remand hearing in California

2014“In independently reviewing the evidence admitted at the remand hearing, we must determine whether the People presented substantial evidence to support a reasonable inference or perception that the [SVPA’s] disparate treatment of SVP’s is necessary to further compelling state interests. [Citations.] . . . ‘[W]hen a constitutional right, such as the right to liberty from involuntary confinement, is at stake, the usual judicial deference to legislative findings gives way to an exercise of independent judgment on the facts to ascertain whether the legislative body “ ‘has drawn reasonable inferenc

2013Defendant contends that McKee II “applied the incorrect standard of review,” “improperly applied the rational basis test, rather than strict scrutiny, to the factual questions before it,” “improperly considered evidence not relevant to a 13 determination of the lawmakers’ intent,” and “failed to compare the SVP, MDO and NGI schemes to each other in light of the evidence adduced at the hearing.” First, defendant contends that the McKee II court improperly applied a substantial evidence standard of review, rather than an independent standard of review, to determine “whether the evidence presente

2021(See Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1118 .) 10 We also disagree with Chinese Theatres’s argument that a literal interpretation of section 1611.6’s language would lead to absurd results because the statute’s legislative history “makes no reference to any ‘remand.’ ” While the statute’s legislative history materials do not explicitly reference any requirement that a court remand a tax refund action to a county board before attorney fees may be awarded, those materials contain statements that are consistent with a remand requirement.

2020(See Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1118 .) 10 We also disagree with Chinese Theatres’s argument that a literal interpretation of section 1611.6’s language would lead to absurd results because the statute’s legislative history “makes no reference to any ‘remand.’ ” While the statute’s legislative history materials do not explicitly reference any requirement that a court remand a tax refund action to a county board before attorney fees may be awarded, those materials contain statements that are consistent with a remand requirement.

2025(People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89 .) Here, the trial court made no orders at the remand hearing with respect to the judgments imposed in case Nos.

2023(Id. at p. 502.) Relying in part on Carroll, Currieri rejected the argument that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction and could not consider the mitigation issue, holding that the remand instruction to deduct earnings from other sources was not “exhaustive” but rather “avoided any impression that the trial court was limited on remand to a mathematical award of back pay without a full inquiry.” (Id., 50 Cal.App.3d at p. 503 .) 11 appellate court orders a money judgment, it is necessary for the trial court to determine the amount of the award.

2023(Cesar V., supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 991 ; Eduardo D., supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 548 .) Cesar V. accepted the Attorney General’s concession without analysis and remanded.

2023(Cesar V., supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 991 ; Eduardo D., supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 548 .) Cesar V. accepted the Attorney General’s concession without analysis and remanded.

2023(Manzy W., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1209 .) In Cesar V. and Eduardo D., the Attorney General conceded that the section 702 errors at issue compelled a remand under the rule of Manzy W.

2021After People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 clarified the application of section 1385 to dismiss strike priors, courts of appeal were faced with the question whether or not to remand judgments that were not yet final for consideration of this power to dismiss.

2021After People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 clarified the application of section 1385 to dismiss strike priors, courts of appeal were faced with the question whether or not to remand judgments that were not yet final for consideration of this power to dismiss.

2021There, the 2We reject the Attorney General’s assertion that “no prejudice could have resulted from [defendant] having to appear without counsel since the entire purpose of this Court’s remand was to allow [defendant] to argue why he should not have to be represented.” As noted, the remand hearing was not merely a rehearing on defendant’s Faretta request—it involved an additional layer of complexity due to the scope and focus of this court’s disposition of the prior appeal. 11 defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and sentenced to death. ( Burgener, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 2

2021(Rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); Pizzaro v. Reynoso, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at pp. 179–181.) In any event, his claim would not result in reversible error given that he fails to challenge the trial court’s substantive rulings that he did not prove any new facts, circumstances or law that were unavailable to him at the time of the remand hearing, and that he made no effort to 17 testify what each claimed charge, check, and invoice in exhibit 25 was for; and he did not testify to how he maintained the purported back-up documentation submitted, saying instead, “[N]ow, 15 years later, I kept trying to dig out

2021Like Gardner, then, the remand hearing “pose[d] a clear and substantial risk of prejudice … .” (Gardner, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1005 .) Second, and again like Gardner, the procedural complexity of the remand hearing was significant.

2021(Gardner, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1006 .) In sum, we conclude the remand hearing was a critical stage of the proceedings because defendant was required to confront the state at a proceeding in which substantial prejudice to his rights could have occurred. 3.

2021(Rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); Pizzaro v. Reynoso, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at pp. 179–181.) In any event, his claim would not result in reversible error given that he fails to challenge the trial court’s substantive rulings that he did not prove any new facts, circumstances or law that were unavailable to him at the time of the remand hearing, and that he made no effort to 17 testify what each claimed charge, check, and invoice in exhibit 25 was for; and he did not testify to how he maintained the purported back-up documentation submitted, saying instead, “[N]ow, 15 years later, I kept trying to dig out

2021(See Fryhaat, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 984 , citing People v. Braxton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 798, 818-820 [although trial court’s error in refusing to hear new trial motion is not prejudicial per se, matter must be remanded for hearing on the motion if the appellate record does not allow the reviewing court to determine as a matter of law that the motion lacked merit or to decide the trial court would have properly exercised its discretion to deny the motion].) Here, although the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing, the error was harmless under any standard.

2021Under this rule, appellate courts look to the record to determine whether it contains “clear indication that the trial court will not exercise its discretion to reduce [appellant’s] sentence.” (People v. McDaniels, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 423 .) The No Remand rule is premised on the ground the trial court has committed no legal error—for, if the trial court had committed error, remand would be necessary to correct the error and conduct resentencing.

2021Under this rule, appellate courts look to the record to determine whether it contains “clear indication that the trial court will not exercise its discretion to reduce [appellant’s] sentence.” (People v. McDaniels, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 423 .) The No Remand rule is premised on the ground the trial court has committed no legal error—for, if the trial court had committed error, remand would be necessary to correct the error and conduct resentencing.

2020(See People v. Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1170 .) Accordingly, we cannot conclude defendant is entitled to a remand for a hearing on the issue.

2020(People v. Rodriguez (1998) 17 Cal.4th 253 , 258–260.) In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

2020(People v. Bunyard (2009) 45 Cal.4th 836, 851 ; People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 892, 893 (Cromer).) a.

2020To obtain relief per this statute, the individual cannot be in custody or under 9 restraint.” (People v. Cruz-Lopez (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 212, 221 .) A parolee is ineligible to seek relief under section 1473.7 because a person on parole is in custody for purposes of seeking habeas relief.