wording exception in Michigan

2015Also, contrary to Auto-Owners’ argument that the focus of the exception is on the activity of the insured at the time of the occurrence, the wording of the exception, “if you are in the business of . . . selling, serving or furnishing alcoholic beverages,” places emphasis on the defining aspect of the insured.6 Auto-Owners could have, but did not, place the focus of the liquor liability exclusion on the nature of the activity giving rise to the claim, as did the policies at issue in some of the out-of-state cases the parties cite, such as McGriff v United States Fire Ins Co, 436 NW2d 859, 861,

2015Also, contrary to Auto-Owners’ argument that the focus of the exception is on the activity of the insured at the time of the occurrence, the wording of the exception, “if you are in the business of. . . selling, serving or furnishing alcoholic beverages,” places emphasis on the defining aspect of the insured. 6 Auto-Owners could have, but did not, place the focus of the liquor-liability exclusion on the nature of the activity giving rise to the claim, as did the policies at issue in some of the out-of-state cases the parties cite, such as McGriff v US Fire Ins Co, 436 NW2d 859, 861-862 (SD, 19

2015Hiner v Mojica, 271 Mich App 604, 612 ; 722 NW2d 914 (2006). -8- While these dictionary definitions support Auto-Owners’ argument that “business” could mean any “occupation, profession, or trade,” nothing in the wording of the exception to the liquor liability exclusion or the rest of the policy supports its argument that the exception is intended to apply only to furnishing alcoholic beverages in a social-host setting.

2015Hiner v Mojica, 271 Mich App 604, 612 ; 722 NW2d 914 (2006). -8- While these dictionary definitions support Auto-Owners’ argument that “business” could mean any “occupation, profession, or trade,” nothing in the wording of the exception to the liquor liability exclusion or the rest of the policy supports its argument that the exception is intended to apply only to furnishing alcoholic beverages in a social-host setting.

1994Allison v City of Southfield, 172 Mich App 592, 596 ; 432 NW2d 369 (1988).

1994Allison v City of Southfield, 172 Mich App 592, 596 ; 432 NW2d 369 (1988).

1992The Supreme Court did, in Matich v Modern Research Corp, 430 Mich 1 ; 420 NW2d 67 (1988), address this issue, but with respect to an insurance policy that contained the "standard interest clause.” Although the Court concluded that the insurer had to pay postjudgment interest on the entire judgment, including the amount in excess of the policy limit, it did so on the basis of the wording of that standard interest clause. *308 In the case at bar, the policy does not include the standard interest clause.

1981The allowance of impleader rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, Danyo v Great Lakes Steel Corp, 93 Mich App 91 ; 286 NW2d 50 (1979), lv den 408 Mich 882 (1980), and the trial court’s determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.

1981The allowance of impleader rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, Danyo v Great Lakes Steel Corp, 93 Mich App 91 ; 286 NW2d 50 (1979), lv den 408 Mich 882 (1980), and the trial court’s determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.

1970In People v. Dunn (1968), 380 Mich 693 , this Court held (p 700): “We here hold that the meaning of the ‘consequence’ of a plea of guilty, within the wording of the rule, is that an accused, by so pleading, waives his right to trial by jury, or trial without a jury by the court, and that additionally the accused subjects himself to whatever penalty is prescribed by law, including possible confinement in a penal institution.

1970In People v. Dunn (1968), 380 Mich 693 , this Court held (p 700): "We here hold that the meaning of the `consequence' of a plea of guilty, within the wording of the rule, is that an accused, by so pleading, waives his right to trial by jury, or trial without a jury by the court, and that additionally the accused subjects himself to whatever penalty is prescribed by law, including possible confinement in a penal institution.

1945Defendant requested the trial judge to instruct the jury: “Where the testimony is directly conflicting and both versions, as given to you, cannot be true, and there is reasonable doubt as to which story is true, it is your duty to accept that version which is consistent with the innocence of the defendant.” This followed the wording of the instruction of People v. Crofoot, 254 Mich. 167 .

1928In part, Circuit Court Rule No. 32 reads: “In all cases where personal service shall have been made upon a defendant, and proceedings taken after default on the strength thereof, his default shall not be set aside unless the application shall have been made within six months after such default is regularly entered.” In McWilliams v. Lenawee Circuit Judge, 142 Mich. 226 , attention is called to the fact that the wording of this rule was changed in 1903 by inserting the words “default is regularly entered” after the word ‘ ‘ such; ’ ’ and it is stated in substance that this change was obviously

1913In the later case of Irwin v. Benefit Ass’n, 127 Mich. 630 ( 86 N. W. 1036 ), the wording of the exception was “ voluntary or unnecessary exposure to danger.” An effort was made in that case to distinguish it from Johnson’s Case, based upon the difference in the wording of the exceptions, but the court refused to do so, and expressly held that it was ruled by Johnson’s Case.

1913In the later case of Irwin v. Benefit Ass’n, 127 Mich. 630 ( 86 N. W. 1036 ), the wording of the exception was “ voluntary or unnecessary exposure to danger.” An effort was made in that case to distinguish it from Johnson’s Case, based upon the difference in the wording of the exceptions, but the court refused to do so, and expressly held that it was ruled by Johnson’s Case.