16 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1935–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mickens v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2012App. 1997)); see also Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171 (2002) (clarifying the phrase “actual conflict of interest” in the Court’s remand instruction in a previous case by stating “we think ‘an actual conflict of interest’ meant precisely a conflict that affected counsel’s performance—as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties”). 2012App. 1997)); see also Mickens v. Taylor , 535 U.S. 162, 171 (2002) (clarifying the phrase "actual conflict of interest" in the Court's remand instruction in a previous case by stating "we think 'an actual conflict of interest' meant precisely a conflict that affected counsel's performance--as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties"). | 6 | 6 |
Ramirez v. Stategreen2 sentences2011“An appellant must identify specific instances in the record that reflect a choice that counsel made between possible alternative courses of action, such as ‘eliciting (or failing to elicit) evidence helpful to one [interest] but harmful to the other.’ ” Gaston v. State, 136 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. struck) (en banc) (quoting Ramirez v. State, 13 S.W.3d 482, 488 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. dism’d)). “[A] potential conflict may become an actual conflict, but [an appellate court need not] speculate about a strategy an attorney might have pursued ... in the 2011“An appellant must identify specific instances in the record that reflect a choice that counsel made between possible alternative courses of action, such as ‘eliciting (or failing to elicit) evidence helpful to one [interest] but harmful to the other.’” Gaston v. State, 136 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. struck) (en banc) (quoting Ramirez v. State, 13 S.W.3d 482, 488 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, pet. dism’d)). “[A] potential conflict may become an actual conflict, but [an appellate court need not] speculate about a strategy an attorney might have pursued . . . in | 2 | 2 |
Gaston v. Stategreen2 sentences2011“An appellant must identify specific instances in the record that reflect a choice that counsel made between possible alternative courses of action, such as ‘eliciting (or failing to elicit) evidence helpful to one [interest] but harmful to the other.’ ” Gaston v. State, 136 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. struck) (en banc) (quoting Ramirez v. State, 13 S.W.3d 482, 488 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. dism’d)). “[A] potential conflict may become an actual conflict, but [an appellate court need not] speculate about a strategy an attorney might have pursued ... in the 2011“An appellant must identify specific instances in the record that reflect a choice that counsel made between possible alternative courses of action, such as ‘eliciting (or failing to elicit) evidence helpful to one [interest] but harmful to the other.’” Gaston v. State, 136 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. struck) (en banc) (quoting Ramirez v. State, 13 S.W.3d 482, 488 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, pet. dism’d)). “[A] potential conflict may become an actual conflict, but [an appellate court need not] speculate about a strategy an attorney might have pursued . . . in | 2 | 2 |
Routier v. Stategreen2 sentences2011“An appellant must identify specific instances in the record that reflect a choice that counsel made between possible alternative courses of action, such as ‘eliciting (or failing to elicit) evidence helpful to one [interest] but harmful to the other.’ ” Gaston v. State, 136 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. struck) (en banc) (quoting Ramirez v. State, 13 S.W.3d 482, 488 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. dism’d)). “[A] potential conflict may become an actual conflict, but [an appellate court need not] speculate about a strategy an attorney might have pursued ... in the 2011“An appellant must identify specific instances in the record that reflect a choice that counsel made between possible alternative courses of action, such as ‘eliciting (or failing to elicit) evidence helpful to one [interest] but harmful to the other.’” Gaston v. State, 136 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. struck) (en banc) (quoting Ramirez v. State, 13 S.W.3d 482, 488 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, pet. dism’d)). “[A] potential conflict may become an actual conflict, but [an appellate court need not] speculate about a strategy an attorney might have pursued . . . in | 2 | 2 |
Hammond v. Stategreen1 sentence2025Hammond v. State, 799 S.W.2d 741, 746 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Rozell v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See Rozell v. State, 176 S.W.3d 228, 230 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hendersongreen1 sentence2011Id. at 884-85. 10 . | 1 | 1 |
James v. Stategreen1 sentence2011“An appellant must identify specific instances in the record that reflect a choice that counsel made between possible alternative courses of action, such as ‘eliciting (or failing to elicit) evidence helpful to one [interest] but harmful to the other.’ ” Gaston v. State, 136 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. struck) (en banc) (quoting Ramirez v. State, 13 S.W.3d 482, 488 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. dism’d)). “[A] potential conflict may become an actual conflict, but [an appellate court need not] speculate about a strategy an attorney might have pursued ... in the | 1 | 1 |
Janecka v. Stategreen1 sentence1999Appellant also relies upon Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 461 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), ce rt. denied, — U.S. —, 118 S.Ct. 86 , 139 L.Ed.2d 43 (1997), and Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 , 84 S.Ct. 1697 , 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964), for the proposition that this Court’s remand for a hearing on punishment only constituted a retroactive and unforeseeable judicial construction of Article 44.29(c) under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. | 1 | 1 |
Garrett v. Stategreen2 sentences1992Garrett v. State, 749 S.W.2d 784, 792 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) precludes an analysis under Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (opinion on rehearing). 1992Garrett v. State, 749 S.W.2d 784, 792 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) precludes an analysis under Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985) (opinion on rehearing). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Michael Ray Townleygreen1 sentence1990See also U.S. v. Townley, 665 F.2d 579, 582 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied 456 U.S. 1010 , 102 S.Ct. 2305 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1982) (Held, delay against defendant was only partly for investigative reasons; therefore, second prong of the claim, prejudice to defendant, was required to be proven.) It was error for the trial judge in this cause not to have considered the testimony which was elicited at the remand hearing, and it was also error for the trial judge not to have allowed full discovery of all non-privileged material both at the initial hearing and on remand. | 1 | 1 |
Celifie v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1990See also U.S. v. Townley, 665 F.2d 579, 582 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied 456 U.S. 1010 , 102 S.Ct. 2305 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1982) (Held, delay against defendant was only partly for investigative reasons; therefore, second prong of the claim, prejudice to defendant, was required to be proven.) It was error for the trial judge in this cause not to have considered the testimony which was elicited at the remand hearing, and it was also error for the trial judge not to have allowed full discovery of all non-privileged material both at the initial hearing and on remand. | 1 | 1 |
Bennett v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1990See also U.S. v. Townley, 665 F.2d 579, 582 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied 456 U.S. 1010 , 102 S.Ct. 2305 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1982) (Held, delay against defendant was only partly for investigative reasons; therefore, second prong of the claim, prejudice to defendant, was required to be proven.) It was error for the trial judge in this cause not to have considered the testimony which was elicited at the remand hearing, and it was also error for the trial judge not to have allowed full discovery of all non-privileged material both at the initial hearing and on remand. | 1 | 1 |
Morris v. Rossgreen1 sentence1990See also U.S. v. Townley, 665 F.2d 579, 582 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied 456 U.S. 1010 , 102 S.Ct. 2305 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1982) (Held, delay against defendant was only partly for investigative reasons; therefore, second prong of the claim, prejudice to defendant, was required to be proven.) It was error for the trial judge in this cause not to have considered the testimony which was elicited at the remand hearing, and it was also error for the trial judge not to have allowed full discovery of all non-privileged material both at the initial hearing and on remand. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Acosta v. State
green
2 sentences2011Actual Conflict Counsel has an actual conflict of interest if he “‘is required to make a choice between advancing his client’s interest in a fair trial or advancing other interests (perhaps counsel’s own) to the detriment of his client’s interest.’ ” Acosta, 233 S.W.3d at 355 (quoting Monreal, 947 S.W.2d at 564 ); see also Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 , 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002) (clarifying the phrase “actual conflict of interest” in a remand instruction in a previous case by stating “we think ‘an actual conflict of interest’ meant precisely a conflict that affected couns 2011Actual Conflict Counsel has an actual conflict of interest if he “‘is required to make a choice between advancing his client’s interest in a fair trial or advancing other interests (perhaps counsel’s own) to the detriment of his client’s interest.’” Acosta, 233 S.W.3d at 355 (quoting Monreal, 947 S.W.2d at 564 ); see also Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171 (2002) (clarifying the phrase “actual conflict of interest” in a remand instruction in a previous case by stating “we think ‘an actual conflict of interest’ meant precisely a conflict that affected counsel’s performance—as opposed to a mer | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Monreal v. State
green
2 sentences2011Actual Conflict Counsel has an actual conflict of interest if he “‘is required to make a choice between advancing his client’s interest in a fair trial or advancing other interests (perhaps counsel’s own) to the detriment of his client’s interest.’ ” Acosta, 233 S.W.3d at 355 (quoting Monreal, 947 S.W.2d at 564 ); see also Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 , 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002) (clarifying the phrase “actual conflict of interest” in a remand instruction in a previous case by stating “we think ‘an actual conflict of interest’ meant precisely a conflict that affected couns 2011Actual Conflict Counsel has an actual conflict of interest if he “‘is required to make a choice between advancing his client’s interest in a fair trial or advancing other interests (perhaps counsel’s own) to the detriment of his client’s interest.’” Acosta, 233 S.W.3d at 355 (quoting Monreal, 947 S.W.2d at 564 ); see also Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171 (2002) (clarifying the phrase “actual conflict of interest” in a remand instruction in a previous case by stating “we think ‘an actual conflict of interest’ meant precisely a conflict that affected counsel’s performance—as opposed to a mer | 2 | 2011–2011 |
ET Gathering & Processing v. Tellurian Production
green
1 sentence2026LLC, 2025 Tex. Bus. 11 ,4 9, 709 8.W.3d 1, 5 (11th Div.) (“in absence of proof of fraud or a sham pleading, the amount in controversy in the Chicago suit is not being used to calculate the amount in controversy for the court’s remand analysis. q9 q10 the allegations in the pleadings control to determine whether this court has Jurisdiction to hear this case”). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Texas Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda
green
1 sentence2020The Comptroller argues that because sovereign immunity is ultimately a question about the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction can always be challenged, see id., then it is entitled to a remand for a hearing that would allow it to challenge whether sufficient jurisdictional facts exist under section 112.108. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Cuyler v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences2011“An appellant must identify specific instances in the record that reflect a choice that counsel made between possible alternative courses of action, such as ‘eliciting (or failing to elicit) evidence helpful to one [interest] but harmful to the other.’ ” Gaston v. State, 136 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. struck) (en banc) (quoting Ramirez v. State, 13 S.W.3d 482, 488 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. dism’d)). “[A] potential conflict may become an actual conflict, but [an appellate court need not] speculate about a strategy an attorney might have pursued ... in the 2011“An appellant must identify specific instances in the record that reflect a choice that counsel made between possible alternative courses of action, such as ‘eliciting (or failing to elicit) evidence helpful to one [interest] but harmful to the other.’ ” Gaston v. State, 136 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. struck) (en banc) (quoting Ramirez v. State, 13 S.W.3d 482, 488 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. dism’d)). “[A] potential conflict may become an actual conflict, but [an appellate court need not] speculate about a strategy an attorney might have pursued ... in the | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Manuel v. State
green
1 sentence2000The Court of Criminal Appeals held in Manuel v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658 (Tex.Cr.App.1999), that an appellant may not collaterally attack the sufficiency of the evidence to support his original guilty plea in the direct appeal from a later judgment adjudicating his guilt. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Bouie v. City of Columbia
green
2 sentences1999Appellant also relies upon Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 461 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), ce rt. denied, — U.S. —, 118 S.Ct. 86 , 139 L.Ed.2d 43 (1997), and Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 , 84 S.Ct. 1697 , 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964), for the proposition that this Court’s remand for a hearing on punishment only constituted a retroactive and unforeseeable judicial construction of Article 44.29(c) under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1999Appellant also relies upon Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 461 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), ce rt. denied, — U.S. —, 118 S.Ct. 86 , 139 L.Ed.2d 43 (1997), and Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 , 84 S.Ct. 1697 , 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964), for the proposition that this Court’s remand for a hearing on punishment only constituted a retroactive and unforeseeable judicial construction of Article 44.29(c) under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Moreno v. United States
green
1 sentence1999Appellant also relies upon Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 461 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), ce rt. denied, — U.S. —, 118 S.Ct. 86 , 139 L.Ed.2d 43 (1997), and Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 , 84 S.Ct. 1697 , 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964), for the proposition that this Court’s remand for a hearing on punishment only constituted a retroactive and unforeseeable judicial construction of Article 44.29(c) under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Almanza v. State
green
2 sentences1992Garrett v. State, 749 S.W.2d 784, 792 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) precludes an analysis under Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (opinion on rehearing). 1992Garrett v. State, 749 S.W.2d 784, 792 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) precludes an analysis under Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985) (opinion on rehearing). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Sartain v. Hamilton
green
1 sentence1935Wandelohr v. Bank, supra; Sartain v. Hamilton, supra. It is, therefore, our order that the judgment of the court below against United _ States Fidelity & Guaranty Company be reversed and that judgment be here rendered in its favor. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.