estate violation in Kentucky

1940However, in Ryan et al. v. Ball et al. 267 Ky. 83 , 101 S. W. (2d) 187 , the general rule stated in Harvey v. Bell was followed and it was held that where the personal and real property were not separated but devised as a whole and where no intention or purpose of making an absolute devise as to one class of property and limiting the interest devised as to another class appeared, both classes of property must be governed by the real estate rule and it was pointed out that in Ireland v. Cooper there was a separation of the two classes of property.

1940However, in Ryan et al. v. Ball et al. 267 Ky. 83 , 101 S. W. (2d) 187 , the general rule stated in Harvey v. Bell was followed and it was held that where the personal and real property were not separated but devised as a whole and where no intention or purpose of making an absolute devise as to one class of property and limiting the interest devised as to another class appeared, both classes of property must be governed by the real estate rule and it was pointed out that in Ireland v. Cooper there was a separation of the two classes of property.

2024In Inter-Tel Techs., Inc., supra, the Kentucky Supreme Court advised, “[c]ourts should not pierce corporate veils lightly but neither should they hesitate in those cases where the circumstances are extreme enough to justify disregard of an allegedly separate corporate entity.” 360 S.W.3d at 168.

2021We consider each argument below. -12- A. Statute of Frauds The Currins argue that the trial court erred in allowing the Estate’s claim to come before a jury because KRS 371.010 provides that “[n]o action shall be brought to charge a person . . . (7) [u]pon any agreement that is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof . . . unless the promise, contract, agreement, representation, assurance, or ratification, or some memorandum or note thereof, be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or by his authorized agent.” Id.

2021As noted by the Estate, however, the statute goes on to state that “[i]t shall not be necessary to express the consideration in the writing, but it may be proved when necessary or disproved by parol or other evidence.” Id.

2021Before we reach the merits, we will address the Estate’s claim that the court did not comply with the mandates of Baptist Healthcare System, Inc. v. Miller, 177 S.W.3d 676 (Ky. 2005), and conduct a hearing.

2020In the administrative setting, “[t]he fundamental requirement of procedural due process is simply that all affected parties be given ‘the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Hilltop Basic Resources, 180 S.W.3d at 469 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 902 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)).

2020Upon review of Tommy’s POA, applying Ping, we agree with Signature that the POA granted Kenneth the authority to enter into the Arbitration Agreement on Tommy’s behalf, but we premise our holding on Article V, which grants the agent “all powers as are necessary or desirable to provide for [Tommy’s] support, maintenance, [and] health.” The construction of a power of attorney is a question of law, Ping, 376 S.W.3d at 590 , generally requiring application of the rules for interpretation of written instruments and the principles governing the law of agency, see id. at 590-94 .

2020Upon review of Tommy’s POA, applying Ping, we agree with Signature that the POA granted Kenneth the authority to enter into the Arbitration Agreement on Tommy’s behalf, but we premise our holding on Article V, which grants the agent “all powers as are necessary or desirable to provide for [Tommy’s] support, maintenance, [and] health.” The construction of a power of attorney is a question of law, Ping, 376 S.W.3d at 590 , generally requiring application of the rules for interpretation of written instruments and the principles governing the law of agency, see id. at 590-94 .

2020In the administrative setting, “[t]he fundamental requirement of procedural due process is simply that all affected parties be given ‘the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Hilltop Basic Resources, 180 S.W.3d at 469 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 902 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)).

2020In the administrative setting, “[t]he fundamental requirement of procedural due process is simply that all affected parties be given ‘the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Hilltop Basic Resources, 180 S.W.3d at 469 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 902 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)).

2020RCr 4.00(a); Miller v. Commonwealth, 234 S.W. 307 (Ky. 1921); see also Passmore v. Commonwealth, 580 S.W.3d 558 , 564-65 (Ky. App. 2019).1 As the Estate’s claim sounds in contract, we are of the opinion that the Commonwealth is not imbued with immunity against the claim nor is the $5,000 monetary judgment barred by immunity.

2010After reviewing the recent opinion by this Court in Jackson v. Tullar, 285 S.W.3d 290 (Ky.App.2007), the trial court denied the Estate’s motion for declaratory relief and dismissed its claim for punitive damages.

2009In McCollum, supra, a prosecutor and a detective 7 were sued for malicious prosecution.

2001Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F.Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (an opinion by a federal trial court); Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 870 F.2d 85, 87 (2nd Cir.1989) (“The district court found Comics World’s product to be ‘a bona fide newsstand publication’ and concluded that this circumstance rendered its use of the photographs protected by the first amendment.”); Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, 75 A.D.2d 768 , 427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (1980) ("Special term held that the book here involved is what it purportes [sic] to be, a biography, and as such did not give rise to a cause of action in favo

2001But see Priestley v. Priestley, Ky., 949 S.W.2d 594, 596 (1997). [8] Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F.Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (an opinion by a federal trial court); Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 870 F.2d 85, 87 (2nd Cir.1989) ("The district court found Comics World's product to be `a bona fide newsstand publication' and concluded that this circumstance rendered its use of the photographs protected by the first amendment."); Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, 75 A.D.2d 768 , 427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (1980) ("Special term held that the book here involved is what it purportes [sic] to be, a

2001Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F.Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (an opinion by a federal trial court); Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 870 F.2d 85, 87 (2nd Cir.1989) (“The district court found Comics World’s product to be ‘a bona fide newsstand publication’ and concluded that this circumstance rendered its use of the photographs protected by the first amendment.”); Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, 75 A.D.2d 768 , 427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (1980) ("Special term held that the book here involved is what it purportes [sic] to be, a biography, and as such did not give rise to a cause of action in favo

2001But see Priestley v. Priestley, Ky., 949 S.W.2d 594, 596 (1997). [8] Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F.Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (an opinion by a federal trial court); Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 870 F.2d 85, 87 (2nd Cir.1989) ("The district court found Comics World's product to be `a bona fide newsstand publication' and concluded that this circumstance rendered its use of the photographs protected by the first amendment."); Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, 75 A.D.2d 768 , 427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (1980) ("Special term held that the book here involved is what it purportes [sic] to be, a

1968Reliance is placed upon Kentucky Stone Company v. Gaddie, Ky., 396 S.W.2d 337 , and Wiser Oil Company v. Conley, Ky., 380 S.W.2d 217 .

1968Reliance is placed upon Kentucky Stone Company v. Gaddie, Ky., 396 S.W.2d 337 , and Wiser Oil Company v. Conley, Ky., 380 S.W.2d 217 .

1939“The modern doctrine in such cases, and the one supported by the great weight of authority, is, as stated in Becker v. Neurath, and approved in ■Chapman’s Ex’r v. Chapman, supra: “ ‘To enforce a trust of this character when it *449 is shown that it would be unconscientious to permit the grantee to hold the estate in violation of the promise, although there may be no evidence of ac- ' tual fraud on the part of the grantee in obtaining the conveyance.’ ” Compare also the cases of Motley’s Adm’rs v. Tabor, 208 Ky. 702 , 271 S. W. 1064 , and Huff v. Byers, 209 Ky. 375 , 272 S. W. 897 , wherein is

1939“The modern doctrine in such cases, and the one supported by the great weight of authority, is, as stated in Becker v. Neurath, and approved in ■Chapman’s Ex’r v. Chapman, supra: “ ‘To enforce a trust of this character when it *449 is shown that it would be unconscientious to permit the grantee to hold the estate in violation of the promise, although there may be no evidence of ac- ' tual fraud on the part of the grantee in obtaining the conveyance.’ ” Compare also the cases of Motley’s Adm’rs v. Tabor, 208 Ky. 702 , 271 S. W. 1064 , and Huff v. Byers, 209 Ky. 375 , 272 S. W. 897 , wherein is

1939“The modern doctrine in such cases, and the one supported by the great weight of authority, is, as stated in Becker v. Neurath, and approved in ■Chapman’s Ex’r v. Chapman, supra: “ ‘To enforce a trust of this character when it *449 is shown that it would be unconscientious to permit the grantee to hold the estate in violation of the promise, although there may be no evidence of ac- ' tual fraud on the part of the grantee in obtaining the conveyance.’ ” Compare also the cases of Motley’s Adm’rs v. Tabor, 208 Ky. 702 , 271 S. W. 1064 , and Huff v. Byers, 209 Ky. 375 , 272 S. W. 897 , wherein is

1939“The modern doctrine in such cases, and the one supported by the great weight of authority, is, as stated in Becker v. Neurath, and approved in ■Chapman’s Ex’r v. Chapman, supra: “ ‘To enforce a trust of this character when it *449 is shown that it would be unconscientious to permit the grantee to hold the estate in violation of the promise, although there may be no evidence of ac- ' tual fraud on the part of the grantee in obtaining the conveyance.’ ” Compare also the cases of Motley’s Adm’rs v. Tabor, 208 Ky. 702 , 271 S. W. 1064 , and Huff v. Byers, 209 Ky. 375 , 272 S. W. 897 , wherein is