discrimination claim (Wisconsin) · Go Syfert
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discrimination claim in Wisconsin

11 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2023 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
Hiegel v. Labor & Industry Review Commissiongreen
wisctapp · 1984 · cited in 1 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014See Hiegel v. LIRC, 121 Wis. 2d 205, 215 , 359 N.W.2d 405 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting the "equal-pay-for-substantially-equal-work concept" is "clearly embodied" in both the WFEA and the Equal Pay Act).

2014See Hiegel v. LIRC, 121 Wis. 2d 205, 215 , 359 N.W.2d 405 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting the "equal-pay-for-substantially-equal-work concept" is "clearly embodied" in both the WFEA and the Equal Pay Act).

11
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1977 · cited in 1 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
2 sentences

2003In Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977), the United States Supreme Court held that to show a "pattern" in the context of a discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the government had "to prove more than the mere occurrence of isolated or 'accidental' or sporadic discriminatory acts." The Court quoted an explanation by Senator Humphrey: "single, insignificant, isolated acts of discrimination by a single business would not justify a finding of a pattern or practice. ..." Id. at 336 n.16 (internal quotation omitted). ¶ 56.

2003In Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977), the United States Supreme Court held that to show a "pattern" in the context of a discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the government had "to prove more than the mere occurrence of isolated or 'accidental' or sporadic discriminatory acts." The Court quoted an explanation by Senator Humphrey: "single, insignificant, isolated acts of discrimination by a single business would not justify a finding of a pattern or practice. ..." Id. at 336 n.16 (internal quotation omitted). ¶ 56.

11
American Motors Corp. v. Labor & Industry Review Commissiongreen
wis · 1984 · cited in 1 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
2 sentences

1991See American Motors Corp. v. LIRC 119 Wis. 2d 706, 709-10 , 350 N.W.2d 120, 122 (1984). 13 With these general principles in mind, we now turn to the specific issues concerning the statute's discrimination requirement.

1991See American Motors Corp. v. LIRC 119 Wis. 2d 706, 709-10 , 350 N.W.2d 120, 122 (1984). 13 With these general principles in mind, we now turn to the specific issues concerning the statute's discrimination requirement.

11
Watkins v. Labor & Industry Review Commissiongreen
wis · 1984 · cited in 1 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988
2 sentences

1988Id. at 766 .

1988Watkins, 117 Wis. 2d at 754, 756 .

11
Hamilton v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relationsgreen
wis · 1980 · cited in 1 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987
2 sentences

1987While Wisconsin courts considering claims of sex discrimination under the [WFEA] are not bound by decisions of the federal courts under Title VII [Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e], "[t]his court has looked to such federal decisions before for guidelines in applying the state fair employment law." Hamilton v. ILHR Dept., 94 Wis. 2d 611 , 621 n. 4, 288 N.W.2d 857, 861 (1980) (citations omitted). [3] The Puetz court summarized the methodology for proving a discrimination claim: The basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in employment discrimination suits bro

1987While Wisconsin courts considering claims of sex discrimination under the [WFEA] are not bound by decisions of the federal courts under Title VII [Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e], "[t]his court has looked to such federal decisions before for guidelines in applying the state fair employment law." Hamilton v. ILHR Dept., 94 Wis. 2d 611 , 621 n. 4, 288 N.W.2d 857, 861 (1980) (citations omitted). [3] The Puetz court summarized the methodology for proving a discrimination claim: The basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in employment discrimination suits bro

11
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Diasgreen
scotus · 1984 · cited in 1 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 1986–1986
2 sentences

1986A discrimination claim, by its nature, requires a comparison of the two classifications, and it could always be said that there was no intent to impose a burden on one party, but rather the intent was to confer a benefit on the other." Bacchus Imports, LTD v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 273 , 82 L.

1986A discrimination claim, by its nature, requires a comparison of the two classifications, and it could always be said that there was no intent to impose a burden on one party, but rather the intent was to confer a benefit on the other." Bacchus Imports, LTD v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 273 , 82 L.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
Hlavinka v. Blunt, Ellis & Loewi, Inc. green
wisctapp · 1993
2 sentences

2023Balele alleges that during the time that he has lived in his apartment, since 2004, each new owner or manager of the property has had “some kind of racist overtones towards Blacks”; that “[u]sually [the] new owners … did not want Black people as tenants … and preferred to replace them with Caucasian tenants”; and that “Balele knew Defendants collectively were treating him differently because of his Black race.” These factual allegations are not sufficiently concrete or specific to support a discrimination claim against one or more of the respondents. ¶11 In short, Balele’s allegations do not p

2023Balele alleges that during the time that he has lived in his apartment, since 2004, each new owner or manager of the property has had “some kind of racist overtones towards Blacks”; that “[u]sually [the] new owners … did not want Black people as tenants … and preferred to replace them with Caucasian tenants”; and that “Balele knew Defendants collectively were treating him differently because of his Black race.” These factual allegations are not sufficiently concrete or specific to support a discrimination claim against one or more of the respondents. ¶11 In short, Balele’s allegations do not p

12023–2023
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lewis neutral
wis · 2002
2 sentences

2020The OLR also points to In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lewis, 2002 WI 115 , 256 Wis. 2d 41 , 651 N.W.2d 734 .

2020The OLR also points to In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lewis, 2002 WI 115 , 256 Wis. 2d 41 , 651 N.W.2d 734 .

12020–2020
Dennis R. Bay v. Cassens Transport Company green
ca7 · 2000
2 sentences

2007Id. at 971-72 .

2007Id. at 971-72 .

12007–2007
Norris v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations green
wisctapp · 1990
2 sentences

1993Because both Schachtner and Norris v. DILHR, 155 Wis. 2d 337 , 455 N.W.2d 665 (Ct. App. 1990), address the issue of whether the exclusivity provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act bar a discrimination claim for a work-related injury, but do not directly address the issue of whether a compromise agreement precludes such a claim, we conclude that the issue is very nearly one of first impression, and therefore we give LIRC's decision due weight or great bearing.

1993Because both Schachtner and Norris v. DILHR, 155 Wis. 2d 337 , 455 N.W.2d 665 (Ct. App. 1990), address the issue of whether the exclusivity provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act bar a discrimination claim for a work-related injury, but do not directly address the issue of whether a compromise agreement precludes such a claim, we conclude that the issue is very nearly one of first impression, and therefore we give LIRC's decision due weight or great bearing.

11993–1993
Taylor v. Conta green
wis · 1982
1 sentence

1989The “‘substantial reason for the discrimination’ test falls between the minimum scrutiny (rational relation to a legitimate state interest) *14 and the strict scrutiny (necessary relation to a compelling state interest) tests. ..Id. 106 Wis. 2d at 339-40 .

11989–1989
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green green
scotus · 1973
2 sentences

1987The Puetz court summarized the methodology for proving a discrimination claim: The basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in employment discrimination suits brought under Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982), was determined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

1987While Wisconsin courts considering claims of sex discrimination under the [WFEA] are not bound by decisions of the federal courts under Title VII [Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e], "[t]his court has looked to such federal decisions before for guidelines in applying the state fair employment law." Hamilton v. ILHR Dept., 94 Wis. 2d 611 , 621 n. 4, 288 N.W.2d 857, 861 (1980) (citations omitted). [3] The Puetz court summarized the methodology for proving a discrimination claim: The basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in employment discrimination suits bro

11987–1987

Statutes the citing opinions construe

WI § Wis. Stat. § 111.32 (3) WI § Wis. Stat. § 111.321 (3) WI § Wis. Stat. § 111.36 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 162 (1978–2026) TX 132 (1998–2026) MA 64 (1984–2026) NY 62 (1978–2026) NJ 62 (1976–2026) OH 59 (1923–2025) WA 45 (1961–2026) IL 36 (1980–2025) MI 35 (1984–2024) IA 28 (1922–2025) PA 24 (1983–2026) MO 18 (1993–2024) MN 17 (1980–2025) OR 17 (1979–2025) WV 15 (1965–2023) CT 15 (1999–2025) DC 15 (1987–2025) LA 13 (1984–2017) MD 12 (1995–2025) NM 12 (1978–2026) WI 11 (1986–2023) AZ 9 (1988–2024) ME 8 (1999–2019) HI 8 (2002–2022) TN 7 (1991–2025) MT 7 (1995–2023) FL 6 (1998–2025) VT 6 (2005–2026) ND 5 (2011–2020) NC 5 (2005–2017) CO 4 (1996–2026) KS 4 (1904–2011) IN 3 (2006–2017) SD 3 (1991–2024) GA 3 (2009–2025) AR 3 (1997–2013) OK 3 (1989–2009) AK 3 (1983–2010) AL 3 (1989–2010) KY 3 (2010–2024) MS 3 (1992–2022) NH 3 (2013–2019) VA 3 (2002–2024) SC 2 (2011–2018) RI 2 (2015–2019) NE 2 (1999–2003) UT 2 (2013–2024)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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