wording instruction in Arizona

16 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1954–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

Case	Followed	Cited
Western Truck Lines, Ltd. v. Berrygreen ariz · 1938 · cited in 2 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983 2 sentences 1983See Western Truck Lines v. Berry, 52 Ariz. 38 , 78 P.2d 997 (1938), and Gilbert v. Quinet, supra. Words used in an opinion discussing legal principles are not necessarily the best words to be used in instructing the jury. 1983See Western Truck Lines v. Berry, 52 Ariz. 38 , 78 P.2d 997 (1938), and Gilbert v. Quinet, supra. Words used in an opinion discussing legal principles are not necessarily the best words to be used in instructing the jury.	2	2
State v. Zunigagreen ariz · 1990 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990 2 sentences 1990See State v. Zuniga, 163 Ariz. 105, 107 , 786 P.2d 956, 958 (1990) (Corcoran, J., specially concurring). 1990See State v. Zuniga, 163 Ariz. 105, 107 , 786 P.2d 956, 958 (1990) (Corcoran, J., specially concurring).	1	1
Webb v. Ericksongreen ariz · 1982 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984 2 sentences 1984Clause 6 allows a trial court to grant relief from a final judgment or order for “any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” We have recently noted that the wording of clause 6 places two separate limitations on its application: “First, the reason for setting aside the [judgment or order] must not be one of the reasons set forth in the five preceding clauses. * * * Second, the ‘other reason’ advanced must be one which justifies relief.” (citations omitted) Webb v. Erickson, supra, at 186, 655 P.2d at 10 (emphasis in original). 1984We concluded that, to justify relief under clause 6, the facts must go beyond the factors enumerated in clauses 1 through 5 and raise “extraordinary circumstances of hardship or injustice * * Id. at 187 , 655 P.2d at 11 .	1	1
Sandstrom v. Montanagreen scotus · 1979 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981 2 sentences 1981The Sandstrom Court directly addressed this argument, however, in the following language: “Alternatively, the jury may have interpreted the instruction as a direction to find intent upon proof of the defendant’s voluntary actions (and their ‘ordinary’ consequences), unless the defendant proved the contrary by some quantum of proof which may well have been considerably greater than ‘some’ evidence—thus effectively shifting the burden of persuasion on the element of intent.” Id. at 517 , 99 S.Ct. at 2456 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 47 (Emphasis in original.) The only possible distinction is that the wording 1981The Sandstrom Court directly addressed this argument, however, in the following language: “Alternatively, the jury may have interpreted the instruction as a direction to find intent upon proof of the defendant’s voluntary actions (and their ‘ordinary’ consequences), unless the defendant proved the contrary by some quantum of proof which may well have been considerably greater than ‘some’ evidence—thus effectively shifting the burden of persuasion on the element of intent.” Id. at 517 , 99 S.Ct. at 2456 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 47 (Emphasis in original.) The only possible distinction is that the wording	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (16)

Case	Cited	Years
West Virginia Central & Pittsburg R. Co. v. State Ex Rel. Fuller green · 1903 2 sentences 1954Co. v. State, 96 Md. 652 , 54 A. 669, 671 , 61 L.R.A. 574 , this wording of the rule: “ * * * In every instance, before negligence can be predicated of a given act, back of the act must be sought and found a duty to the individual complaining, the observance of which duty would have averted or avoided the injury. * * * ” Under all the circumstances prevailing, what duty did the City of Phoenix owe to the deceased? 1954Co. v. State, 96 Md. 652 , 54 A. 669, 671 , 61 L.R.A. 574 , this wording of the rule: “ * * * In every instance, before negligence can be predicated of a given act, back of the act must be sought and found a duty to the individual complaining, the observance of which duty would have averted or avoided the injury. * * * ” Under all the circumstances prevailing, what duty did the City of Phoenix owe to the deceased?	2	1954–1954
Bliss v. Treece green ariz · 1983 2 sentences 2020The wording of the instruction is similar to the language used in Bliss v. Treece, 134 Ariz. 516 (1983). 2020There, the trial court instructed the jury that “[t]he fact that a collision happened does not necessarily mean that someone was negligent[.]” Id. at 520 .	1	2020–2020
Vega v. Sullivan green arizctapp · 2001 1 sentence 2010Id. at 507-08, ¶¶ 9-10, 19 P.3d at 648-49 .	1	2010–2010
Payton v. New York green scotus · 1980 2 sentences 2004As noted, Payton authorizes officers who possess a valid arrest warrant to enter a residence in which the suspect lives “when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.” 445 U.S. at 603 , 100 S.Ct. at 1389 , 63 L.Ed.2d at 661 . 2004As noted, Payton authorizes officers who possess a valid arrest warrant to enter a residence in which the suspect lives “when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.” 445 U.S. at 603 , 100 S.Ct. at 1389 , 63 L.Ed.2d at 661 .	1	2004–2004
State v. Rabun green ariz · 1989 2 sentences 1990The distinction between the wording of the rule and its exceptions also indicates, as the court of appeals pointed out in Rabun , that "the drafters of Rule 31.3 clearly appreciated the distinction between `entry' and `service' of a judgment." State v. Rabun, 162 Ariz. 260 , 782 P.2d 736 (App.), rev'd, 162 Ariz. 261 , 782 P.2d 737 (1989). 1990The distinction between the wording of the rule and its exceptions also indicates, as the court of appeals pointed out in Rabun , that "the drafters of Rule 31.3 clearly appreciated the distinction between `entry' and `service' of a judgment." State v. Rabun, 162 Ariz. 260 , 782 P.2d 736 (App.), rev'd, 162 Ariz. 261 , 782 P.2d 737 (1989).	1	1990–1990
State v. Rabun neutral arizctapp · 1989 2 sentences 1990The distinction between the wording of the rule and its exceptions also indicates, as the court of appeals pointed out in Rabun , that "the drafters of Rule 31.3 clearly appreciated the distinction between `entry' and `service' of a judgment." State v. Rabun, 162 Ariz. 260 , 782 P.2d 736 (App.), rev'd, 162 Ariz. 261 , 782 P.2d 737 (1989). 1990The distinction between the wording of the rule and its exceptions also indicates, as the court of appeals pointed out in Rabun , that "the drafters of Rule 31.3 clearly appreciated the distinction between `entry' and `service' of a judgment." State v. Rabun, 162 Ariz. 260 , 782 P.2d 736 (App.), rev'd, 162 Ariz. 261 , 782 P.2d 737 (1989).	1	1990–1990
Rawlings v. Apodaca green ariz · 1986 2 sentences 1988Appellants now contend that the wording of this instruction failed to convey the “evil mind” requirement for recovery of punitive damages under Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149 , 726 P.2d 565 (1986) and Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Insurance Co., 150 Ariz. 326 , 723 P.2d 675 (1986). 1988Appellants now contend that the wording of this instruction failed to convey the “evil mind” requirement for recovery of punitive damages under Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149 , 726 P.2d 565 (1986) and Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Insurance Co., 150 Ariz. 326 , 723 P.2d 675 (1986).	1	1988–1988
Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Insurance green ariz · 1986 2 sentences 1988Appellants now contend that the wording of this instruction failed to convey the “evil mind” requirement for recovery of punitive damages under Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149 , 726 P.2d 565 (1986) and Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Insurance Co., 150 Ariz. 326 , 723 P.2d 675 (1986). 1988Appellants now contend that the wording of this instruction failed to convey the “evil mind” requirement for recovery of punitive damages under Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149 , 726 P.2d 565 (1986) and Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Insurance Co., 150 Ariz. 326 , 723 P.2d 675 (1986).	1	1988–1988
State v. Cruz green ariz · 1980 2 sentences 1984Defendant argues that under State v. Canedo, 125 Ariz. 197 , 608 P.2d 774 (1980) and State v. Cruz, 127 Ariz. 33 , 617 P.2d 1149 (1980) the instruction “was inadequate to properly inform the jury of the specific limited use of prior convictions.” In Cañedo and Cruz the defense attorneys had specifically requested a particular instruction. 1984Defendant argues that under State v. Canedo, 125 Ariz. 197 , 608 P.2d 774 (1980) and State v. Cruz, 127 Ariz. 33 , 617 P.2d 1149 (1980) the instruction “was inadequate to properly inform the jury of the specific limited use of prior convictions.” In Cañedo and Cruz the defense attorneys had specifically requested a particular instruction.	1	1984–1984
State v. Canedo green ariz · 1980 2 sentences 1984Defendant argues that under State v. Canedo, 125 Ariz. 197 , 608 P.2d 774 (1980) and State v. Cruz, 127 Ariz. 33 , 617 P.2d 1149 (1980) the instruction “was inadequate to properly inform the jury of the specific limited use of prior convictions.” In Cañedo and Cruz the defense attorneys had specifically requested a particular instruction. 1984Defendant argues that under State v. Canedo, 125 Ariz. 197 , 608 P.2d 774 (1980) and State v. Cruz, 127 Ariz. 33 , 617 P.2d 1149 (1980) the instruction “was inadequate to properly inform the jury of the specific limited use of prior convictions.” In Cañedo and Cruz the defense attorneys had specifically requested a particular instruction.	1	1984–1984
State v. Ballesteros green ariz · 1966 2 sentences 1975As was stated in State v. Ballesteros, 100 Ariz. 262 , 413 P.2d 739 (1966): “But where the crime charged is the sale of a narcotic drug, the required intent is established by the transfer of any amount when the accompanying circumstances indicate an intent to sell.” (emphasis added) 100 Ariz. at 265 , 413 P.2d at 741 . 1975As was stated in State v. Ballesteros, 100 Ariz. 262 , 413 P.2d 739 (1966): “But where the crime charged is the sale of a narcotic drug, the required intent is established by the transfer of any amount when the accompanying circumstances indicate an intent to sell.” (emphasis added) 100 Ariz. at 265 , 413 P.2d at 741 .	1	1975–1975
Sandoval v. Chenoweth green ariz · 1967 2 sentences 1970The appellee places great emphasis on the public policy relating to liability insurance as enumerated by decision of this court, citing Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273 , 380 P.2d 136 ; Jenkins v. Mayflower Insurance Exchange, 93 Ariz. 287 , 380 P.2d 145 , and Sandoval v. Chenoweth, 102 Ariz. 241 , 428 P.2d 98 , in support .of his position that such policy is to provide as much insurance protection as possible, and cites Geyer v. Reserve Insurance Company, 8 Ariz.App. 464 , 447 P.2d 556 , in which it was stated that these cases: “ * * * indicate to us that Arizona will be nowhere but in 1970The appellee places great emphasis on the public policy relating to liability insurance as enumerated by decision of this court, citing Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273 , 380 P.2d 136 ; Jenkins v. Mayflower Insurance Exchange, 93 Ariz. 287 , 380 P.2d 145 , and Sandoval v. Chenoweth, 102 Ariz. 241 , 428 P.2d 98 , in support .of his position that such policy is to provide as much insurance protection as possible, and cites Geyer v. Reserve Insurance Company, 8 Ariz.App. 464 , 447 P.2d 556 , in which it was stated that these cases: “ * * * indicate to us that Arizona will be nowhere but in	1	1970–1970
Jenkins v. Mayflower Insurance Exchange green ariz · 1963 2 sentences 1970The appellee places great emphasis on the public policy relating to liability insurance as enumerated by decision of this court, citing Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273 , 380 P.2d 136 ; Jenkins v. Mayflower Insurance Exchange, 93 Ariz. 287 , 380 P.2d 145 , and Sandoval v. Chenoweth, 102 Ariz. 241 , 428 P.2d 98 , in support .of his position that such policy is to provide as much insurance protection as possible, and cites Geyer v. Reserve Insurance Company, 8 Ariz.App. 464 , 447 P.2d 556 , in which it was stated that these cases: “ * * * indicate to us that Arizona will be nowhere but in 1970The appellee places great emphasis on the public policy relating to liability insurance as enumerated by decision of this court, citing Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273 , 380 P.2d 136 ; Jenkins v. Mayflower Insurance Exchange, 93 Ariz. 287 , 380 P.2d 145 , and Sandoval v. Chenoweth, 102 Ariz. 241 , 428 P.2d 98 , in support .of his position that such policy is to provide as much insurance protection as possible, and cites Geyer v. Reserve Insurance Company, 8 Ariz.App. 464 , 447 P.2d 556 , in which it was stated that these cases: “ * * * indicate to us that Arizona will be nowhere but in	1	1970–1970
Schecter v. Killingsworth green ariz · 1963 2 sentences 1970The appellee places great emphasis on the public policy relating to liability insurance as enumerated by decision of this court, citing Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273 , 380 P.2d 136 ; Jenkins v. Mayflower Insurance Exchange, 93 Ariz. 287 , 380 P.2d 145 , and Sandoval v. Chenoweth, 102 Ariz. 241 , 428 P.2d 98 , in support .of his position that such policy is to provide as much insurance protection as possible, and cites Geyer v. Reserve Insurance Company, 8 Ariz.App. 464 , 447 P.2d 556 , in which it was stated that these cases: “ * * * indicate to us that Arizona will be nowhere but in 1970The appellee places great emphasis on the public policy relating to liability insurance as enumerated by decision of this court, citing Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273 , 380 P.2d 136 ; Jenkins v. Mayflower Insurance Exchange, 93 Ariz. 287 , 380 P.2d 145 , and Sandoval v. Chenoweth, 102 Ariz. 241 , 428 P.2d 98 , in support .of his position that such policy is to provide as much insurance protection as possible, and cites Geyer v. Reserve Insurance Company, 8 Ariz.App. 464 , 447 P.2d 556 , in which it was stated that these cases: “ * * * indicate to us that Arizona will be nowhere but in	1	1970–1970
Geyer v. Reserve Insurance Company green arizctapp · 1968 2 sentences 1970The appellee places great emphasis on the public policy relating to liability insurance as enumerated by decision of this court, citing Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273 , 380 P.2d 136 ; Jenkins v. Mayflower Insurance Exchange, 93 Ariz. 287 , 380 P.2d 145 , and Sandoval v. Chenoweth, 102 Ariz. 241 , 428 P.2d 98 , in support .of his position that such policy is to provide as much insurance protection as possible, and cites Geyer v. Reserve Insurance Company, 8 Ariz.App. 464 , 447 P.2d 556 , in which it was stated that these cases: “ * * * indicate to us that Arizona will be nowhere but in 1970The appellee places great emphasis on the public policy relating to liability insurance as enumerated by decision of this court, citing Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273 , 380 P.2d 136 ; Jenkins v. Mayflower Insurance Exchange, 93 Ariz. 287 , 380 P.2d 145 , and Sandoval v. Chenoweth, 102 Ariz. 241 , 428 P.2d 98 , in support .of his position that such policy is to provide as much insurance protection as possible, and cites Geyer v. Reserve Insurance Company, 8 Ariz.App. 464 , 447 P.2d 556 , in which it was stated that these cases: “ * * * indicate to us that Arizona will be nowhere but in	1	1970–1970
Womack v. Banner Bakery, Inc. green ariz · 1956 2 sentences 1966The wording of this instruction is almost identical to the language used in Womack v. Banner Bakery, Inc., 80 Ariz. 353 , 297 P.2d 936 , which applies to the facts of this case. 1966The wording of this instruction is almost identical to the language used in Womack v. Banner Bakery, Inc., 80 Ariz. 353 , 297 P.2d 936 , which applies to the facts of this case.	1	1966–1966

Where else courts name it

OR 125 (1895–2026) CA 70 (1927–2026) WV 53 (1977–2024) IL 39 (1904–2024) TX 27 (1910–2024) MO 22 (1905–2017) AL 20 (1930–2018) IN 20 (1930–2017) IA 20 (1918–2026) FL 20 (1959–2017) KS 19 (1934–2024) OH 16 (1975–2024) AZ 16 (1954–2020) WA 14 (1906–2024) KY 13 (1920–2026) PA 13 (1924–2021) DC 11 (1960–2025) VA 11 (1964–2025) NY 11 (1916–2004) MI 10 (1913–2025) MA 10 (1947–2010) NM 10 (1954–2025) NC 9 (1927–2024) NJ 9 (1964–2025) CO 9 (1972–2024) ID 8 (1949–2022) OK 8 (1926–2016) WI 7 (1962–2021) UT 4 (1949–2019) NE 4 (1950–2018) MD 4 (1999–2012) WY 4 (1978–1984) AR 4 (1950–1988) GA 4 (1941–2011) CT 3 (2002–2022) MS 3 (2007–2013) NH 3 (1983–2011) TN 2 (1998–2014) LA 2 (1992–2008) VI 2 (2012–2015) SC 2 (1901–1987) DE 2 (2001–2015) AK 2 (1981–2005)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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