discrimination claim in Minnesota

2025That being the case, we also decline Cooper’s request that we overrule our holding in Goins v. West Group, 635 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Minn. 2001), which involved a discrimination claim in an employment setting, but we clarify that Goins’s holding is limited to that context.

2015Goins v West Group, 635 N.W.2d 717, 722-24 (Minn. 2001).

2010To have standing to pursue a discrimination claim under the MHRA, "the act of discrimination itself constitutes sufficient injury for the law to provide a remedy, in the absence of statutory language requiring more." Potter v. LaSalle Court Sports & Health Club, 384 N.W.2d 873, 875 (Minn. 1986) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2010To have standing to pursue a discrimination claim under the MHRA, “the act of discrimination itself constitutes sufficient injury for the law to provide a remedy, in the absence of statutory language requiring more.” Potter v. LaSalle Court Sports & Health Club, 384 N.W.2d 873, 875 (Minn.1986) (citation omitted) (internal quotation, marks omitted).

2009And like the federal common law cited in DeseH Palace, Minnesota law “makes no distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence as to the degree of proof required.” State v. Armstrong, 257 Minn. 295, 312 , 101 N.W.2d 398, 409 (1960); see also III.

2009And like the federal common law cited in DeseH Palace, Minnesota law “makes no distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence as to the degree of proof required.” State v. Armstrong, 257 Minn. 295, 312 , 101 N.W.2d 398, 409 (1960); see also III.

2009See Stephens v. Bd. of Regents, 614 N.W.2d 764, 771 (Minn.App.2000) (holding because there was a statutory cause of action for the discriminatory treatment of persons filing for bankruptcy, the discrimination claim was outside the scope of certiorari review), review denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 2000).

2009See Stephens v. Bd. of Regents, 614 N.W.2d 764, 771 (Minn.App.2000) (holding because there was a statutory cause of action for the discriminatory treatment of persons filing for bankruptcy, the discrimination claim was outside the scope of certiorari review), review denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 2000).

2002See Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 581 n. 15, 117 S.Ct. 1590 .

2002See Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 581 n. 15, 117 S.Ct. 1590 .

1998Citing numerous other jurisdictions adopting this position, the United States District Court of Minnesota determined in Reiff v. Interim Personnel, Inc., that the plaintiff could not bring a discrimination claim under ADA or MHRA where he represented to a long-term disability carrier that he was totally disabled and he continued to collect benefits. 906 F.Supp. 1280, 1288-92 (D.Minn. 1995); see also McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 616-19 (3rd Cir.1996) (appellant judicially estopped from proving he is qualified disabled person under ADA after submitting applications and sworn state

1998Citing numerous other jurisdictions adopting this position, the United States District Court of Minnesota determined in Reiff v. Interim Personnel, Inc., that the plaintiff could not bring a discrimination claim under ADA or MHRA where he represented to a long-term disability carrier that he was totally disabled and he continued to collect benefits. 906 F.Supp. 1280, 1288-92 (D.Minn. 1995); see also McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 616-19 (3rd Cir.1996) (appellant judicially estopped from proving he is qualified disabled person under ADA after submitting applications and sworn state

1998Citing numerous other jurisdictions adopting this position, the United States District Court of Minnesota determined in Reiff v. Interim Personnel, Inc., that the plaintiff could not bring a discrimination claim under ADA or MHRA where he represented to a long-term disability carrier that he was totally disabled and he continued to collect benefits. 906 F.Supp. 1280, 1288-92 (D.Minn. 1995); see also McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 616-19 (3rd Cir.1996) (appellant judicially estopped from proving he is qualified disabled person under ADA after submitting applications and sworn state

1998Citing numerous other jurisdictions adopting this position, the United States District Court of Minnesota determined in Reiff v. Interim Personnel, Inc., that the plaintiff could not bring a discrimination claim under ADA or MHRA where he represented to a long-term disability carrier that he was totally disabled and he continued to collect benefits. 906 F.Supp. 1280, 1288-92 (D.Minn. 1995); see also McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 616-19 (3rd Cir.1996) (appellant judicially estopped from proving he is qualified disabled person under ADA after submitting applications and sworn state

1998Citing numerous other jurisdictions adopting this position, the United States District Court of Minnesota determined in Reiff v. Interim Personnel, Inc., that the plaintiff could not bring a discrimination claim under ADA or MHRA where he represented to a long-term disability carrier that he was totally disabled and he continued to collect benefits. 906 F.Supp. 1280, 1288-92 (D.Minn. 1995); see also McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 616-19 (3rd Cir.1996) (appellant judicially estopped from proving he is qualified disabled person under ADA after submitting applications and sworn state

1997Hasnudeen v. Onan Corp., 552 N.W.2d 555, 556 (Minn. 1996); see also Feges v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 701, 711 (Minn.1992) (third prong of McDonnell Douglas test requires plaintiff to show proffered reason was pretext for discrimination or not worthy of belief). [W]ith regard to the third prong of the test, the sole question is “whether or not the court is persuaded that the employee has been the victim of intentional discrimination.” Hasnudeen, 552 N.W.2d at 557 (quoting Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Minn.1988)).

1997Hasnudeen v. Onan Corp., 552 N.W.2d 555, 556 (Minn. 1996); see also Feges v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 701, 711 (Minn.1992) (third prong of McDonnell Douglas test requires plaintiff to show proffered reason was pretext for discrimination or not worthy of belief). [W]ith regard to the third prong of the test, the sole question is “whether or not the court is persuaded that the employee has been the victim of intentional discrimination.” Hasnudeen, 552 N.W.2d at 557 (quoting Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Minn.1988)).

1997Hasnudeen v. Onan Corp., 552 N.W.2d 555, 556 (Minn. 1996); see also Feges v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 701, 711 (Minn.1992) (third prong of McDonnell Douglas test requires plaintiff to show proffered reason was pretext for discrimination or not worthy of belief). [W]ith regard to the third prong of the test, the sole question is “whether or not the court is persuaded that the employee has been the victim of intentional discrimination.” Hasnudeen, 552 N.W.2d at 557 (quoting Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Minn.1988)).

1997Hasnudeen v. Onan Corp., 552 N.W.2d 555, 556 (Minn. 1996); see also Feges v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 701, 711 (Minn.1992) (third prong of McDonnell Douglas test requires plaintiff to show proffered reason was pretext for discrimination or not worthy of belief). [W]ith regard to the third prong of the test, the sole question is “whether or not the court is persuaded that the employee has been the victim of intentional discrimination.” Hasnudeen, 552 N.W.2d at 557 (quoting Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Minn.1988)).

1996See Berg v. Groschen, 437 N.W.2d 75, 77 (Minn.App. 1989) (“Under the Supreme Court’s directive, we designate the six-year limitations period in Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5), as the applicable statutory limitations period for section 1983 claims.”).

1995State by Beaulieu v. City of Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 570 (Minn.1994).

1995State by Beaulieu v. City of Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 570 (Minn. 1994).

1991In Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395, 399 (Minn.1978), the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the discrimination analysis applied by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 , 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

1980The court stated: Petitioners, in response, rely upon a line of cases which hold, as a general proposition, that the intentional, systematic undervaluation of property similarly situated with other property assessed at its full value constitutes an improper discrimination in violation of equal protection principles. [Citations omitted.] * * * These cases [relied upon by petitioners] do not purport to confine the states to a current value system under equal protection principles or to state an exception to the general rule accepted both by the United States Supreme Court and by us, as previousl