wording instruction in Iowa

2026There can be no question that the jury understood that before a conviction was justified it must find the fact of ownership as alleged in the indictment.”); State v. Shank, 44 N.W. 241, 242 (Iowa 1890) (rejecting challenge to instruction that did not expressly state that intoxicating liquors had to be found in the location described where that fact was “not questioned” by the defendant, who testified to keeping the liquor in the 32 location, and “the error was cured by other parts of the charge”); State v. Goode, 27 N.W. 772, 773 (Iowa 1886) (rejecting challenge to jury instructions for failin

2026There can be no question that the jury understood that before a conviction was justified it must find the fact of ownership as alleged in the indictment.”); State v. Shank, 44 N.W. 241, 242 (Iowa 1890) (rejecting challenge to instruction that did not expressly state that intoxicating liquors had to be found in the location described where that fact was “not questioned” by the defendant, who testified to keeping the liquor in the 32 location, and “the error was cured by other parts of the charge”); State v. Goode, 27 N.W. 772, 773 (Iowa 1886) (rejecting challenge to jury instructions for failin

1984Our review of the jury instruction question is narrower, focusing on the wording of the instruction by which the trial court explained the element of kidnapping referred to as “confinement or removal.” On that second issue defendant urges us to overrule or substantially modify our decision in State v. Rich, 305 N.W.2d 739 (Iowa 1981).

1983Our decisions plainly establish two points: (1) rule 8 is remedial and should be construed "in the light of current social conditions," Wardlow, 190 N.W.2d at 448 ; Irlbeck v. Pomeroy, 210 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Iowa 1973) (rule should be "liberally construed in furtherance of its objects"), and (2) the gist of a rule 8 action is "a wrong done to the parent in consequence of injury to his child by the actionable negligence of another." Handeland v. Brown, 216 N.W.2d 574, 578 (Iowa 1974); Irlbeck, 210 N.W.2d at 833 ("Actions brought under rule 8 are not for the injury to the child but for the injury

1983Our decisions plainly establish two points: (1) rule 8 is remedial and should be construed “in the light of current social conditions,” Wardlow, 190 N.W.2d at 448 ; Irlbeck v. Pomeroy, 210 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Iowa 1973) (rule should be “liberally construed in furtherance of its objects”), and (2) the gist of a rule 8 action is “a wrong done to the parent in consequence of injury to his child by the actionable negligence of another.” Handeland v. Brown, 216 N.W.2d 574, 578 (Iowa 1974); Irlbeck, 210 N.W.2d at 833 (“Actions brought under rule 8 are not for the injury to the child but for the injury

1975In Bos Lines, filed March 19, 1975, 226 N.W.2d at page 821 , we say, “Although less drastic remedies were available, we find no abuse of discretion in the lower court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s petition.” Our rule 134 is substantially the same as rule 37 of the federal rules.

1975Relative to similar provisions found in rule 134(d) for failure to answer interrogatories in Zimmerman v. Purex Corporation, Ltd., 256 Iowa 190, 194 , 125 N.W.2d 822, 824 , we say: “* * * [Ajction under rule 134(d) is discretionary with the trial court and it is clear under the wording of the rule, that failure to answer need not be willful. * * *.” The question of whether Judge Cooper abused his discretion must be reviewed in light of the record before him on May 7, 1973.

1975Relative to similar provisions found in rule 134(d) for failure to answer interrogatories in Zimmerman v. Purex Corporation, Ltd., 256 Iowa 190, 194 , 125 N.W.2d 822, 824 , we say: “* * * [Ajction under rule 134(d) is discretionary with the trial court and it is clear under the wording of the rule, that failure to answer need not be willful. * * *.” The question of whether Judge Cooper abused his discretion must be reviewed in light of the record before him on May 7, 1973.

1974Defendant in relying on this provision cites State v. Zbornik, 248 Iowa 450, 457-458 , 80 N.W.2d 735 , 739 for the proposition, “Counsel were entitled as a matter of right to see the instructions before commencing argument.” See also State v. Miller, 254 Iowa 545, 558 , 117 N.W.2d 447, 456 .

1974Defendant in relying on this provision cites State v. Zbornik, 248 Iowa 450, 457-458 , 80 N.W.2d 735 , 739 for the proposition, “Counsel were entitled as a matter of right to see the instructions before commencing argument.” See also State v. Miller, 254 Iowa 545, 558 , 117 N.W.2d 447, 456 .

1974Defendant in relying on this provision cites State v. Zbornik, 248 Iowa 450, 457-458 , 80 N.W.2d 735 , 739 for the proposition, “Counsel were entitled as a matter of right to see the instructions before commencing argument.” See also State v. Miller, 254 Iowa 545, 558 , 117 N.W.2d 447, 456 .

1974Defendant in relying on this provision cites State v. Zbornik, 248 Iowa 450, 457-458 , 80 N.W.2d 735 , 739 for the proposition, “Counsel were entitled as a matter of right to see the instructions before commencing argument.” See also State v. Miller, 254 Iowa 545, 558 , 117 N.W.2d 447, 456 .

1973In the course of its opinion reversing and remanding the cause for further proceedings the court said: “We think rule 215.1, R.C.P., constitutes the sole method for dismissing a case for want of prosecution, thus eliminating any and all prior local court rules upon this proposition. “* * * “In view of the wording of rule 215.1, and the above pronouncements of this court relative thereto, we hold that rule 215.1 constitutes the sole method under which a cause may be dismissed for want of prosecution; and that it eliminated all local court rules of the various district courts of this state which

1973In the course of its opinion reversing and remanding the cause for further proceedings the court said: “We think rule 215.1, R.C.P., constitutes the sole method for dismissing a case for want of prosecution, thus eliminating any and all prior local court rules upon this proposition. “* * * “In view of the wording of rule 215.1, and the above pronouncements of this court relative thereto, we hold that rule 215.1 constitutes the sole method under which a cause may be dismissed for want of prosecution; and that it eliminated all local court rules of the various district courts of this state which

1967Plaintiff’s case is not controlled by nor are defendants entitled to prevail because of what we said in Wagner v. Larson, 257 Iowa 1202 , 136 N.W.2d 312 .

1967Plaintiff’s case is not controlled by nor are defendants entitled to prevail because of what we said in Wagner v. Larson, 257 Iowa 1202 , 136 N.W.2d 312 .

1964Again quoting from Talbot v. Talbot, supra, 255 Iowa at page 339 , 122 N.W.2d at page 458 , we said “When a cause has been noted for trial pursuant to rule 215:1 and due notice is. served by the clerk, the trial court has no power to grant a continuance * * (Italics ours.) We think a like view is required as to the right or power of the court to dismiss, in that due notice must be given by the clerk as set forth in the rule, is a mandatory antecedent requirement, to a dismissal thereunder.

1964Again quoting from Talbot v. Talbot, supra, 255 Iowa at page 339 , 122 N.W.2d at page 458 , we said “When a cause has been noted for trial pursuant to rule 215:1 and due notice is. served by the clerk, the trial court has no power to grant a continuance * * (Italics ours.) We think a like view is required as to the right or power of the court to dismiss, in that due notice must be given by the clerk as set forth in the rule, is a mandatory antecedent requirement, to a dismissal thereunder.

1956Appellant cites but two authorities in support of his contention, State v. Sauerbry, supra, 233 Iowa 1076, 1083-1085 , which is adverse to him rather than favorable, and State v. Matthes, 210 Iowa 178 , 230 N.W. 522 , which is not a pertinent authority here because of the particular wording of the instruction in that case.

1956Appellant cites but two authorities in support of his contention, State v. Sauerbry, supra, 233 Iowa 1076, 1083-1085 , which is adverse to him rather than favorable, and State v. Matthes, 210 Iowa 178 , 230 N.W. 522 , which is not a pertinent authority here because of the particular wording of the instruction in that case.

1956Appellant cites but two authorities in support of his contention, State v. Sauerbry, supra, 233 Iowa 1076, 1083-1085 , which is adverse to him rather than favorable, and State v. Matthes, 210 Iowa 178 , 230 N.W. 522 , which is not a pertinent authority here because of the particular wording of the instruction in that case.

1956We so held in State v. Doss, 246 Iowa 651, 653 , 67 N.W.2d 451, 452 .

1956We so held in State v. Doss, 246 Iowa 651, 653 , 67 N.W.2d 451, 452 .

1940The court says: “It was, nevertheless, recognized therein [Bell v. Incorporated Town of Clarion, 113 Iowa 126 , 84 N. W. 962 ] that the word ‘presumption’ is not infrequently used as the equivalent and synonym of the word ‘inference.’ It is undoubtedly true that the word ‘presumption’ is popularly used in such sense, and that such use thereof presses itself with great persistency upon lawyers and judges.

1940The court says: “It was, nevertheless, recognized therein [Bell v. Incorporated Town of Clarion, 113 Iowa 126 , 84 N. W. 962 ] that the word ‘presumption’ is not infrequently used as the equivalent and synonym of the word ‘inference.’ It is undoubtedly true that the word ‘presumption’ is popularly used in such sense, and that such use thereof presses itself with great persistency upon lawyers and judges.

1940Co., 189 Iowa 739, 745 , 175 N. W. 583 , 585, an instruction is approved where the wording of the instruction was that “the law presumes,” and the same argument is made as in the instant case as to the use of the words.

1924In Cash v. Dennis, 159 Iowa 18 , we held that the giving of the instruction was not a reversible error, because of its conformity to prior cases, but we stated our disapproval thereof as follows: “We find no reversible error in the giving of this instruction, and yet, at the same time, we do not approve of the wording of the instruction, and suggest that the law can be more clearly stated in some other form than that in which it is expressed in this instruction.” In Ross v. Ross, 140 Iowa 51 , a like instruction was copied into the opinion from the record below, not for the purpose of reviewin

1924In Cash v. Dennis, 159 Iowa 18 , we held that the giving of the instruction was not a reversible error, because of its conformity to prior cases, but we stated our disapproval thereof as follows: “We find no reversible error in the giving of this instruction, and yet, at the same time, we do not approve of the wording of the instruction, and suggest that the law can be more clearly stated in some other form than that in which it is expressed in this instruction.” In Ross v. Ross, 140 Iowa 51 , a like instruction was copied into the opinion from the record below, not for the purpose of reviewin

1918Alexander v. Bishop, 59 Iowa 572, 579 ; Leick v. Tritz, 94 Iowa 322 . 8' in^ury^o' lease-told interest.