discrimination claim in Missouri

2021In 2007, the Missouri Supreme Court determined in Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights that the “contributing factor” standard was to be used when analyzing summary judgment decisions pursuant to the MHRA, holding that a discrimination claim could survive summary judgment if there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the protected classification (age and disability in that case) was a “contributing factor” in the adverse employment action. 231 S.W.3d 814, 820 (Mo. banc 2007).

2016Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 819 (Mo. banc 2Q07), Because the MHRA prohibits "any unfair treatment” based on á protécted characteristic, the Court held that MHRA plaintiffs need not prove "that discrimination was a substantial or determining factor in [a discriminatory] employment decision.” Id. (emphasis added), Instead, if consideration of a protected characteristic even contributed to the unfair treatment, that is sufficient to make a discrimination claim under the MHRA.

2024In bringing a discrimination claim, a taxpayer alleges the assessor has “violate[d] the constitutional requirement of uniformity.” Savage v. State Tax Comm’n of Mo., 722 S.W.2d 72, 78 (Mo. banc 1986).

2024In the absence of intentional discrimination, an assessment may, nonetheless, be discriminatory if it "in effect amounts to an intentional violation of the essential principle of practical uniformity." Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield Tp., 247 U.S. 350, 353 (1918)). 5 The equal protection principle underlying a discrimination claim "protects the individual from state action which selects him out for discriminatory treatment by subjecting him to taxes not imposed on others of the same class." Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cnty.

2024In the absence of intentional discrimination, an assessment may, nonetheless, be discriminatory if it "in effect amounts to an intentional violation of the essential principle of practical uniformity." Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield Tp., 247 U.S. 350, 353 (1918)). 5 The equal protection principle underlying a discrimination claim "protects the individual from state action which selects him out for discriminatory treatment by subjecting him to taxes not imposed on others of the same class." Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cnty.

2024Comm'n of Webster Cnty., 488 U.S. 336, 345 (1989).

2024Allegheny, 488 U.S. at 345-46 ; Crowell, 561 S.W.3d at 892 .

2024A jury’s rejection of an employer’s proffered justification for an employment decision “will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination”; “[n]o additional proof of discrimination is required.” Ferguson, 498 S.W.3d at 491 (emphasis added).

2021Indus., 371 F.3d 1020, 1026 (8th Cir. 2004) (where employee’s administrative charge “alleg[ed] retaliation for having complained about sexual harassment,” “the reference to past harassment is simply insufficient to put the EEOC or [her employer] on notice of [a sexual harassment] charge”), overruled on other grounds by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc)); Shannon v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.3d 678, 685 (8th Cir.1996) (mere reference to previous discrimination charge in subsequent retaliation complaint “was not enough to exhaust, for Title VII purposes, the disc

2021Indus., 371 F.3d 1020, 1026 (8th Cir. 2004) (where employee’s administrative charge “alleg[ed] retaliation for having complained about sexual harassment,” “the reference to past harassment is simply insufficient to put the EEOC or [her employer] on notice of [a sexual harassment] charge”), overruled on other grounds by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc)); Shannon v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.3d 678, 685 (8th Cir.1996) (mere reference to previous discrimination charge in subsequent retaliation complaint “was not enough to exhaust, for Title VII purposes, the disc

2019Hess v. Chase Manhattan Bank, USA, N.A., 220 S.W.3d 758, 769 (Mo. 2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 4 See Bram, 564 S.W.3d at 794–96 (holding that the 2017 modification of the causation standard required to establish a discrimination claim was a substantive change which applied prospectively only); Gilberg v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., No. 6:15- CV-03365, 2018 WL 3614982 , at *8–9 (W.D.

2016Point 3—The Discrimination Claim Respondents sought dismissal of the discrimination claim on the ground that Employee “fails to plead in good faith that a position existed with [Respondents] (a) which is vacant, and (b) for which [Employee] is qualified[.]” In their brief, Respondents rely on Umphries v. Jones, 804 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Mo.App.E.D.1991), and Berkowski v. St.

2016Williams v. Trans States Airlines, Inc., 281 S.W.3d 854, 871 (Mo.App.E.D.2009).

2014ITT Commercial, 854 S.W.2d at 381 (holding that defending party may establish a right to summary judgment by showing that the plaintiff, “after an adequate period of discovery, has not been able to produce, and will not be able to produce, evidence sufficient to allow the trier of fact to find the existence of any one of the claimant’s elements”).

2006Id. at 84 .

2006Further, the court held that the plaintiff's claims in a discrimination claim under the MHRA "are conceptually indistinguishable from other statutory actions for damages that traditionally have carried the right to a jury trial.” Id. at 88 .

1993Brown v. Sibley, 650 F.2d 760, 769 (5th Cir.1981).