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9 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Xuan Huynh v. United States Department of Transportationgreen1 sentence2024Compare Xuan Huynh v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 794 F.3d 952, 959 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding, in race discrimination case, that employer’s “denial of a positive recommendation letter . . . did not rise to the level” of an actionable adverse employment action) with Reed v. Unified Sch. | 1 | 1 |
Town of Wickenburg v. Sabingreen1 sentence2021See Sabin, 68 Ariz. at 80 (concluding that charging one customer a deposit fee that was not required of others similarly situated was discriminatory). ¶28 Sun City argues that combining multiple communities with different costs of service into a single district with uniform rates renders the consolidation impermissibly discriminatory. | 1 | 1 |
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greengreen2 sentences2018Id. at 98 n.21, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; see, e.g. , McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 , 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). 2018Id. at 98 n.21, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; see, e.g. , McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 , 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). | 1 | 1 |
Lemons v. Superior Court of Gila Countygreen2 sentences2009It is clear that, when the trial court entered its judgment, the damages ruling, like its ruling on the discrimination claim, became final and ap-pealable. 10 ¶ 26 It is well settled that “a superior court judge has no jurisdiction to review or change the judgment of another superior court judge when the judgment has become ‘final.’ ” Davis v. Davis, 195 Ariz. 158, 161, ¶ 11 , 985 P.2d 643, 646 (App.1999) (citation omitted); see also Lemons v. Superior Court, 141 Ariz. 502, 504 , 687 P.2d 1257, 1259 (1984) (citation omitted) (“When a final judgment is involved one superior court judge has no j 2009It is clear that, when the trial court entered its judgment, the damages ruling, like its ruling on the discrimination claim, became final and ap-pealable. 10 ¶ 26 It is well settled that “a superior court judge has no jurisdiction to review or change the judgment of another superior court judge when the judgment has become ‘final.’ ” Davis v. Davis, 195 Ariz. 158, 161, ¶ 11 , 985 P.2d 643, 646 (App.1999) (citation omitted); see also Lemons v. Superior Court, 141 Ariz. 502, 504 , 687 P.2d 1257, 1259 (1984) (citation omitted) (“When a final judgment is involved one superior court judge has no j | 1 | 1 |
Dunlap v. City of Phoenixgreen2 sentences2009It is clear that, when the trial court entered its judgment, the damages ruling, like its ruling on the discrimination claim, became final and ap-pealable. 10 ¶ 26 It is well settled that “a superior court judge has no jurisdiction to review or change the judgment of another superior court judge when the judgment has become ‘final.’ ” Davis v. Davis, 195 Ariz. 158, 161, ¶ 11 , 985 P.2d 643, 646 (App.1999) (citation omitted); see also Lemons v. Superior Court, 141 Ariz. 502, 504 , 687 P.2d 1257, 1259 (1984) (citation omitted) (“When a final judgment is involved one superior court judge has no j 2009It is clear that, when the trial court entered its judgment, the damages ruling, like its ruling on the discrimination claim, became final and ap-pealable. 10 ¶ 26 It is well settled that “a superior court judge has no jurisdiction to review or change the judgment of another superior court judge when the judgment has become ‘final.’ ” Davis v. Davis, 195 Ariz. 158, 161, ¶ 11 , 985 P.2d 643, 646 (App.1999) (citation omitted); see also Lemons v. Superior Court, 141 Ariz. 502, 504 , 687 P.2d 1257, 1259 (1984) (citation omitted) (“When a final judgment is involved one superior court judge has no j | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Davisgreen2 sentences2009It is clear that, when the trial court entered its judgment, the damages ruling, like its ruling on the discrimination claim, became final and ap-pealable. 10 ¶ 26 It is well settled that “a superior court judge has no jurisdiction to review or change the judgment of another superior court judge when the judgment has become ‘final.’ ” Davis v. Davis, 195 Ariz. 158, 161, ¶ 11 , 985 P.2d 643, 646 (App.1999) (citation omitted); see also Lemons v. Superior Court, 141 Ariz. 502, 504 , 687 P.2d 1257, 1259 (1984) (citation omitted) (“When a final judgment is involved one superior court judge has no j 2009It is clear that, when the trial court entered its judgment, the damages ruling, like its ruling on the discrimination claim, became final and ap-pealable. 10 ¶ 26 It is well settled that “a superior court judge has no jurisdiction to review or change the judgment of another superior court judge when the judgment has become ‘final.’ ” Davis v. Davis, 195 Ariz. 158, 161, ¶ 11 , 985 P.2d 643, 646 (App.1999) (citation omitted); see also Lemons v. Superior Court, 141 Ariz. 502, 504 , 687 P.2d 1257, 1259 (1984) (citation omitted) (“When a final judgment is involved one superior court judge has no j | 1 | 1 |
U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. Arizona Department of Revenuegreen2 sentences2003The record contains mere generalizations about similarities between the purpose and use of U.S. West’s intraLATA property and the purpose and use of other long-distance carriers’ interLATA property.” U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 193 Ariz. 319, 324, ¶ 21 , 972 P.2d 652, 657 (App. 1998). ¶7 During the pendency of that appeal, Qwest and the ILECs filed complaints or answers to ADOR’s complaints challenging the methods used to value their class 3 telecommunications property for tax years 1997, 1998, and/or 1999. 3 Following consolidation of the claims, the parties file 2003The record contains mere generalizations about similarities between the purpose and use of U.S. West’s intraLATA property and the purpose and use of other long-distance carriers’ interLATA property.” U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 193 Ariz. 319, 324, ¶ 21 , 972 P.2d 652, 657 (App. 1998). ¶7 During the pendency of that appeal, Qwest and the ILECs filed complaints or answers to ADOR’s complaints challenging the methods used to value their class 3 telecommunications property for tax years 1997, 1998, and/or 1999. 3 Following consolidation of the claims, the parties file | 1 | 1 |
Asare v. Hartford Fire Insurancegreen2 sentences1993Co., 1 Cal. App. 4th 856 , 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 452, 455-56 (1991) (finding a release of workers' compensation claim did not necessarily include the release of a discrimination claim, noting, among other things, that although aware of the latter, the release made "no explicit reference" to the discrimination claim). 1993Co., 1 Cal. App. 4th 856 , 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 452, 455-56 (1991) (finding a release of workers' compensation claim did not necessarily include the release of a discrimination claim, noting, among other things, that although aware of the latter, the release made "no explicit reference" to the discrimination claim). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Batson v. Kentucky
green
2 sentences2018Finally, the restoration option contemplates that the wrongfully excluded jurors will be "reinstated on the venire." Id. ¶ 13 Elsewhere in the decision, the Court analogized the Batson inquiry to a discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, under which a very similar three-part test is used to determine intentional discrimination. 2018Id. at 98 n.21, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; see, e.g. , McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 , 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Carol N. Cooper, an Individual v. Neiman Marcus Group, a Delaware Corporation, Susan B. Zegers, an Individual, Maria Dempsey Rebolledo, an Individual
green
1 sentence1999Cooper v. Neiman Marcus Group, 125 F.3d 786 (9th Cir.1997). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Vest v. Bd. of Educ. of Cty. of Nicholas
green
2 sentences1995Vest v. Board of Educ., 193 W.Va. 222 , 455 S.E.2d 781 (1995). 1995Vest v. Board of Educ., 193 W.Va. 222 , 455 S.E.2d 781 (1995). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Lettich v. Kenway
green
1 sentence1988We also reject Dr. Lundell’s contention that he could not have been an “agent” of CSA because he and CSA were “independent contracting parties.” Contrary to Dr. Lundell’s implicit argument and the trial court’s reasoning, there is no legal requirement that a person be an employee or servant of another in order to be his “agent.” See A.R.S. § 41-1461(1), (2); Lettich v. Kenway, 590 F.Supp. 1225 (D.Mass.1984) (each general partner in law partnership was an “agent” of the partnership and therefore an “employer”). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.