8 Oklahoma opinions name it 2 courts 1926–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oklahoma courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Roberts v. Allengreen1 sentence2007Cr. 465, 484, 182 P. 983, 940 (1913). ¶ 11 Similarly, authorities in other jurisdictions have made clear that their statutes also assume compulsion as a prerequisite. 9 These jurisdictions (depending on the particular wording of their immunity statute), differ as to the form the compulsion must take, 10 as well as whether the statute is "self-execut ing" or requires invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege before immunity can apply. 11 Nevertheless, despite such variations, we have found no jurisdiction that allows immunity to attach without the presence of some type of compulsion. | 1 | 1 |
Scribner v. Stategreen1 sentence2007Cr. 465, 484, 132 P. 933, 940 (1913). ¶ 11 Similarly, authorities in other jurisdictions have made clear that their statutes also assume compulsion as a prerequisite. [9] These jurisdictions (depending on the particular wording of their immunity statute), differ as to the form the compulsion must take, [10] as well as whether the statute is "self-executing" *205 or requires invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege before immunity can apply. [11] Nevertheless, despite such variations, we have found no jurisdiction that allows immunity to attach without the presence of some type of compulsion | 1 | 1 |
Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Federal Savings & Loan Ass'ngreen1 sentence1983See Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Federal Savings & Loan Association, 308 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. 1981). [10] Murphy v. Fox, 278 P.2d 820, 825 (Okl. 1955). [11] We find persuasive the Texas Court of Appeal's analysis of a due-on-sale clause in Crestview, Ltd. v. Foremost Insurance Co.: "The wording of the clause is singularly inapt to express a contractual intention that it be narrowly limited in its effect to one particular circumstance, that is, where a sale by the owner threatens to impair the security of the debt ... | 1 | 1 |
Murphy v. Foxgreen1 sentence1983See Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Federal Savings & Loan Association, 308 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. 1981). [10] Murphy v. Fox, 278 P.2d 820, 825 (Okl. 1955). [11] We find persuasive the Texas Court of Appeal's analysis of a due-on-sale clause in Crestview, Ltd. v. Foremost Insurance Co.: "The wording of the clause is singularly inapt to express a contractual intention that it be narrowly limited in its effect to one particular circumstance, that is, where a sale by the owner threatens to impair the security of the debt ... | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oklahoma. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Waples-Platter Co. v. Commercial Standard Insurance
green
2 sentences2016Co., 156 Tex. 234 , 294 S.W.2d 375 (1956) where a building and its contents including fixtures and merchandise were damaged by fire. 2016Co., 156 Tex. 234 , 294 S.W.2d 375 (1956) where a building and its contents including fixtures and merchandise were damaged by fire. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Harris v. State
green
2 sentences2011However, as Appellant points out, several months before his trial, in Harris v. State, 2007 OK CR 28 , 164 P.3d 1103 , we recommended changes in the wording of this instruction. 2011However, as Appellant points out, several months before his trial, in Harris v. State, 2007 OK CR 28 , 164 P.3d 1103 , we recommended changes in the wording of this instruction. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Jones v. United States
green
2 sentences2006This argument is based on the indigent defense system’s oft-raised interpretation of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 , 119 S.Ct. 1215 , 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999). ¶ 60 But as Appellant’s brief admits, this Court has repeatedly rejected this claim. 2006This argument is based on the indigent defense system’s oft-raised interpretation of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 , 119 S.Ct. 1215 , 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999). ¶ 60 But as Appellant’s brief admits, this Court has repeatedly rejected this claim. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2006This argument is based on the indigent defense system’s oft-raised interpretation of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 , 119 S.Ct. 1215 , 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999). ¶ 60 But as Appellant’s brief admits, this Court has repeatedly rejected this claim. 2006This argument is based on the indigent defense system’s oft-raised interpretation of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 , 119 S.Ct. 1215 , 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999). ¶ 60 But as Appellant’s brief admits, this Court has repeatedly rejected this claim. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Ring v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2006This argument is based on the indigent defense system’s oft-raised interpretation of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 , 119 S.Ct. 1215 , 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999). ¶ 60 But as Appellant’s brief admits, this Court has repeatedly rejected this claim. 2006This argument is based on the indigent defense system’s oft-raised interpretation of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 , 119 S.Ct. 1215 , 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999). ¶ 60 But as Appellant’s brief admits, this Court has repeatedly rejected this claim. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Lundy v. State
neutral
1 sentence1950Cr. 316 , 127 P. 707 . *207 Keeping in mind that the burden of proof in criminal cases rests on the state, and that the circumstances must be such as to exclude every other hypothesis except the defendant's guilt, and considering that "must" is defined in Webster's New International Dictionary as "Necessary to a result", and is positive, we conclude, after consulting law dictionaries and references, that this word is more consistent with the spirit of the other wording of the instruction in question than is the word "should". | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Knight v. State
neutral
2 sentences1950Counsel earnestly insist, on the strength of Jackson v. State, supra, and Knight v. State, 73 Okla. 1950Counsel earnestly insist, on the strength of Jackson v. State, supra, and Knight v. State, 73 Okla. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Muskogee Co. v. Yahola Sand Co.
neutral
2 sentences1926Under the holdings of this court, the text of the instruction did not constitute error, for in Muskogee v. Yahola Sand Co., 60 Okla. 196 , 159 Pac. 898 , syllabus paragraph 1, it is said; “Prospective profits, proximately resulting from the breach of a contract, are recoverable in an action for damages, whore the amount thereof is not contingent and speculative, but can be measured with reasonable certainty.” ■So far as the wording of the instruction is concerned in being a departure from ihe text of section 5976, -supra, we think the contemplation of the statute, as construed, is that damages 1926Under the holdings of this court, the text of the instruction did not constitute error, for in Muskogee v. Yahola Sand Co., 60 Okla. 196 , 159 Pac. 898 , syllabus paragraph 1, it is said; “Prospective profits, proximately resulting from the breach of a contract, are recoverable in an action for damages, whore the amount thereof is not contingent and speculative, but can be measured with reasonable certainty.” ■So far as the wording of the instruction is concerned in being a departure from ihe text of section 5976, -supra, we think the contemplation of the statute, as construed, is that damages | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.