12 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1897–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Matter of Estate of Sautergreen1 sentence2023Code Ann. § 72-3-701 to reverse the district court and to order appointment of a special adrninistrator regarding the fate of an alleged estate claim that 16 Mr. Werner's law partner had been defending. 189 Mont. at 248, 250-51 , 615 P.2d at 17 877-79. | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Estate of Franchsgreen1 sentence2023See, alsoin re Estate of Franchs, 722 P.2d 422, 424 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) 18 (When the record supports the necessity of appointing a special administrator "to 19 preserve the estate and to secure its proper administration," "the probate court did not 20 abuse its discretion in appointing a...special administrator, despite spouse's statutory 21 priority for appointment as personal representative,"); "[A] common thread in all of the 22 foregoing provisions is that appointment of a special administrator is appropriate only 23 where action or inaction by the personal representative designated by t | 1 | 1 |
Martel v. Montana Power Co.green2 sentences2000Thus, as this Court has often stated, liability does not become fixed upon a showing of negligence per se; rather, “there must be a determination of whether the violation was the proximate cause of the alleged injuries.” See, e.g., Steiner, 269 Mont. at 278 , 887 P.2d at 1234; Martel v. Montana Power Co. (1988), 231 Mont. 96, 103 , 752 P.2d 140, 145 (stating that jury instruction must provide that a violation of law is of no consequence unless it contributed as a proximate cause to an injury found by the jury to.have been suffered by the plaintiff). ¶28 Accordingly, Custer’s Inn asserts that w 2000Thus, as this Court has often stated, liability does not become fixed upon a showing of negligence per se; rather, “there must be a determination of whether the violation was the proximate cause of the alleged injuries.” See, e.g., Steiner, 269 Mont. at 278 , 887 P.2d at 1234; Martel v. Montana Power Co. (1988), 231 Mont. 96, 103 , 752 P.2d 140, 145 (stating that jury instruction must provide that a violation of law is of no consequence unless it contributed as a proximate cause to an injury found by the jury to.have been suffered by the plaintiff). ¶28 Accordingly, Custer’s Inn asserts that w | 1 | 1 |
Steiner v. Department of Highwaysgreen2 sentences2000Thus, as this Court has often stated, liability does not become fixed upon a showing of negligence per se; rather, “there must be a determination of whether the violation was the proximate cause of the alleged injuries.” See, e.g., Steiner, 269 Mont. at 278 , 887 P.2d at 1234; Martel v. Montana Power Co. (1988), 231 Mont. 96, 103 , 752 P.2d 140, 145 (stating that jury instruction must provide that a violation of law is of no consequence unless it contributed as a proximate cause to an injury found by the jury to.have been suffered by the plaintiff). ¶28 Accordingly, Custer’s Inn asserts that w 2000Thus, as this Court has often stated, liability does not become fixed upon a showing of negligence per se; rather, “there must be a determination of whether the violation was the proximate cause of the alleged injuries.” See, e.g., Steiner, 269 Mont. at 278 , 887 P.2d at 1234; Martel v. Montana Power Co. (1988), 231 Mont. 96, 103 , 752 P.2d 140, 145 (stating that jury instruction must provide that a violation of law is of no consequence unless it contributed as a proximate cause to an injury found by the jury to.have been suffered by the plaintiff). ¶28 Accordingly, Custer’s Inn asserts that w | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Relf v. Shatayeva
green
1 sentence2023See, alsoin re Estate of Franchs, 722 P.2d 422, 424 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) 18 (When the record supports the necessity of appointing a special administrator "to 19 preserve the estate and to secure its proper administration," "the probate court did not 20 abuse its discretion in appointing a...special administrator, despite spouse's statutory 21 priority for appointment as personal representative,"); "[A] common thread in all of the 22 foregoing provisions is that appointment of a special administrator is appropriate only 23 where action or inaction by the personal representative designated by t | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Matter of Estate of Peterson
green
2 sentences2022Ian’s citation to In re Estate of Peterson, 265 Mont. 104 , 874 P.2d 1230 (1994) is inapposite as Womack had no relationship with 12 the Elliot family prior to Ada’s death, and the Estate has no claim against Womack. 2022Ian’s citation to In re Estate of Peterson, 265 Mont. 104 , 874 P.2d 1230 (1994) is inapposite as Womack had no relationship with 12 the Elliot family prior to Ada’s death, and the Estate has no claim against Womack. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Lussy v. Dye
green
2 sentences2016It must be shown that something prevented a full presentation of the cause or an accurate determination on the merits and that for reasons of fairness and equity redress is justified.” Lussy, 215 Mont. at 93 , 695 P.2d at 466 . ¶31 The Estate’s motion in this case was essentially a request that the District Court change its mind. 2016It must be shown that something prevented a full presentation of the cause or an accurate determination on the merits and that for reasons of fairness and equity redress is justified.” Lussy, 215 Mont. at 93 , 695 P.2d at 466 . ¶31 The Estate’s motion in this case was essentially a request that the District Court change its mind. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Rouse v. Anaconda-Deer Lodge County
green
2 sentences2016The Estate contends that the decision in Rouse remains good law insofar as it held that under §§ 2-9-302 and 27-2-209(3), MCA, “the initial period for claims against a county is tolled upon timely filing of the claim and the six month period of limitation for filing an action in district court does not begin to run until the claimant received notice of the county board’s first denial of the claim.” Rouse, 250 Mont. at 6 , 817 P.2d at 693 . 2016The Estate contends that the decision in Rouse remains good law insofar as it held that under §§ 2-9-302 and 27-2-209(3), MCA, “the initial period for claims against a county is tolled upon timely filing of the claim and the six month period of limitation for filing an action in district court does not begin to run until the claimant received notice of the county board’s first denial of the claim.” Rouse, 250 Mont. at 6 , 817 P.2d at 693 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
GOETTEL v. Estate of Ballard
green
2 sentences2015Relying on Goettel v. Estate of Ballard, 2010 MT 140 , 356 Mont. 527 , 234 P.3d 99 , the court reasoned that (1) Locke had offered on several *259 occasions to settle her claim within the available policy limits and to release the Estate and Safeco; (2) Safeco rejected the offers and forced Locke to trial; (3) Locke obtained a $400,000 jury verdict; and (4) Safeco continued to refuse to pay the remaining liability policy limits. 2015Relying on Goettel v. Estate of Ballard, 2010 MT 140 , 356 Mont. 527 , 234 P.3d 99 , the court reasoned that (1) Locke had offered on several *259 occasions to settle her claim within the available policy limits and to release the Estate and Safeco; (2) Safeco rejected the offers and forced Locke to trial; (3) Locke obtained a $400,000 jury verdict; and (4) Safeco continued to refuse to pay the remaining liability policy limits. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
In Re the Marriage of Lee
green
2 sentences1998Frank cites In re Marriage of Lee (1991), 249 Mont. 516 , 816 P.2d 1076 , in support of this claim. ¶23 Marriage of Lee, however, stands for the proposition that where a property distribution ordered by the court includes a taxable event "precipitating a concrete and immediate tax liability," such tax liability should be considered by the court in entering its final judgment. 1998Frank cites In re Marriage of Lee (1991), 249 Mont. 516 , 816 P.2d 1076 , in support of this claim. ¶23 Marriage of Lee, however, stands for the proposition that where a property distribution ordered by the court includes a taxable event "precipitating a concrete and immediate tax liability," such tax liability should be considered by the court in entering its final judgment. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Halse v. Murphy
neutral
2 sentences1994The Estate next contends that Halse v. Murphy (1989), 237 Mont. 509 , 774 P.2d 418 , mandates relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(2), M.R.Civ.P. 1994The Estate next contends that Halse v. Murphy (1989), 237 Mont. 509 , 774 P.2d 418 , mandates relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(2), M.R.Civ.P. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Steer, Inc. v. Department of Revenue
green
2 sentences1994Steer, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 475 , 803 P.2d 601, 603 . 1994Steer, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 475 , 803 P.2d 601, 603 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Reese v. Reese
green
1 sentence1988Reese held “a claimant is not required to present a claim to the personal representative of a decedent’s estate where such claim is the subject of a legal proceeding against the decedent pending at the time of his death.” Reese, 637 P.2d at 1185 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Wills v. Morris
neutral
2 sentences1945That the administrator pay to F. F. Haynes for special and extraordinary services in the defense of the will contest, fees in addition to the regular fees for the probate of the estate. “ Accordingly, we hold that where a judgment is *380 divisible into parts, an appeal will lie from a part of tbe judgment.” Wills v. Morris, 100 Mont. 504 , 50 Pac. (2d) 858, 860 . 1945That the administrator pay to F. F. Haynes for special and extraordinary services in the defense of the will contest, fees in addition to the regular fees for the probate of the estate. “ Accordingly, we hold that where a judgment is *380 divisible into parts, an appeal will lie from a part of tbe judgment.” Wills v. Morris, 100 Mont. 504 , 50 Pac. (2d) 858, 860 . | 1 | 1945–1945 |
McGrath v. Carroll
green
2 sentences1920In McGrath v. Carroll, 110 Cal. 79 , 42 Pac. 466 , claim was presented upon a simple money demand; suit was brought for moneys held and received by deceased in trust for plaintiff. 1920In McGrath v. Carroll, 110 Cal. 79 , 42 Pac. 466 , claim was presented upon a simple money demand; suit was brought for moneys held and received by deceased in trust for plaintiff. | 1 | 1920–1920 |
White Star Bus Line, Inc. v. Lutz
neutral
1 sentence1897In this, connection we have read with interest the pertinent decision of the supreme court of Oregon (see Hindman v. Rizor, 27 Pac. 13 ), and also the recent decision of the supreme court of Colorado (Nichols v. Lantz, 47 Pac. 70 ). | 1 | 1897–1897 |
Hindman v. Rizor
green
1 sentence1897In this, connection we have read with interest the pertinent decision of the supreme court of Oregon (see Hindman v. Rizor, 27 Pac. 13 ), and also the recent decision of the supreme court of Colorado (Nichols v. Lantz, 47 Pac. 70 ). | 1 | 1897–1897 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.