remand hearing in Kansas

2020Before the district court, Savery argued that Wells was ineffective for failing to act on evidence that Savery believed proved his actual innocence and for failing to request a remand for hearing on his direct appeal counsel's effectiveness based on State v. Van Cleave, 239 Kan. 117 , 716 P.2d 580 (1986).

2020Before the district court, Savery argued that Wells was ineffective for failing to act on evidence that Savery believed proved his actual innocence and for failing to request a remand for hearing on his direct appeal counsel's effectiveness based on State v. Van Cleave, 239 Kan. 117 , 716 P.2d 580 (1986).

2021Smith primarily relies on two cases to support his proposition that these issues were not beyond the scope of the Smith II mandate: Soto, 310 Kan. at 255-57, and State v. DuMars, 37 Kan.

2013State v. McRae, 494 N.W.2d 252, 260 (Minn. 1992) (granting new trial for combination of errors; suggesting that “[i]f a remand for a hearing on whether there was a specific basis for closure might remedy the violation of closing the trial without an adequate showing of the need for closure,” then initial remedy remand, not retrial); State v. Rollins, 221 N.C.

2013App. 572, 576-79 , 729 S.E.2d 73 (2012) (noting split of authority concerning remedy; state statute permits exclusion of public during victim’s testimony in sex crime case).

2007At the remand hearing, Sickmann admitted to assuming the burden of the waiver decision, but this is a decision “[c]riminal defendants are charged with making.” State v. Rivera, 277 Kan. 109, 116-17 , 83 P.3d 169 (2004); see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 , 77 L.

2007At the remand hearing, Sickmann admitted to assuming the burden of the waiver decision, but this is a decision “[c]riminal defendants are charged with making.” State v. Rivera, 277 Kan. 109, 116-17 , 83 P.3d 169 (2004); see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 , 77 L.

1997In reversing, the Cabrera court stated: “[W]e must reverse the sentence and remand to allow the State to prove the convictions within a reasonable time after the mandate issues.” 73 Wash. App. at 170 . *623 Although the remand instruction by this court in Strickland’s first appeal was not as specific as those in Mitchell or Cabrera , the connotation of an appellate court remanding for resentencing is such that the entire sentencing process is to occur again, unless directed otherwise.

1989K.S.A. 22-3405(1) provides, in part: “The defendant in a felony case shall be present at the arraignment, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of' the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by law.” In the case of State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645 , 647 P.2d 1292 (1982), we held that the conducting of a conference for the exercise of peremptory challenges outside the presence of the defendant was not error, and did not deny the defendant a fair trial, since the conference dealt with a matter of law.

1989K.S.A. 22-3405(1) provides, in part: “The defendant in a felony case shall be present at the arraignment, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of' the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by law.” In the case of State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645 , 647 P.2d 1292 (1982), we held that the conducting of a conference for the exercise of peremptory challenges outside the presence of the defendant was not error, and did not deny the defendant a fair trial, since the conference dealt with a matter of law.

1978The Court noted that “there are facts in substantial dispute concerning the voluntariness of petitioner’s confession.” The Court also observed that “we are not inclined to dispose of a matter so fundamental as the voluntariness of a confession of guilt on any theory of waiver.” ( 204 Kan. at 617 .) The result, in that proceeding under K.S.A. 60-1507, was a remand for a hearing on voluntariness.