discrimination claim in Oregon

1979More recently, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Company, 415 US 36 , 94 S Ct 1011 , 39 L Ed 2d 147 (1974), the Supreme Court held that an employe’s right to trial de novo of a discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC §§ 2000e, et seq., is not waived or foreclosed by prior submission of the claim to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of the collective bargaining agreement.

1979More recently, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Company, 415 US 36 , 94 S Ct 1011 , 39 L Ed 2d 147 (1974), the Supreme Court held that an employe’s right to trial de novo of a discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC §§ 2000e, et seq., is not waived or foreclosed by prior submission of the claim to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of the collective bargaining agreement.

2025In resolving a discrimination claim, we “ask whether the trier of fact reasonably could infer that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff in the terms or condi- tions of work because of the plaintiff’s * * * race.” Durham v. City of Portland, 181 Or App 409, 421-22 , 45 P3d 998 (2002).

2025In resolving a discrimination claim, we “ask whether the trier of fact reasonably could infer that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff in the terms or condi- tions of work because of the plaintiff’s * * * race.” Durham v. City of Portland, 181 Or App 409, 421-22 , 45 P3d 998 (2002).

2023Cite as 328 Or App 46 (2023) 53 “(B) ‘Source of income’ does not include income derived from a specific occupation or income derived in an illegal manner.” A plaintiff to a discrimination claim must show either direct evidence of discriminatory intent or at least indirect evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could infer dis- criminatory intent, such as evidence that other similarly sit- uated individuals who were not in the protected class were treated more favorably.

2023Cite as 328 Or App 46 (2023) 53 “(B) ‘Source of income’ does not include income derived from a specific occupation or income derived in an illegal manner.” A plaintiff to a discrimination claim must show either direct evidence of discriminatory intent or at least indirect evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could infer dis- criminatory intent, such as evidence that other similarly sit- uated individuals who were not in the protected class were treated more favorably.

2020Herbert v. Altimeter, Inc., 230 Or App 715, 717 , 218 P3d 42 (2009).

2019App. 70 , 93-96, 445 P.3d 371 (2019) (plaintiff's "strong impression" that employer treated her differently based on her gender was insufficient to support a discrimination claim); *565 Deberry v. Summers , 255 Or.

2019App. 152 , 167, 296 P.3d 610 (2013) (explaining that, "[a]lthough the line between reasonable inference and impermissible speculation is not always easy to draw, in certain respects, the line is a bright one," and concluding that, on summary judgment, one person's belief about another's intent was insufficient to "permit a trier of fact to engage in any deductive process other than pure speculation").

2017Freightliner Corp., 275 Or at 17 , quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 US 350 , 38 S Ct 495 , 62 L Ed 1154 (1918).

2017Freightliner Corp., 275 Or at 17 , quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 US 350 , 38 S Ct 495 , 62 L Ed 1154 (1918).

2017Freightliner Corp., 275 Or at 17 , quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 US 350 , 38 S Ct 495 , 62 L Ed 1154 (1918).

2012In Richardson v. Commission on Human Rights, 532 F3d 114 (2d Cir 2008) cert den, 558 US 932 (2009), an employee (Richardson) of the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO) — Connecticut’s analog to BOLI and the EEOC — filed a retaliation claim after CHRO invoked an ROP-like provision, Article 15, section 10(a)(2), 15 to halt collectively bargained-for grievance proceedings after Richardson filed a discrimination claim with CHRO.

2006Powell v. Bunn, 198 Or App 21 , 108 P3d 37 (2005).

2006Powell v. Bunn, 198 Or App 21 , 108 P3d 37 (2005).

2000By its terms, ORS 20.107(1) limits a defendant’s recovery of attorney fees for discrimination claims to cases where “the plaintiff had no objectively reasonable basis for asserting a claim.” Before the adoption of that statute, we had interpreted ORS 659.121(1) to allow attorney fees awards against plaintiffs only where the discrimination claim was “frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation.” Robinson v. School District No. 1, 92 Or App 627, 632 , 759 P2d 1116 (1988) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2000By its terms, ORS 20.107(1) limits a defendant’s recovery of attorney fees for discrimination claims to cases where “the plaintiff had no objectively reasonable basis for asserting a claim.” Before the adoption of that statute, we had interpreted ORS 659.121(1) to allow attorney fees awards against plaintiffs only where the discrimination claim was “frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation.” Robinson v. School District No. 1, 92 Or App 627, 632 , 759 P2d 1116 (1988) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

1995Specifically, she contends that her employer's rehiring of Mahoney and its failure to take adequate remedial measures "established that it intended to force plaintiffs to leave its employment." In Bratcher , the Supreme Court concluded that, in order to establish a claim of constructive discharge due to unacceptable working conditions, a plaintiff must prove that the employer deliberately created or maintained those working conditions with the intention of forcing the employee to leave the employment, and that the employee left his or her employment because of the hostile working conditions. 3

1995Specifically, she contends that her employer's rehiring of Mahoney and its failure to take adequate remedial measures "established that it intended to force plaintiffs to leave its employment." In Bratcher , the Supreme Court concluded that, in order to establish a claim of constructive discharge due to unacceptable working conditions, a plaintiff must prove that the employer deliberately created or maintained those working conditions with the intention of forcing the employee to leave the employment, and that the employee left his or her employment because of the hostile working conditions. 3

1994The majority in this case states that it is "unwilling to attribute to the legislature an intent—never expressed anywhere—to waive the OTCA limits on this single form of wrong out of all the kinds of wrongs that could be committed by governmental bodies," 318 Or. at 514 , 870 P.2d at 815 .

1994The majority in this case states that it is "unwilling to attribute to the legislature an intent—never expressed anywhere—to waive the OTCA limits on this single form of wrong out of all the kinds of wrongs that could be committed by governmental bodies," 318 Or. at 514 , 870 P.2d at 815 .

1983Gunther v. County of Washington, supra, 623 F.2d at 1318 .