discrimination claim in California

2022(See Morgan v. Regents of University of California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52 , 67–69 (Morgan); Akers v. County of San Diego (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1453 ; see also Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 (Guz) [applying McDonnell Douglas to a discrimination claim under FEHA; citing cases]; Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042 [applying McDonnell Douglas to a FEHA retaliation claim; citing cases].) As we explained in Guz, the high court established the McDonnell Douglas framework for trying claims of intentional discrimination — there, intentional emplo

2017The law governing proof of discrimination claims Government Code section 12940, subdivision (a) provides that it is an unlawful *184 employment practice for an employer, "because of the race ... of any person, to ... discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." 4 Particular burden-shifting rules apply to proof of a discrimination claim under this section, which "reflects the principle that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is rare, and that such claims must usually be proved circumstantially." ( Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.

2022Moreover, Harris tells us ‘there must be a causal link between the employer’s consideration of a protected characteristic and the action taken by the employer’ and a plaintiff must demonstrate ‘discrimination was a substantial motivating factor, rather than simply a motivating factor.’ ( Harris, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 215, 232 . . . ; see DeJung v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 533 , 551 . . . [‘[P]roof of discriminatory animus does not end the analysis of a discrimination claim.

2017Moreover, Harris tells us "there must be a causal link between the employer's consideration of a protected characteristic and the action taken by the employer" and a plaintiff must demonstrate "discrimination was a substantial motivating factor, rather than simply a motivating factor." ( Harris, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 215, 232, 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 392 , 294 P.3d 49 ; accord, Soria, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 590 , 210 Cal.Rptr.3d 59 ; see DeJung v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 533 , 551, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 99 ["[P]roof of discriminatory animus does not end the analysis of a discrimination c

2018Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) In the context of an employer's motion for summary adjudication of a discrimination claim, this means "the burden shifts to the [plaintiff] to 'demonstrate a triable issue by producing substantial evidence that the employer's stated reasons were untrue or pretextual, or that the employer acted with a discriminatory animus, such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the employer engaged in intentional discrimination or other unlawful action.' " ( Serri, supra , 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 861 , 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 732 , italics omitted; see also Caldwell, supra

2018Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) In the context of an employer's motion for summary adjudication of a discrimination claim, this means "the burden shifts to the [plaintiff] to 'demonstrate a triable issue by producing substantial evidence that the employer's stated reasons were untrue or pretextual, or that the employer acted with a discriminatory animus, such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the employer engaged in intentional discrimination or other unlawful action.' " ( Serri, supra , 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 861 , 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 732 , italics omitted; see also Caldwell, supra

2022(See Morgan v. Regents of University of California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52 , 67–69 (Morgan); Akers v. County of San Diego (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1453 ; see also Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 (Guz) [applying McDonnell Douglas to a discrimination claim under FEHA; citing cases]; Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042 [applying McDonnell Douglas to a FEHA retaliation claim; citing cases].) As we explained in Guz, the high court established the McDonnell Douglas framework for trying claims of intentional discrimination — there, intentional emplo

2014Instead, a discrimination claim based on retaliation requires proof that the plaintiff believed he or she suffered discrimination as a result of his or her physical disability by (1) engaging in protected activity by opposing discrimination and seeking a reasonable accommodation, (2) he or she was subjected to adverse employment action and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer’s action.15 (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042-1043 .) Timec did not even attempt to 15 Indeed, the almost immediate succession of events given the proximity o

2007In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. (1974) 415 U.S. 36 [ 39 L.Ed.2d 147 , 94 S.Ct. 1011 ] (Alexander), the United States Supreme Court considered the preclusive effect of an arbitration decision on a subsequent discrimination claim under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.), when the arbitration procedure was mandated by a CBA.

2007In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. (1974) 415 U.S. 36 [ 39 L.Ed.2d 147 , 94 S.Ct. 1011 ] (Alexander), the United States Supreme Court considered the preclusive effect of an arbitration decision on a subsequent discrimination claim under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.), when the arbitration procedure was mandated by a CBA.

2025(Bailey, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 637 [FEHA retaliation claim under § 12940, subd. (h), requires same showing of adverse employment action necessary for a discrimination claim under § 12940]; Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1168 [“the [adverse] employment actions that can give rise to a claim for retaliation are identical to the actions that can give rise to a claim for discrimination”]; Francis v. City of Los Angeles (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 532 , 540–541 [to * See footnote, ante, page 1. 27. prove claim of retaliation under Lab.

2017Instead, harassment consists of conduct outside the scope of necessary job performance, conduct presumably engaged in for personal gratification, because of meanness or bigotry, or for other personal motives.' " ( Reno, at pp. 645-646, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499 , 957 P.2d 1333 .) "Behavior that gives rise to a discrimination claim, on the other hand, is often indistinguishable from performing one's job duties." ( Id. at p. 657, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499 , 957 P.2d 1333 .) Thus, "[w]hatever similarities there may be between [discrimination and harassment], the employer ultimately does the former; coworkers a

2025(See Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 280 [“For FEHA claims, the discrimination requirement has been phrased similarly [to that under Title VII]: ‘To plead a cause of action for [hostile work environment] sexual harassment, it is “only necessary to show that gender is a substantial factor 8 These issues include (but are not limited to) whether the City properly exercised its discretion with regard to separating Bailey and Larkin (see Swenson, supra, 271 F.3d at pp. 1194–1195), whether the City’s actions with respect to Larkin were reasonably anticipated to

2025(See Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 280 [“For FEHA claims, the discrimination requirement has been phrased similarly [to that under Title VII]: ‘To plead a cause of action for [hostile work environment] sexual harassment, it is “only necessary to show that gender is a substantial factor 8 These issues include (but are not limited to) whether the City properly exercised its discretion with regard to separating Bailey and Larkin (see Swenson, supra, 271 F.3d at pp. 1194–1195), whether the City’s actions with respect to Larkin were reasonably anticipated to

2017Moreover, Harris tells us "there must be a causal link between the employer's consideration of a protected characteristic and the action taken by the employer" and a plaintiff must demonstrate "discrimination was a substantial motivating factor, rather than simply a motivating factor." ( Harris, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 215, 232, 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 392 , 294 P.3d 49 ; accord, Soria, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 590 , 210 Cal.Rptr.3d 59 ; see DeJung v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 533 , 551, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 99 ["[P]roof of discriminatory animus does not end the analysis of a discrimination c

2017Moreover, Harris tells us "there must be a causal link between the employer's consideration of a protected characteristic and the action taken by the employer" and a plaintiff must demonstrate "discrimination was a substantial motivating factor, rather than simply a motivating factor." ( Harris, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 215, 232, 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 392 , 294 P.3d 49 ; accord, Soria, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 590 , 210 Cal.Rptr.3d 59 ; see DeJung v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 533 , 551, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 99 ["[P]roof of discriminatory animus does not end the analysis of a discrimination c

2016For a discrimination claim, Dushman must prove that he was able to perform the essential functions of the position for which he had been hired. ( Jensen, supra, at p. 256 ; accord, Furtado v. State Personnel Bd. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 729, 744-745 (Furtado).) He admittedly could not do so with or without reasonable accommodation.

2016No Genuine Issue of Material Fact To establish a claim for failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the plaintiff has a disability covered by FEHA; (2) the plaintiff is a qualified individual; and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff’s disability. [Citation.]” (Furtado, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 744 .) An important distinction between this claim and a discrimination claim is that “‘the plaintiff proves he or she is a qualified individual by establishing that he or she can perform the essential functions of the position to which reassignment is sough

2016(See § 12940, subd. (a); Jones v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1379 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 200 ] [plaintiff’s claim based on a disparate treatment theory “requires a showing that the employer acted with discriminatory intent”]; see also Clark v. Claremont University Center (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 639, 662 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 151 ]; Mixon v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1306, 1316 [ 237 Cal.Rptr. 884 ].) In addition, “there must be a causal link between the employer’s consideration of a protected characteristic and the action taken by the em

2014(See Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203 , 214- 215, 232; Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 356-357 (Guz).) Discriminatory intent is a necessary element of a discrimination claim. (§ 12940, subds. (a), (h); see Clark v. Claremont University Center (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 639, 662 ; Mixon v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1306, 1316 .) An employer moving for summary judgment on a FEHA cause of action for discrimination may satisfy its initial burden of proving a cause of action has no merit by showing either that one or more elements of the

2024The phrase ‘because of’ means there must be a causal link between the employer’s consideration of a protected characteristic and the action taken by the employer.” (Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 215 .) In other words, the facts that the plaintiff was a member of a protected class and was subjected to adverse employment actions are necessary, but not sufficient, to establish a discrimination claim.

2022Moreover, Harris tells us ‘there must be a causal link between the employer’s consideration of a protected characteristic and the action taken by the employer’ and a plaintiff must demonstrate ‘discrimination was a substantial motivating factor, rather than simply a motivating factor.’ ( Harris, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 215, 232 . . . ; see DeJung v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 533 , 551 . . . [‘[P]roof of discriminatory animus does not end the analysis of a discrimination claim.

2017Instead, harassment consists of conduct outside the scope of necessary job performance, conduct presumably engaged in for personal gratification, because of meanness or bigotry, or for other personal motives.' " ( Reno, at pp. 645-646, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499 , 957 P.2d 1333 .) "Behavior that gives rise to a discrimination claim, on the other hand, is often indistinguishable from performing one's job duties." ( Id. at p. 657, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499 , 957 P.2d 1333 .) Thus, "[w]hatever similarities there may be between [discrimination and harassment], the employer ultimately does the former; coworkers a

2017Instead, harassment consists of conduct outside the scope of necessary job performance, conduct presumably engaged in for personal gratification, because of meanness or bigotry, or for other personal motives.' " ( Reno, at pp. 645-646, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499 , 957 P.2d 1333 .) "Behavior that gives rise to a discrimination claim, on the other hand, is often indistinguishable from performing one's job duties." ( Id. at p. 657, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499 , 957 P.2d 1333 .) Thus, "[w]hatever similarities there may be between [discrimination and harassment], the employer ultimately does the former; coworkers a

2014(See Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203 , 214- 215, 232; Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 356-357 (Guz).) Discriminatory intent is a necessary element of a discrimination claim. (§ 12940, subds. (a), (h); see Clark v. Claremont University Center (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 639, 662 ; Mixon v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1306, 1316 .) An employer moving for summary judgment on a FEHA cause of action for discrimination may satisfy its initial burden of proving a cause of action has no merit by showing either that one or more elements of the

1992(Mixon v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1306, 1316 [ 237 Cal.Rptr. 884 ].) In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 [ 36 L.Ed.2d 668 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 ], the Supreme Court described the shifting burden of proof in establishing a discrimination claim: (1) the complainant must show a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) the employer may then offer a legitimate reason for his actions; after which (3) the complainant is afforded an opportunity to prove that the reason given is a pretext to mask an illegal motive.

2014(See, e.g., Foxborough, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th 217 [original complaint alleged negligent transactional advice between 1978 and 1981 and proposed amendment alleged negligence when attorney served as expert consultant and witness and denied responsibility for the oversight; no relation back because latter was separate incident that arose from new and later contractual relationship between the parties]; Kim v. Regents of University of California (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 160, 168-169 [amended complaint alleging cause of action for age discrimination did not relate back to 25 filing of the original com

2014(See, e.g., Foxborough, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th 217 [original complaint alleged negligent transactional advice between 1978 and 1981 and proposed amendment alleged negligence when attorney served as expert consultant and witness and denied responsibility for the oversight; no relation back because latter was separate incident that arose from new and later contractual relationship between the parties]; Kim v. Regents of University of California (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 160, 168-169 [amended complaint alleging cause of action for age discrimination did not relate back to 25 filing of the original com

2022To establish a disability discrimination claim, a plaintiff must show he or she “(1) suffered from a disability, (2) was otherwise qualified to do his or her job, and (3) was subjected to adverse employment action because of the disability.” (Nealy, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 378 .) To decide whether a plaintiff was a qualified individual “[i]n connection with a discrimination claim under section 12940, subdivision (a), the court considers whether [the] plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job held—or for job applicants, the job desired—with or without reasonable accommodat

2017Under FEHA, “reasonable accommodation” means “ ‘a modification or adjustment to the workplace that enables the employee to perform the essential functions of the job held or desired.’ ” (Furtado, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 745 , italics omitted; see Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neman Marcus Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 952, 974 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 190 ] (Nadaf-Rahrov).) While the reasonableness of an accommodation is ordinarily a question of fact (Nealy, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 374 ; Raine, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 1227, fn. 11 ), FEHA does not require employers to eliminate essential functio

2018Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) In the context of an employer's motion for summary adjudication of a discrimination claim, this means "the burden shifts to the [plaintiff] to 'demonstrate a triable issue by producing substantial evidence that the employer's stated reasons were untrue or pretextual, or that the employer acted with a discriminatory animus, such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the employer engaged in intentional discrimination or other unlawful action.' " ( Serri, supra , 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 861 , 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 732 , italics omitted; see also Caldwell, supra

2018Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) In the context of an employer's motion for summary adjudication of a discrimination claim, this means "the burden shifts to the [plaintiff] to 'demonstrate a triable issue by producing substantial evidence that the employer's stated reasons were untrue or pretextual, or that the employer acted with a discriminatory animus, such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the employer engaged in intentional discrimination or other unlawful action.' " ( Serri, supra , 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 861 , 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 732 , italics omitted; see also Caldwell, supra

2017(See Slatkin, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 1158 , 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 480 ["all the evidence that the [defendant's] claimed *361 reasons were dishonest pointed equally to the conclusion that its true reasons were nondiscriminatory"].) We therefore conclude that there was insufficient evidence to support the Officers' discrimination claim. c.

2017(See Slatkin, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 1158 , 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 480 ["all the evidence that the [defendant's] claimed *361 reasons were dishonest pointed equally to the conclusion that its true reasons were nondiscriminatory"].) We therefore conclude that there was insufficient evidence to support the Officers' discrimination claim. c.

2016(See § 12940, subd. (a); Jones v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1379 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 200 ] [plaintiff’s claim based on a disparate treatment theory “requires a showing that the employer acted with discriminatory intent”]; see also Clark v. Claremont University Center (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 639, 662 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 151 ]; Mixon v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1306, 1316 [ 237 Cal.Rptr. 884 ].) In addition, “there must be a causal link between the employer’s consideration of a protected characteristic and the action taken by the em

2016(See § 12940, subd. (a); Jones v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1379 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 200 ] [plaintiff’s claim based on a disparate treatment theory “requires a showing that the employer acted with discriminatory intent”]; see also Clark v. Claremont University Center (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 639, 662 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 151 ]; Mixon v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1306, 1316 [ 237 Cal.Rptr. 884 ].) In addition, “there must be a causal link between the employer’s consideration of a protected characteristic and the action taken by the em

2015In it, the court, citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC (1978) 434 U.S. 412 (Christiansburg), reiterated its conclusion that the discrimination claim was frivolous and unreasonable, and it incorporated by reference its reasoning as recited during the hearing.

1999The Supreme Court held: “[A] prevailing plaintiff . . . ‘should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust’ ” (Id. at pp. 416-417 [ 98 S.Ct. at p. 698 ].) By contrast, a defendant who prevails in a discrimination claim is not necessarily entitled to an award of fees.

2015(Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 539 .) Although the ultimate decisionmaker may be innocent of discriminatory intent, the employer can still be liable if the discriminatory comments were made by an employee who can influence the decisionmaker.

2013(Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 354 ; Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 520, fn. 2 (Reid).) 10 “At trial, the McDonnell Douglas test places on the plaintiff the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 354 .) In general, the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination are (1) the plaintiff was a member of a protected class; (2) the plaintiff was qualified for the position sought or performed competently; (3) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination; and (4) “some other circumstance suggests dis

2002(See, e.g., King v. Hofer (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 678, 682 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 719 ]; Beaty v. Truck Ins.

2002(See, e.g., King v. Hofer (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 678, 682 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 719 ]; Beaty v. Truck Ins.

2025The advertising and emails may supply evidence of the alleged discrimination, and they may be the means of carrying out or communicating or publicizing the alleged discrimination, but speech is not the actual basis for the discrimination claim and does not “supply elements of the challenged claim.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1064 .) “What gives rise to liability is not that the defendant spoke, but that the defendant denied the plaintiff a benefit, or subjected the plaintiff to a burden, on account of a discriminatory or retaliatory consideration.” (Id. at p. 1066.) And to the extent Appell

2025In Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th 1057 , the Supreme Court held that a discrimination claim brought by a university professor who was denied tenure did not arise from the university’s protected statements and communications during the official tenure process.

2025(See Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 280 [“For FEHA claims, the discrimination requirement has been phrased similarly [to that under Title VII]: ‘To plead a cause of action for [hostile work environment] sexual harassment, it is “only necessary to show that gender is a substantial factor 8 These issues include (but are not limited to) whether the City properly exercised its discretion with regard to separating Bailey and Larkin (see Swenson, supra, 271 F.3d at pp. 1194–1195), whether the City’s actions with respect to Larkin were reasonably anticipated to

2025(See Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 280 [“For FEHA claims, the discrimination requirement has been phrased similarly [to that under Title VII]: ‘To plead a cause of action for [hostile work environment] sexual harassment, it is “only necessary to show that gender is a substantial factor 8 These issues include (but are not limited to) whether the City properly exercised its discretion with regard to separating Bailey and Larkin (see Swenson, supra, 271 F.3d at pp. 1194–1195), whether the City’s actions with respect to Larkin were reasonably anticipated to

2018Proc., § 437c, subd. ( o )(2).) In the context of an employer's motion for summary adjudication of a discrimination claim, this means the employer " 'has the initial burden to present admissible evidence showing either that one or more elements of [the] plaintiff's prima facie case is lacking or that the adverse employment action was based upon legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors.' " ( Serri, supra , 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 861 , 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 732 .) Once a defendant satisfies its initial burden, "the burden shifts to the plaintiff ... to show that a triable issue of one or more material fac

2018Proc., § 437c, subd. ( o )(2).) In the context of an employer's motion for summary adjudication of a discrimination claim, this means the employer " 'has the initial burden to present admissible evidence showing either that one or more elements of [the] plaintiff's prima facie case is lacking or that the adverse employment action was based upon legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors.' " ( Serri, supra , 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 861 , 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 732 .) Once a defendant satisfies its initial burden, "the burden shifts to the plaintiff ... to show that a triable issue of one or more material fac

2013The Legal Framework for a Disability Discrimination Claim California has adopted the three-stage, burden-shifting test known as the McDonnell Douglas test (McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 ) for determining the merits of a discrimination claim, including a claim for disability discrimination.

2013Summary Adjudication of a Discrimination Claim California has adopted the three-stage, burden-shifting test known as the McDonnell Douglas test (McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 ) for determining the merits of a discrimination claim, including discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.

2025Appeals Bd. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1021, 1035 .) Evidence of discrimination is required for finding an employer has violated section 12940, subdivision (k).

2014Appeals Bd. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1021, 1035-1036 [“Prompt investigation of a discrimination claim is a necessary step by which an employer meets its obligation to ensure a discrimination-free work environment”]; American Airlines, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 881, 890 [“To carry out its obligation to prevent discrimination by investigating claims, an employer likely will need to obtain information from a wrongdoer’s co-workers who were in a position to witness the misconduct and identify the wrongdoer”].) “‘The public policy against sex discrimination and sexual harassment i

2017(See Horsford, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 375 , 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 644 ; Mamou v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 686 , 713, 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 406 [elements of a discrimination claim include proof of the plaintiff's "membership in a classification protected by the statute" and "discriminatory animus on the part of the employer toward members of that classification ," italics added].) The conclusion that the Officers were required to show disparate treatment because of their race is also consistent with the purpose of section 12940.

2017(See Horsford, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 375 , 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 644 ; Mamou v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 686 , 713, 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 406 [elements of a discrimination claim include proof of the plaintiff's "membership in a classification protected by the statute" and "discriminatory animus on the part of the employer toward members of that classification ," italics added].) The conclusion that the Officers were required to show disparate treatment because of their race is also consistent with the purpose of section 12940.