estate claim in Indiana

2009Gruber's contention is based on the premise that there is a distinction between "malfeasance" and "nonfeasance." See, e.g., J.A.W. v. Roberts, 627 N.E.2d 802, 809 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994) ("This court has held that when a defendant's alleged negligence arises from nonfeasance, the complete omission or failure to perform, as opposed to misfeasance, negligent conduct or active misconduct, then the duty to act must arise from a special relationship between the parties"); Harper v. Guar.

2009Gruber's contention is based on the premise that there is a distinction between "malfeasance" and "nonfeasance." See, e.g., J.A.W. v. Roberts, 627 N.E.2d 802, 809 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) ("This court has held that when a defendant's alleged negligence arises from nonfeasance, the complete omission or failure to perform, as opposed to misfeasance, negligent conduct or active misconduct, then the duty to act must arise from a special relationship between the parties"); Harper v. Guar.

2004Moreover, we note that in Markley Enterprises, Inc. v. Grover, 716 N.E.2d 559, 563 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), we encountered a similar procedural issue and determined that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting a late summary judgment filing.

2003See, e.g., Markley Enters., Inc. v. Grover, 716 N.E.2d 559, 563 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (holding that because the adverse party failed to comply with the requirements of Ind. Trial Rule 56, the trial court erred when it granted the adverse party's motion for extension of time to respond to the motion for summary judgment).

1999See Id. (discussing probate proceedings which are made applicable to guardianship proceedings through Ind. Code § 29-3-2-6 ); see also McGahan v. National Bank of Logansport , 151 Ind. App. 658 , 281 N.E.2d 522 (1972) (A final settlement of an estate "is conclusive on interested parties until set aside by appeal or proceeding brought for that purpose.").

1999See Id. (discussing probate proceedings which are made applicable to guardianship proceedings through Ind.Code § 29-3-2-6); see also McGahan v. National Bank of Logansport, 151 Ind.App. 658 , 281 N.E.2d 522 (1972) (A final settlement of an estate “is conclusive on interested parties until set aside by appeal or proceeding brought for that purpose.”).

1999See Id. (discussing probate proceedings which are made applicable to guardianship proceedings through Ind. Code § 29-3-2-6 ); see also McGahan v. National Bank of Logansport , 151 Ind. App. 658 , 281 N.E.2d 522 (1972) (A final settlement of an estate "is conclusive on interested parties until set aside by appeal or proceeding brought for that purpose.").

1999See Id. (discussing probate proceedings which are made applicable to guardianship proceedings through Ind. Code § 29-3-2-6 ); see also McGahan v. National Bank of Logansport , 151 Ind. App. 658 , 281 N.E.2d 522 (1972) (A final settlement of an estate "is conclusive on interested parties until set aside by appeal or proceeding brought for that purpose.").

2020We consider “whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Goodwin v. Yeakle’s Sports Bar and Grill, Inc., 62 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2016) (citation omitted); Ind. Trial Rule 56(C) (Summary judgment is appropriate if the designated evidence “shows that there is no genuine issue as Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-2569 | May 14, 2020 Page 4 of 15 to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”). [10] The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of mak

2019After hearing argument on the parties' respective motions, the trial court issued its order denying the Estate's motion for summary judgment and granting the Store's: When presented with a set of circumstances so clearly analogous to those of Goodwin [ v. Yeakle's Sports Bar & Grill , 62 N.E.3d 384 , 394 (Ind. 2016) ], a trial court has an absolute and important obligation to follow established precedent.

2014However, we nevertheless find Gahl instructive in determining whether the Wests are persons whose claims are governed by the MMA because, in both Gahl and the present case, inquiry was whether a claimant who has no prior relationship with the health care provider is a “patient” within the meaning of the MMA. “[A]lthough the Estate’s claim is related to the defendants’ alleged malpractice, it is not so interwined that it falls within the purview of the Malpractice Act.” Id. at 1262 ; see also R.R.K., 853 N.E.2d at 1289 (where patient of psychiatric hospital injured another patient, whose status

2014Gahl, 540 N.E.2d at 1262 (observing that any recovery by Estate’s claim will not benefit patient).

1995See Shourek v. Stirling (1993), Ind.App., 607 N.E.2d 402 .

1995See Shourek v. Stirling (1993), Ind. App., 607 N.E.2d 402 .

2026See Hacker v. Holland, 575 N.E.2d 675, 676 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (“An appellee’s failure to respond to an issue raised by an appellant is akin to failure to file a brief, and subjects the appellee to reversal upon the appellant’s showing of prima facie error[.]”) (italics in original), denying reh’g, trans. denied.

2026In such cases, “the law, in effect, implies negative findings as to such issues against the party having the burden of their proof.” Rogers v. City of Evansville, 437 N.E.2d 1019, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). 10 In her reply brief, Woodson asks that we review the trial court’s judgment for prima facie error because, according to her, the Estate’s brief falls short of the cogency required by the Appellate Rules and effectively fails to respond to the issues raised on appeal.

2026Admin., 964 N.E.2d 784, 791 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d at 408 ), cert. denied. [21] The designated evidence described above negates an essential element of the Estate’s claim for unjust enrichment—that the enrichment be unjust.

2026The plaintiff “must show that he has legal title with a present right of possession paramount to the title of the defendant.” Chmiel v. US Bank Nat’l Assoc., 109 N.E.3d 398, 407 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).

2026In the context of this case, the Vestals can defeat the Estate’s claim by showing the Estate “does not have title or interest in the property.” Id. [28] Measured against this standard, the Estate’s claim fails.

2026The Vestals’ counterclaim to quiet title is based on the trust provisions and the recorded Trustee’s Deed in their names. [27] As for the Estate’s claim, “[i]n an action to quiet title . . . the plaintiff must recover, if at all, on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness of his adversary’s title.” Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Holland, 993 N.E.2d 184, 191 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

2026The Vestals’ counterclaim to quiet title is based on the trust provisions and the recorded Trustee’s Deed in their names. [27] As for the Estate’s claim, “[i]n an action to quiet title . . . the plaintiff must recover, if at all, on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness of his adversary’s title.” Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Holland, 993 N.E.2d 184, 191 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

2025Szabo v. Cwidak, 558 N.E.2d 855, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).

2024Corp., 719 N.E.2d 824, 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)). [31] Perry argues the trial court erred when it denied her motion for relief from judgment because she did not receive adequate notice of the Estate’s motion for return of funds and/or the December 28 hearing.

2024See, e.g., King v. United Leasing, 765 N.E.2d 1287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (default judgment against King reversed because King did not receive sufficient notice of the claim against him). [35] If the notice was intended to inform Perry of the December 28, 2021, hearing, the circumstances are equally problematic.

2020Because we have reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to TCGC and are remanding for further proceedings, we need not address the Estate’s challenge to the trial court’s motion to correct error rulings. “[W]hen we are unable to provide effective relief upon an issue, the issue is deemed moot, and we will not reverse the trial court’s determination where absolutely no change in the status quo will result.” Sainvil v. State, 51 N.E.3d 337, 342 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citations omitted), trans denied.

2020IUHP maintains that, doing so, renders the Estate’s claim against IUHP moot because the Estate has already recovered $1.25 million. [9] In reviewing a grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, we “stand in the shoes of the trial court.” Murray v. Indianapolis Public Schools, 128 N.E.3d 450, 452 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Campbell Hausfeld/Scott Fetzer Company v. Johnson, 109 N.E.3d 953, 955-56 (Ind. 2018)).

2020IUHP maintains that, doing so, renders the Estate’s claim against IUHP moot because the Estate has already recovered $1.25 million. [9] In reviewing a grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, we “stand in the shoes of the trial court.” Murray v. Indianapolis Public Schools, 128 N.E.3d 450, 452 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Campbell Hausfeld/Scott Fetzer Company v. Johnson, 109 N.E.3d 953, 955-56 (Ind. 2018)).

2020See Morris v. Crain, 71 N.E.3d 871, 878 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (explaining that “[r]elevant evidence is defined as evidence having any tendency Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CC-541 | November 24, 2020 Page 14 of 20 to make the existence of any pertinent fact more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence”).

2018Peacocke v. Leffler, 74 Ind. 327, 330 (1881). [11] Here, the trial court properly concluded that the guardianship case necessarily adjudicated Charles’s embezzlement claim.