. 418, 427 , 703 N.W.2d 774 (2005). [6] People v. Koonce, 466 Mich. 515, 518 , 648 N.W.2d 153 (2002). [7] Subsection 2 provides different rules regarding lesser included offenses when a defendant is charged with a major controlled substance offense. [8] MCL 750.520b.

2007Defendant was, however, sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 3 to 15 years of imprisonment for his CSC II convictions. [3] Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued January 13, 2005 (Docket No. 248094), 2005 WL 77117 . [4] 474 Mich. 1099 , 711 N.W.2d 83 (2006). [5] People v. Schaefer, 473 Mich. 418, 427 , 703 N.W.2d 774 (2005). [6] People v. Koonce, 466 Mich. 515, 518 , 648 N.W.2d 153 (2002). [7] Subsection 2 provides different rules regarding lesser included offenses when a defendant is charged with a major controlled substance offense. [8] MCL 750.520b.

2007Defendant was, however, sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 3 to 15 years of imprisonment for his CSC II convictions. [3] Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued January 13, 2005 (Docket No. 248094), 2005 WL 77117 . [4] 474 Mich. 1099 , 711 N.W.2d 83 (2006). [5] People v. Schaefer, 473 Mich. 418, 427 , 703 N.W.2d 774 (2005). [6] People v. Koonce, 466 Mich. 515, 518 , 648 N.W.2d 153 (2002). [7] Subsection 2 provides different rules regarding lesser included offenses when a defendant is charged with a major controlled substance offense. [8] MCL 750.520b.

2007NOTES [1] People v. Cornell, 466 Mich. 335 , 646 N.W.2d 127 (2002). [2] But, at a remand hearing held months later, the court puzzlingly stated on the record that the prosecutor had shown CSC I, that the court "believed every word she [the complainant] said," and that the court had hoped that by giving defendant a break he would not have to go to prison.

2007NOTES [1] People v. Cornell, 466 Mich. 335 , 646 N.W.2d 127 (2002). [2] But, at a remand hearing held months later, the court puzzlingly stated on the record that the prosecutor had shown CSC I, that the court "believed every word she [the complainant] said," and that the court had hoped that by giving defendant a break he would not have to go to prison.

2002Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 , 50 S.Ct. 451 , 74 L.Ed. 1107 (1930).

2002Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 , 50 S.Ct. 451 , 74 L.Ed. 1107 (1930).

1993The Court of Appeals decision in People v Green, 152 Mich App 16, 18 ; 391 NW2d 507 (1986), correctly recognized that the judge’s scoring of the sentencing guidelines will be upheld if there is evidence to support the score. 25 If the judge made an initial scoring decision that is supported by the evidence, then remand would not serve a useful purpose. 26 See, e.g., People v Degraffenreid, 19 Mich App 702, 719 ; 173 NW2d 317 (1969).

1993The Court of Appeals decision in People v Green, 152 Mich App 16, 18 ; 391 NW2d 507 (1986), correctly recognized that the judge’s scoring of the sentencing guidelines will be upheld if there is evidence to support the score. 25 If the judge made an initial scoring decision that is supported by the evidence, then remand would not serve a useful purpose. 26 See, e.g., People v Degraffenreid, 19 Mich App 702, 719 ; 173 NW2d 317 (1969).

1993The Court of Appeals decision in People v Green, 152 Mich App 16, 18 ; 391 NW2d 507 (1986), correctly recognized that the judge’s scoring of the sentencing guidelines will be upheld if there is evidence to support the score. 25 If the judge made an initial scoring decision that is supported by the evidence, then remand would not serve a useful purpose. 26 See, e.g., People v Degraffenreid, 19 Mich App 702, 719 ; 173 NW2d 317 (1969).

1993The Court of Appeals decision in People v Green, 152 Mich App 16, 18 ; 391 NW2d 507 (1986), correctly recognized that the judge’s scoring of the sentencing guidelines will be upheld if there is evidence to support the score. 25 If the judge made an initial scoring decision that is supported by the evidence, then remand would not serve a useful purpose. 26 See, e.g., People v Degraffenreid, 19 Mich App 702, 719 ; 173 NW2d 317 (1969).

1985A review of the court’s explanation for the sentence indicates that the trial court took the proper factors into consideration, along with the objectives of sentencing announced in Coles, supra, and Snow, supra. Specifically, the court found that defendant readily admitted to sexual intercourse with his stepdaughter and was not remorseful.