27 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1910–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
TEXAS a & M UNIVERSITY v. Chambersgreen2 sentences2014See Tex. A & M Univ. v. Chambers, 31 S.W.3d 780, 785 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied). 2014See Tex. A & M Univ. v. Chambers, 31 S.W.3d 780, 785 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied). | 2 | 2 |
Luquis v. Stategreen2 sentences2020See Luquis, 72 S.W.3d at 363 (“There are even quotation marks around the wording of the instruction. 2020That is at least some indication that the Legislature did not want any 12 In Luquis v. State. the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the Section 4(a) instruction is mandatory and constitutional—even when the defendant is not eligible for early release based on good-conduct time. 72 S.W.3d at 363–68. | 1 | 2 |
Wilson v. Stategreen1 sentence2024See Parker v. State, No. 11-16-00175-CR, 2018 WL 3151506 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 28, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (complaint waived because “Appellant did not object to the instruction that the trial court gave or make a request for a different instruction to disregard.”); Wilson v. State, 884 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, no writ) (nothing preserved for appeal when defendant failed to object in the trial court to any insufficiencies in the instruction to disregard); Gonzalez v. State, 647 S.W.2d 369, 374 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1983, pet. | 1 | 1 |
Gonzalez v. Stategreen1 sentence2024See Parker v. State, No. 11-16-00175-CR, 2018 WL 3151506 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 28, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (complaint waived because “Appellant did not object to the instruction that the trial court gave or make a request for a different instruction to disregard.”); Wilson v. State, 884 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, no writ) (nothing preserved for appeal when defendant failed to object in the trial court to any insufficiencies in the instruction to disregard); Gonzalez v. State, 647 S.W.2d 369, 374 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1983, pet. | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Menchacagreen1 sentence2022See Ex parte Menchaca, 854 S.W.2d at 133 . | 1 | 1 |
Barrios v. Stategreen1 sentence2020See id. at 353 (holding that while the “inartful” use of “will acquit” could have confused the jury, there was no indication that it did so when the jury found appellant guilty of the greater offense). | 1 | 1 |
Conners v. Stategreen1 sentence2020R. 2 (allowing appellate courts “to suspend a rule’s operation in a particular case and order a different procedure” in certain circumstances); Conners v. State, 966 S.W.2d 108, 110 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d) (dismissing an appeal where the motion to dismiss was signed by the appellant but was not signed by counsel because “we know of nothing, other than the wording of the rule itself, that 2 would prevent us from dismissing an appeal where that is the expressly stated desire of an appellant”); see also Green v. State, No. 13-14-00393-CR, 2014 WL 3796420 , at *1 (Tex. App | 1 | 1 |
Chase, Ryan Francisgreen1 sentence2016See id.; see also Chase v. State, 448 S.W.3d 6, 11 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Sosa v. Stategreen1 sentence2015See, Sosa v. State, 769 S.W.2d 909, 916 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2015See 446 U.S. at 301 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 ("the term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police ... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response”) (emphasis added); Jones v. United States, 779 A.2d 277, 282 (D.C.2001) (defendant argued that express questioning is interrogation without regard to "should know” test). | 1 | 1 |
Rhode Island v. Innisgreen2 sentences2015See 446 U.S. at 301 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 ("the term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police ... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response”) (emphasis added); Jones v. United States, 779 A.2d 277, 282 (D.C.2001) (defendant argued that express questioning is interrogation without regard to "should know” test). 2015See 446 U.S. at 301 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 ("the term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police ... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response”) (emphasis added); Jones v. United States, 779 A.2d 277, 282 (D.C.2001) (defendant argued that express questioning is interrogation without regard to "should know” test). | 1 | 1 |
Almanza v. Stategreen1 sentence2003See id. | 1 | 1 |
Skinner v. Stategreen2 sentences1999The wording of the instruction that the trial court denied would have provided an alternate definition of mitigating evidence, which we have previously held is "contrary to the law." Skinner v. State, 956 S.W.2d 532, 542 (Tex.Cr.App.1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1526 , 140 L.Ed.2d 677 (1998). 1999The wording of the instruction that the trial court denied would have provided an alternate definition of mitigating evidence, which we have previously held is “contrary to the law.” Skinner v. State, 956 S.W.2d 532, 542 (Tex.Cr.App.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. , 118 S.Ct. 1526 , 140 L.Ed.2d 677 (1998). | 1 | 1 |
Gustafson v. Chambersgreen2 sentences1994E.g., Gustafson v. Chambers, 871 S.W.2d 938, 945 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding); R.K., 855 S.W.2d at 206-07 ; S.A.B. v. Schattman, 838 S.W.2d 290, 294-95 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1992, orig. proceeding); Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat’l Management Co. v. Tennant, 782 S.W.2d 318 , 320 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, orig. proceeding). 1994E.g., Gustafson v. Chambers, 871 S.W.2d 938, 945 (Tex.App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding); R.K., 855 S.W.2d at 206-07 ; S.A.B. v. Schattman, 838 S.W.2d 290, 294-95 (Tex.App. Fort Worth 1992, orig. proceeding); Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat'l Management Co. v. Tennant, 782 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Tex.App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, orig. proceeding). | 1 | 1 |
KENTUCKY FRIED CHICKEN NAT. MGT. CO. v. Tennantgreen2 sentences1994E.g., Gustafson v. Chambers, 871 S.W.2d 938, 945 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding); R.K., 855 S.W.2d at 206-07 ; S.A.B. v. Schattman, 838 S.W.2d 290, 294-95 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1992, orig. proceeding); Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat’l Management Co. v. Tennant, 782 S.W.2d 318 , 320 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, orig. proceeding). 1994E.g., Gustafson v. Chambers, 871 S.W.2d 938, 945 (Tex.App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding); R.K., 855 S.W.2d at 206-07 ; S.A.B. v. Schattman, 838 S.W.2d 290, 294-95 (Tex.App. Fort Worth 1992, orig. proceeding); Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat'l Management Co. v. Tennant, 782 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Tex.App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, orig. proceeding). | 1 | 1 |
S.A.B. v. Schattmangreen2 sentences1994E.g., Gustafson v. Chambers, 871 S.W.2d 938, 945 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding); R.K., 855 S.W.2d at 206-07 ; S.A.B. v. Schattman, 838 S.W.2d 290, 294-95 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1992, orig. proceeding); Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat’l Management Co. v. Tennant, 782 S.W.2d 318 , 320 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, orig. proceeding). 1994E.g., Gustafson v. Chambers, 871 S.W.2d 938, 945 (Tex.App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding); R.K., 855 S.W.2d at 206-07 ; S.A.B. v. Schattman, 838 S.W.2d 290, 294-95 (Tex.App. Fort Worth 1992, orig. proceeding); Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat'l Management Co. v. Tennant, 782 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Tex.App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, orig. proceeding). | 1 | 1 |
Dallas Railway & Terminal Co. v. Baileygreen1 sentence1990See Dallas Railway & Terminal Co. v. Bailey, 151 Tex. 359 , 250 S.W.2d 379, 385 (1952). *693 Wisenbarger does not challenge the wording of the instruction. | 1 | 1 |
Dallas Railway & Terminal Co. v. Baileygreen1 sentence1990See Dallas Railway & Terminal Co. v. Bailey, 151 Tex. 359 , 250 S.W.2d 379, 385 (1952). *693 Wisenbarger does not challenge the wording of the instruction. | 1 | 1 |
| Dodd v. Gainesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Darden v. State
green
1 sentence2024Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn
green
2 sentences2015In Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 to the public-at-large, would result in U.S. 469, 95 S.Ct. 1029 , 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975), the Supreme Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit © 2015 Thomson Reuters. 2015In Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 to the public-at-large, would result in U.S. 469, 95 S.Ct. 1029 , 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975), the Supreme Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit © 2015 Thomson Reuters. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Austin v. Bell
green
2 sentences1999The wording of the instruction that the trial court denied would have provided an alternate definition of mitigating evidence, which we have previously held is "contrary to the law." Skinner v. State, 956 S.W.2d 532, 542 (Tex.Cr.App.1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1526 , 140 L.Ed.2d 677 (1998). 1999The wording of the instruction that the trial court denied would have provided an alternate definition of mitigating evidence, which we have previously held is “contrary to the law.” Skinner v. State, 956 S.W.2d 532, 542 (Tex.Cr.App.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. , 118 S.Ct. 1526 , 140 L.Ed.2d 677 (1998). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
R.K. v. Ramirez
green
2 sentences1994E.g., Gustafson v. Chambers, 871 S.W.2d 938, 945 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding); R.K., 855 S.W.2d at 206-07 ; S.A.B. v. Schattman, 838 S.W.2d 290, 294-95 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1992, orig. proceeding); Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat’l Management Co. v. Tennant, 782 S.W.2d 318 , 320 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, orig. proceeding). 1994E.g., Gustafson v. Chambers, 871 S.W.2d 938, 945 (Tex.App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding); R.K., 855 S.W.2d at 206-07 ; S.A.B. v. Schattman, 838 S.W.2d 290, 294-95 (Tex.App. Fort Worth 1992, orig. proceeding); Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat'l Management Co. v. Tennant, 782 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Tex.App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, orig. proceeding). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Central Texas Clarklift, Inc. v. Simmons
green
1 sentence1989Central Texas Clarklift, Inc. v. Simmons, 540 S.W.2d 745 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1976, no writ) involved a non-competition agreement with a clause requiring arbitration “[u]pon the occurrence of a dispute relative to any provision of this agreement....” Simmons sold his interest in the business and went to work for a competitor, contrary to his agreement. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Rose v. State
green
1 sentence1988Cf. Rose, supra. In this cause, although charged with the offense of murder, the jury found appellant guilty of voluntary manslaughter and also assessed his punishment at 12 years’ confinement in the Department of Corrections and a fine of $1,000. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Webb v. Dameron
green
1 sentence1987The wording of the instruction appears to come from at least two of the cases cited by HL & P, as well as from the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “arbitrary.” See Wagoner, 345 S.W.2d at 763 ; Webb, 219 S.W.2d at 584 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Castleberry v. Branscum
red
1 sentence1987The Supreme Court found various defects in the wording of the instruction used in the case, 721 S.W.2d at 276 , but found no fault with the form of submission. 2 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Wagoner v. City of Arlington
green
1 sentence1987The wording of the instruction appears to come from at least two of the cases cited by HL & P, as well as from the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “arbitrary.” See Wagoner, 345 S.W.2d at 763 ; Webb, 219 S.W.2d at 584 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Rosebury v. State
green
1 sentence1987The issue, therefore, reduces itself to whether the indictments constitute prosecutions for a single case or for separate cases arising out of the same transaction.” Rosebury, supra at 657 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Roberts v. Griffith
green
1 sentence1971Roberts v. Griffith, 207 S.W.2d 443 Tex.Civ.App.1948,error ref. n.r.e.) WIg find no indicationIn the wording of the waiver.of the 1969 contract that any right accruing to the county.attorneyof Hardin County after the expiration of such contract was intended to be waived, neither do we find any considerationfor any such future relinquishment of rights by the county attorney. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Nyman v. Monteleone-Iberville Garage, Inc. green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Wilks v. Allstate Insurance Company
green
1 sentence1969Co., La.App., 177 So.2d 790 , the Court, in discussing the distinction between the different exclusionary clauses, said: “Plaintiff contends the Nyman case [Ny-man v. Monteleone — Iberville Garage, Inc., 211 La. 375 , 30 So.2d 123 ] is not controlling here because the wording of the exclusionary clause in the Nyman case is different from the wording of the clause in the present matter. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Morris v. State green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Harrison green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.