estate claim in Wisconsin

2026Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶23 , 383 Wis. 2d 1 , 914 N.W.2d 678 . ¶44 As the Estate’s challenge does not implicate a fundamental right or regulation of a protected class, we apply rational basis scrutiny, “where statutes are upheld if there is any rational basis for the legislation.” Id., ¶¶28-29.

2026Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶23 , 383 Wis. 2d 1 , 914 N.W.2d 678 . ¶44 As the Estate’s challenge does not implicate a fundamental right or regulation of a protected class, we apply rational basis scrutiny, “where statutes are upheld if there is any rational basis for the legislation.” Id., ¶¶28-29.

2025She contends that issue preclusion requires factfinding, see Finch v. Southside Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 2004 WI App 110, ¶43 , 274 Wis. 2d 719 , 685 N.W.2d 154 , as well as a discretionary determination regarding “fundamental fairness.” 14 No. 2024AP1673 See Flooring Brokers, Inc. v. Florstar Sales, Inc., 2010 WI App 40, ¶¶6-9 , 324 Wis. 2d 196 , 781 N.W.2d 248 .

2025Hammarback argues that because there is no factfinding or fundamental fairness determination for us to review, we are foreclosed from evaluating the Estate’s issue preclusion argument. ¶35 We disagree because “we will usually permit a respondent to employ any theory or argument on appeal that will allow us to affirm the [circuit] court’s order, even if not previously raised.” See Finch, 274 Wis. 2d 719 , ¶42 Here, however, we agree with Hammarback’s alternative argument that issue preclusion simply does not apply.

2025Steuck Living Tr. v. Easley, 2010 WI App 74, ¶22 , 325 Wis. 2d 455 , 785 N.W.2d 631 (“[A]lthough the use need be only the ordinary use an owner would make of it, the use must also be open, notorious, visible, exclusive, and hostile (as well as continuous).”). ¶21 The circuit court’s findings of fact related to the Pichlers’ use of the parcels were extremely detailed and thorough, necessitating an equal amount of detail and thoroughness by the Estate to challenge those findings on appeal.

2025Steuck Living Tr. v. Easley, 2010 WI App 74, ¶22 , 325 Wis. 2d 455 , 785 N.W.2d 631 (“[A]lthough the use need be only the ordinary use an owner would make of it, the use must also be open, notorious, visible, exclusive, and hostile (as well as continuous).”). ¶21 The circuit court’s findings of fact related to the Pichlers’ use of the parcels were extremely detailed and thorough, necessitating an equal amount of detail and thoroughness by the Estate to challenge those findings on appeal.

2025She contends that issue preclusion requires factfinding, see Finch v. Southside Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 2004 WI App 110, ¶43 , 274 Wis. 2d 719 , 685 N.W.2d 154 , as well as a discretionary determination regarding “fundamental fairness.” 14 No. 2024AP1673 See Flooring Brokers, Inc. v. Florstar Sales, Inc., 2010 WI App 40, ¶¶6-9 , 324 Wis. 2d 196 , 781 N.W.2d 248 .

2025She contends that issue preclusion requires factfinding, see Finch v. Southside Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 2004 WI App 110, ¶43 , 274 Wis. 2d 719 , 685 N.W.2d 154 , as well as a discretionary determination regarding “fundamental fairness.” 14 No. 2024AP1673 See Flooring Brokers, Inc. v. Florstar Sales, Inc., 2010 WI App 40, ¶¶6-9 , 324 Wis. 2d 196 , 781 N.W.2d 248 .

2025Id. 9 There is also no language in the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act that supports the Estate’s claim that a declaratory judgment action involving an estate must be heard in probate proceedings.

2025“An issue is ‘actually litigated’ when it is ‘properly raised, by the pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is determined.’” Id. (citation omitted). ¶34 Hammarback first argues that we should not address the Estate’s issue preclusion argument because it was not raised in the circuit court.

2017Because we conclude that § 895.446 is an "other civil action," we 3 No. 2014AP2420 consequently conclude that the damages cap is $10,000 under § 799.01(1)(d) and that double costs are authorized under Wis. Stat. § 807.01 (3). ¶6 As to the second issue, we conclude that attorney fees are included within the meaning of "costs of investigation and litigation" under Wis. Stat. § 895.446 (3)(b) because Stathus v. Horst, 2003 WI App 28 , 260 Wis. 2d 166 , 659 N.W.2d 165 , a judicial interpretation by the court of appeals, has long stood for that proposition, and the legislature, despite taking other

2017Because we conclude that § 895.446 is an "other civil action," we 3 No. 2014AP2420 consequently conclude that the damages cap is $10,000 under § 799.01(1)(d) and that double costs are authorized under Wis. Stat. § 807.01 (3). ¶6 As to the second issue, we conclude that attorney fees are included within the meaning of "costs of investigation and litigation" under Wis. Stat. § 895.446 (3)(b) because Stathus v. Horst, 2003 WI App 28 , 260 Wis. 2d 166 , 659 N.W.2d 165 , a judicial interpretation by the court of appeals, has long stood for that proposition, and the legislature, despite taking other

2010The circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that "the obligation to pay estate and inheritance taxes rests on the estate and the personal representative, not the defendants." As to the Wisconsin estate tax, the circuit court concluded that Firstar Trust Company v. First National Bank of *47 Kenosha, 197 Wis. 2d 484 , 541 N.W.2d 467 (1995), "deals with the issue completely" and that the Estate's claim that the defendants were obligated to pay a portion of the Wisconsin estate tax generated by the EO.D. accounts is not maintainable under state law.

2010The circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that "the obligation to pay estate and inheritance taxes rests on the estate and the personal representative, not the defendants." As to the Wisconsin estate tax, the circuit court concluded that Firstar Trust Company v. First National Bank of *47 Kenosha, 197 Wis. 2d 484 , 541 N.W.2d 467 (1995), "deals with the issue completely" and that the Estate's claim that the defendants were obligated to pay a portion of the Wisconsin estate tax generated by the EO.D. accounts is not maintainable under state law.

1988In addition, it is clear that Northwestern’s present position is that it is the policy which excepts coverage for the Estate’s claim. 7 Dowling’s reliance upon Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, 121 Wis. 2d 338 , 360 N.W.2d 2 (1984), and Maskrey v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 125 Wis. 2d 145 , 370 N.W.2d 815 (Ct. App. 1985), for the proposition that there may be several acts which contribute to the ultimate injury and damages is misplaced.

1988In addition, it is clear that Northwestern’s present position is that it is the policy which excepts coverage for the Estate’s claim. 7 Dowling’s reliance upon Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, 121 Wis. 2d 338 , 360 N.W.2d 2 (1984), and Maskrey v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 125 Wis. 2d 145 , 370 N.W.2d 815 (Ct. App. 1985), for the proposition that there may be several acts which contribute to the ultimate injury and damages is misplaced.

1988In addition, it is clear that Northwestern’s present position is that it is the policy which excepts coverage for the Estate’s claim. 7 Dowling’s reliance upon Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, 121 Wis. 2d 338 , 360 N.W.2d 2 (1984), and Maskrey v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 125 Wis. 2d 145 , 370 N.W.2d 815 (Ct. App. 1985), for the proposition that there may be several acts which contribute to the ultimate injury and damages is misplaced.

1988In addition, it is clear that Northwestern’s present position is that it is the policy which excepts coverage for the Estate’s claim. 7 Dowling’s reliance upon Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, 121 Wis. 2d 338 , 360 N.W.2d 2 (1984), and Maskrey v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 125 Wis. 2d 145 , 370 N.W.2d 815 (Ct. App. 1985), for the proposition that there may be several acts which contribute to the ultimate injury and damages is misplaced.

1977The statute then points out that the only limitation where a claim is made against an estate is the requirement that the claim be timely filed. *40 That this interpretation is the only one permitted under these statutes and under Wisconsin law is clear from the language of Garcia v. Chicago & North Western Railway Co., 256 Wis. 633, 638 , 42 N.W.2d 288 (1950), in which we said: “ ‘An exception exempts something absolutely from the operation of a statute by express words in the enacting clause; a proviso defeats its operation conditionally.

1977The statute then points out that the only limitation where a claim is made against an estate is the requirement that the claim be timely filed. *40 That this interpretation is the only one permitted under these statutes and under Wisconsin law is clear from the language of Garcia v. Chicago & North Western Railway Co., 256 Wis. 633, 638 , 42 N.W.2d 288 (1950), in which we said: “ ‘An exception exempts something absolutely from the operation of a statute by express words in the enacting clause; a proviso defeats its operation conditionally.

1963If on such hearing it shall appear that the heirs or dev-isees of the real estate in question or persons claiming under them contest the validity o£ any debt or claim which may be represented as existing against the estate, the hearing, shall be postponed until the liability of the estate for such claim is finally determined.” In re Anderson (1922), 176 Wis. 459 , 186 N. W. 1019 .

1963If on such hearing it shall appear that the heirs or dev-isees of the real estate in question or persons claiming under them contest the validity o£ any debt or claim which may be represented as existing against the estate, the hearing, shall be postponed until the liability of the estate for such claim is finally determined.” In re Anderson (1922), 176 Wis. 459 , 186 N. W. 1019 .

1955Where, as here, there *552 are two joint tenants, the shares of each were in the property jointly owned and only one half thereof need be included in the estate under the rule announced in Will of Schaech, 252 Wis. 299 , 31 N. W. (2d) 614 .

1933The payments, however, were made prior to the case of Will of Rice, 150 Wis. 401 , 136 N. W. 956 , 137 N. W. 778 , to the persons solely interested in the estate, who were compos mentis, and perhaps is not enough, standing alone, to warrant more than a reprimand.

1933The payments, however, were made prior to the case of Will of Rice, 150 Wis. 401 , 136 N. W. 956 , 137 N. W. 778 , to the persons solely interested in the estate, who were compos mentis, and perhaps is not enough, standing alone, to warrant more than a reprimand.