48 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1903–2025 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Waughop v. Bartlettgreen2 sentences2022See Waughop, 165 Ill. at 129 . 2022See Waughop, 165 Ill. at 129 . | 2 | 2 |
ABN AMRO Mortgage Group Inc. v. McGahangreen2 sentences2022See McGahan, 237 Ill. 2d at 535-36 . ¶ 26 However, in holding that a lapsed claim against a decedent’s estate did not bar a separate foreclosure action, Waughop did not expressly base its conclusion on its characterization of a foreclosure case as an in rem proceeding. 2022See McGahan, 237 Ill. 2d at 535-36 . ¶ 26 However, in holding that a lapsed claim against a decedent’s estate did not bar a separate foreclosure action, Waughop did not expressly base its conclusion on its characterization of a foreclosure case as an in rem proceeding. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Estate of Minskygreen2 sentences1999See In re Estate of Minsky , 59 Ill. 1999See In re Estate of Minsky, 59 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Both v. Nelsongreen1 sentence2024“Where it appears that an error did not affect the outcome below, or where the court can see from the entire record that no injury has been done, the judgment or decree will not be disturbed.” Both v. Nelson, 31 Ill. 2d 511, 514 (1964); accord Simmons v. Garces, 198 Ill. 2d 541, 566-67 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Donovangreen1 sentence2024Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Donovan, 145 Ill. 2d 166, 172 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Simmons v. Garcesgreen1 sentence2024“Where it appears that an error did not affect the outcome below, or where the court can see from the entire record that no injury has been done, the judgment or decree will not be disturbed.” Both v. Nelson, 31 Ill. 2d 511, 514 (1964); accord Simmons v. Garces, 198 Ill. 2d 541, 566-67 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
Hall v. Gillinsgreen1 sentence2023However, the Estate mischaracterizes (1) the effect that the presumption of loss of society has on wrongful death proceedings, (2) the trial court’s written order denying the Estate’s motion for a new trial, and (3) the strength of the Estate’s evidence. ¶ 134 Although the Estate correctly asserts that the presumption of pecuniary injury, on its own, is sufficient to sustain a verdict awarding substantial damages (Hall v. Gillins, 13 Ill. 2d 26, 31 (1958)), that presumption does not require the jury to award damages. | 1 | 1 |
Flynn v. Vancilgreen1 sentence2023See 740 ILCS 180/2(a) (West 2020) (“[T]he jury may give such damages as they shall deem a fair and just compensation ***.” (Emphasis added.)); see also Flynn v. Vancil, 41 Ill. 2d 236, 240 , 242 - 30 - N.E.2d 237 (1968) (“Implicit in the right to weigh the presumption is the right to give it no weight at all.”). | 1 | 1 |
Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicagogreen1 sentence2013The evidence may be slight; a reviewing court may not reweigh it or determine if it should lead to a particular conclusion.” Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 100 (1995). ¶ 131 Bovis first claims that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing a specific provision into the Estate’s issue instructions. | 1 | 1 |
Minikon v. Escobedogreen1 sentence2012If a party elects to have a special representative appointed under this paragraph (2), the recovery shall be limited to the proceeds of any liability insurance protecting the estate and shall not bar the estate from enforcing any claims that might have been available to it as counterclaims. (c) If a party commences an action against a deceased person whose death is unknown to the party before the expiration of the time limited for the commencement thereof, and the cause of action survives, and is not otherwise barred, the action may be commenced against the deceased person’s personal represent | 1 | 1 |
| Augustus v. Estate of Somersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pufahl v. Estate of Parksgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Estate of Newcombgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Illinois Public Aid Commission v. Sandersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Estate of Garrettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ragen v. Bennigsengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Estate of Glogovsek v. Weck
green
2 sentences2018See 755 ILCS 5/2-1, 2-8 (West 2014); Glogovsek, 248 Ill. 2017See 755 ILCS 5/2-1, 2-8 (West 2014); Glogovsek , 248 Ill. | 2 | 2017–2018 |
Maple v. Gustafson
green
2 sentences2016When considering a motion for a new trial, the trial court, after weighing the evidence, will set aside a jury’s verdict and order a new trial only “ ‘if the verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.’ ” Id. at 454 (quoting Mizowek, 64 Ill. 2d at 310 ). 2015When considering a motion for a new trial, the trial court, after weighing the evidence, will set aside a jury's verdict and order a new trial only " 'if the verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.' " Id. at 454 (quoting Mizowek, 64 Ill. 2d at 310 ). | 2 | 2015–2016 |
Mizowek v. De Franco
green
2 sentences2016When considering a motion for a new trial, the trial court, after weighing the evidence, will set aside a jury’s verdict and order a new trial only “ ‘if the verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.’ ” Id. at 454 (quoting Mizowek, 64 Ill. 2d at 310 ). 2015When considering a motion for a new trial, the trial court, after weighing the evidence, will set aside a jury's verdict and order a new trial only " 'if the verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.' " Id. at 454 (quoting Mizowek, 64 Ill. 2d at 310 ). | 2 | 2015–2016 |
Chenal v. Diersen
green
2 sentences2001Given this conclusion, the trial court was within its discretionary authority to demand that plaintiff prove her claim. (footnote: 2) Nonetheless, in opposition to this determination, plaintiff cites In re Estate of Brauns , 330 Ill. 2001Given this conclusion, the trial court was within its discretionary authority to demand that plaintiff prove her claim. 2 Nonetheless, in opposition to this determination, plaintiff cites In re Estate of Brauns, 330 Ill. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
In Re Estate of Hoheiser
green
2 sentences1993App. 3d 1077 , 424 N.E.2d 25 .) Thus, if Knott’s payment of Hines’ attorney fees was an estate claim, it should have been barred from payment because it was filed more than six months after letters of office issued to Miles. 1993(Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 110½, par. 18-12; In re Estate of Hoheiser (1981), 97 Ill.App.3d 1077 , 53 Ill.Dec. 612 , 424 N.E.2d 25 .) Thus, if Knott's payment of Hines' attorney fees was an estate claim, it should have been barred from payment because it was filed more than six months after letters of office issued to Miles. | 2 | 1993–1993 |
Christiansen v. Christiansen
green
2 sentences1987First, a court should consider the permanence of the incompetent’s condition. ( 248 Cal. App. 2d at 424-25 , 56 Cal. Rptr. at 523 .) Since it had been established that Christiansen’s condition was considered permanent, the court declined to consider whether the condition rendering the ward incompetent is a prerequisite to the invocation of the substituted judgment doctrine. 1987First, a court should consider the permanence of the incompetent’s condition. ( 248 Cal. App. 2d at 424-25 , 56 Cal. Rptr. at 523 .) Since it had been established that Christiansen’s condition was considered permanent, the court declined to consider whether the condition rendering the ward incompetent is a prerequisite to the invocation of the substituted judgment doctrine. | 2 | 1987–1987 |
Parker v. Gray
green
2 sentences1955Brown v. Brown, 329 Ill. 198 ; Parker v. Gray, 317 Ill. 468 ; Murdock v. Murdock, 219 Ill. 123 ; Hessick v. Hessick, 169 Ill. 486 . 1927(Parker v. Gray, 317 Ill. 468 ; Slater v. Slater, 310 id. 454; Landes v. Landes, 268 id. 11; Warner v. Warner, 235 id. 448.) The master found that no evidence had been introduced to show that appellee knew the nature, character, value or extent of Blackburn’s property or that the same had been disclosed to her before executing the agreement, and that the provisions made for her in the contract were inadequate, harsh, unreasonable and disproportionate. | 2 | 1927–1955 |
Russell v. Hubbard
green
2 sentences1917(Hall v. Hale, 202 Ill. 326 .) And so it was held in Russell v. Hubbard, 59 Ill. 335 , that the amount stated as the alleged indebtedness in a claim filed against an estate should be given the same effect as an ad damnum in a declaration. 1903Stat. 1896, p. 293.) In Russell v. Hubbard, 59 Ill. 335 , we held that the amount set forth as the alleged indebtedness in a claim filed against an estate should be given like effect as an ad damnum in a declaration, and that the amount of the .recovery should be limited accordingly. | 2 | 1903–1917 |
Insurance Co. of North America v. J. L. Hubbard Co.
green
1 sentence2025Hubbard Co. Id. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
In re: Estate of Frain
green
2 sentences2025We affirm. 2025 IL App (2d) 240780 ¶2 I. 2025Thus, this evidence is not entitled to great weight, other than to show that Dorothy and Villanueva had many jointly held accounts at the bank, which supports the court’s determination that the 1842 account was jointly held with survivorship rights. ¶ 54 In summary, the trial court’s denial of the Estate’s motion for turnover of the funds in the 1842 account was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. - 17 - 2025 IL App (2d) 240780 ¶ 55 III. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Relf v. Shatayeva
green
1 sentence2023If a party elects to have a special representative appointed under this paragraph (2), the recovery shall be limited to the proceeds of any liability insurance protecting the estate and shall not bar the estate from enforcing any claims that might have been available to it as counterclaims. (c) If a party commences an action against a deceased person whose death is unknown to the party before the expiration of the time limited for the commencement thereof, and the cause of action survives, and is not otherwise barred, the action may be commenced against the deceased person’s personal represent | 1 | 2023–2023 |
In re Estate of Zivin
green
1 sentence2023Id. slip op. 3. ¶ 17 We read the federal case in sync with our ruling today. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Chrysler v. Darnall
green
1 sentence2023Id. at 678 . ¶ 145 Accordingly, we conclude that (1) on this record, the jury’s award of $0 for loss of society was not unreasonable or arbitrary and (2) as a result, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Estate’s motion for a new trial. ¶ 146 3. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Miller v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center
neutral
2 sentences2023Reducing the Judgment ¶ 147 Last, the Estate argues that (1) Rossi did not “allege or prove the source or origin of the $1,422,700 they sought in reduction” and (2) the trial court erred by applying Second District precedent from Perkey, 2013 IL App (2d) 120470 , to conclude that a judgment may be reduced by the amount of medical bills that the medical providers had written-off, pursuant to section 2-1205 of the Code; instead, the Estate contends that the Fourth District case of Miller v. - 33 - Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 2016 IL App (4th) 150728 , 56 N.E.3d 599 , should be applied to t 2023Reducing the Judgment ¶ 147 Last, the Estate argues that (1) Rossi did not “allege or prove the source or origin of the $1,422,700 they sought in reduction” and (2) the trial court erred by applying Second District precedent from Perkey, 2013 IL App (2d) 120470 , to conclude that a judgment may be reduced by the amount of medical bills that the medical providers had written-off, pursuant to section 2-1205 of the Code; instead, the Estate contends that the Fourth District case of Miller v. - 33 - Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 2016 IL App (4th) 150728 , 56 N.E.3d 599 , should be applied to t | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Chicago City Railway Co. v. Smith
neutral
2 sentences2023Co. v. Smith, 226 Ill. 178 , 80 N.E. 716 (1907). 2023Co. v. Smith, 226 Ill. 178 , 80 N.E. 716 (1907). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Perkey v. Portes-Jorol
green
1 sentence2023Reducing the Judgment ¶ 147 Last, the Estate argues that (1) Rossi did not “allege or prove the source or origin of the $1,422,700 they sought in reduction” and (2) the trial court erred by applying Second District precedent from Perkey, 2013 IL App (2d) 120470 , to conclude that a judgment may be reduced by the amount of medical bills that the medical providers had written-off, pursuant to section 2-1205 of the Code; instead, the Estate contends that the Fourth District case of Miller v. - 33 - Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 2016 IL App (4th) 150728 , 56 N.E.3d 599 , should be applied to t | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Power Dry of Chicago, Inc. v. Bean
green
2 sentences2022Williams prepared an estate analysis report for the decedent, and Dooley executed a - 27 - 2022 IL App (2d) 210043 MetLife “customer profile” form that stated her investment and tax objectives. 2022Id. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
In re Estate of Ries
green
1 sentence2021Critical here, the lawsuit was the Estate’s sole asset. ¶8 In December 2016, the Department filed against the Estate a claim for the entirety of the medical expenses it had paid on Lois’s behalf during her lifetime, i.e., $212,567.94. -2- 2021 IL App (2d) 191027 ¶9 In 2018, the Estate sought to settle the lawsuit and approached the Department about reducing its claim. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Schacht v. Lome
green
1 sentence2021Schacht v. Lome, 2016 IL App (1st) 141931, ¶ 34 . ¶ 16 Here, the trial court granted the Estate’s motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619(a)(3). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In re Estate of Stewart
green
1 sentence2016However, as we will explain, Harper’s later conduct, even after it was “too late” to save Stewart, may still -29- 2016 IL App (2d) 151117 be relevant to the willful-and-wanton element of the claim. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| In Re Estate of Beider green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Wojdyla v. City of Park Ridge green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Mitseff v. Acme Steel Company neutral | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Schloegl v. Nardi green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Madden v. Kuehn green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| In Re Estate of Bajonski green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Newman v. Gates green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Newman v. Gates green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Balch v. English neutral | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Brosam v. Employer's Mutual Casualty Co. green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Netcher green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| In re the Estate of Brown neutral | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| In Re Estate of Kuhn green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Walter Wanger Pictures, Inc. v. Rogan neutral | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Corporation of the Fine Arts Building neutral | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Brown v. Brown green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Hessick v. Hessick neutral | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Murdock v. Murdock green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Taylor v. Taylor neutral | 1 | 1925–1925 |
| Union Trust Co. v. Shoemaker green | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.