wording instruction in California

2022(People v. Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 579 .) In doing so, we review the wording of the instruction at issue and determine whether it accurately states the law.

2021(People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579 .) In the context of the CALJIC instructions, “[i]n the absence of instructional errors … , the standard manslaughter instruction is not misleading, because the jury is told that premeditation and deliberation is the factor distinguishing first and second degree murder.

2023The weight to which such circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to determine. [¶] No further instruction on the subject of flight need be given.” (§ 1127c.) Here, instruction 372 replicated the applicable portions of the pattern flight instruction in CALCRIM No. 372, stating: “If the defendant fled or tried to flee 3 The People argue that defendant forfeited his challenge to the wording of instruction 372 by failing to request modification of the standard instruction at trial, citing People v. Sánchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 461 .

2022(Id. at p. 652.) The prosecutor in closing argument directed the jury to CALCRIM No. 315 and noted Campusano “‘was certain the entire time.’” (Ibid.) Reviewing the instruction on certainty in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record, the Supreme Court concluded Rudd’s trial was not “‘“so infuse[d] . . . with unfairness as to deny due process of law.”’” (Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 655 .) The Supreme Court rejected Rudd’s contention that CALCRIM No. 315 lowered the prosecutor’s burden of proof, citing the finding in Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pages 461 through 463

2022First, the court reasoned that although the wording of the instruction made it theoretically possible for a jury to believe that it could find a knife “inherently deadly,” the use of both CALCRIM Nos. 875 and 3145 made it “unlikely the jury would simply view the [knife] as inherently deadly without considering the circumstances, including how defendant used it.” (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 14 .)8 whether the object would be used for a dangerous, rather than a harmless, purpose.” (Compare CALCRIM No. 3145 with Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 14.) If anything, the additional language unde

2022First, the court reasoned that although the wording of the instruction made it theoretically possible for a jury to believe that it could find a knife “inherently deadly,” the use of both CALCRIM Nos. 875 and 3145 made it “unlikely the jury would simply view the [knife] as inherently deadly without considering the circumstances, including how defendant used it.” (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 14 .)8 whether the object would be used for a dangerous, rather than a harmless, purpose.” (Compare CALCRIM No. 3145 with Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 14.) If anything, the additional language unde

2021We find Johnson’s counsel did not object to the instruction, but we may review “any instruction given, refused, or modified even though no objection was made thereto in the lower court, if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.” (§ 1259.) “Ascertaining whether claimed instructional error affected the substantial rights of the defendant necessarily requires an examination of the merits of the claim—at least to the extent of ascertaining whether the asserted error would result in prejudice if error it was.” (People v. Andersen (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249 .) It is wel

2021“Ascertaining whether claimed instructional error affected the substantial rights of the defendant necessarily requires an examination of the merits of the claim—at least to the extent of ascertaining whether the asserted error would result in prejudice if error it was.” (People v. Andersen (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249 .) We review claims of instructional error de novo by considering the wording of the instruction and assessing whether it accurately states the law.

2019As Atkins's trial counsel did not object to the wording of the instruction, Atkins has waived this objection for purposes of appellate review. ( People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148 , 1163, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 874 .) 2.

2019(People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1163 .) 2.

2017Aguirre emphasized that rule 3.766(f), in addition to allowing notice by publication when personal notice is " 'unreasonably expensive' " or the individual losses are " 'insubstantial,' " also allows for notice by publication or similar means " 'if it appears that all members of the class cannot be notified personally. ...' " ( 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 1301 , 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 415 , italics omitted.) We agree the rule anticipates that some class actions must dispense with personal notice, but the wording of the rule clearly implies that personal notice is the preferable method. 9 The opinion in Agu

2017Aguirre emphasized that rule 3.766(f), in addition to allowing notice by publication when personal notice is " 'unreasonably expensive' " or the individual losses are " 'insubstantial,' " also allows for notice by publication or similar means " 'if it appears that all members of the class cannot be notified personally. ...' " ( 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 1301 , 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 415 , italics omitted.) We agree the rule anticipates that some class actions must dispense with personal notice, but the wording of the rule clearly implies that personal notice is the preferable method. 9 The opinion in Agu

2005In Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 945 , 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 16 P.3d 94 ( Powerine I ), we held that under the wording of the standard primary comprehensive general liability (CGL) policy, the term "damages" limits the insurer's indemnification obligation to "money ordered by a court," i.e., a money judgment entered against the insured in a third party suit for damages. ( Id. at pp. 960, 964, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 16 P.3d 94 .) We went on to conclude that the duty to indemnify does not extend to the costs of complying with a governmental agency's

2005In Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 945 , 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 16 P.3d 94 ( Powerine I ), we held that under the wording of the standard primary comprehensive general liability (CGL) policy, the term "damages" limits the insurer's indemnification obligation to "money ordered by a court," i.e., a money judgment entered against the insured in a third party suit for damages. ( Id. at pp. 960, 964, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 16 P.3d 94 .) We went on to conclude that the duty to indemnify does not extend to the costs of complying with a governmental agency's

2025Even if the evidence strongly supports a finding that Castaneda personally acted with conscious disregard for life, as the Attorney General submits, the dispositive question at the prima facie stage is whether the jury was required to make that finding under the instructions it received. ( Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 463–464.) Given the instructions and the verdict, the record does not disclose whether the jury necessarily found that Castaneda intended to aid in a life-endangering act or only in an act of intimidation, a distinction critical to determining whether he personally acted with

2024Indeed, while discussing the People’s pretrial motion to preclude Dr. Gaines from testifying, the court explicitly stated her testimony would be admissible if she opined that he was suffering from a mental illness “on that day at that particular time.” The court also noted evidence of a defendant’s mental illness may “negate specific intent.” It is apparent from these comments that the court understood Dr. Gaines could testify to Kroll’s specific conditions at the time of the offenses and how those conditions may have affected his intent. 10 Kroll nevertheless suggests the court must have misu

2023CALCRIM No. 521, continued this wording with the requirement that, if the jury decided “either or both defendants has committed murder,” it then had to decide if it was first or second degree murder, again continuously referring to “either defendant.” We must presume the jury followed these instructions (People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1121 ), which collectively made clear that the prosecution was required to separately establish each defendant’s culpability.

2023However, “[a]lternative explanations for flight conduct go to the weight of the evidence, which is a matter for the jury, not the court, to decide.” (People v. Rhodes (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1471, 1477 .) The trial court properly fulfilled its threshold duty to ensure there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find flight. ( Hannon, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 597–598; People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 328 .) Even assuming it was error to give the flight instruction, there was no reasonable probability the instruction affected the jury’s verdict given the wording of instruction

2023However, “[a]lternative explanations for flight conduct go to the weight of the evidence, which is a matter for the jury, not the court, to decide.” (People v. Rhodes (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1471, 1477 .) The trial court properly fulfilled its threshold duty to ensure there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find flight. ( Hannon, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 597–598; People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 328 .) Even assuming it was error to give the flight instruction, there was no reasonable probability the instruction affected the jury’s verdict given the wording of instruction

2023(See, e.g., People v. Price (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 409 , 454–458 (Price); People v. Paysinger (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 26 , 29–32 (Paysinger); People v. Hernández Ríos (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1154 , 1158–1159 (Hernández Ríos) [addressing unconstitutionality argument only].) Defendant acknowledges none of these cases in his opening brief; and in reply to the People’s citations, he simply states these cases were “wrongly decided,” without offering any analysis.

2023(See, e.g., People v. Price (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 409 , 454–458 (Price); People v. Paysinger (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 26 , 29–32 (Paysinger); People v. Hernández Ríos (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1154 , 1158–1159 (Hernández Ríos) [addressing unconstitutionality argument only].) Defendant acknowledges none of these cases in his opening brief; and in reply to the People’s citations, he simply states these cases were “wrongly decided,” without offering any analysis.

2023However, “[a]lternative explanations for flight conduct go to the weight of the evidence, which is a matter for the jury, not the court, to decide.” (People v. Rhodes (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1471, 1477 .) The trial court properly fulfilled its threshold duty to ensure there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find flight. ( Hannon, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 597–598; People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 328 .) Even assuming it was error to give the flight instruction, there was no reasonable probability the instruction affected the jury’s verdict given the wording of instruction

2023He acknowledges, however, that this court is bound by the California Supreme Court’s decision in Villatoro (see Auto Equity, supra, 57 Cal.2d at p. 455 ), and he fails to identify any material difference between the wording of the instruction given in Villatoro and CALCRIM No. 1191B.

2023(See, e.g., People v. Price (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 409 , 454–458 (Price); People v. Paysinger (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 26 , 29–32 (Paysinger); People v. Hernández Ríos (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1154 , 1158–1159 (Hernández Ríos) [addressing unconstitutionality argument only].) Defendant acknowledges none of these cases in his opening brief; and in reply to the People’s citations, he simply states these cases were “wrongly decided,” without offering any analysis.

2021(See Beardslee, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 97 .) The jury was excused, and then the trial court told counsel (in colorful and emphatic terms) that it was not going to answer the jury’s question because trying to explain jury instructions always spells trouble on appeal.

2021(Ibid.) The court identified the relevant statutory text by stating former “section 910 provides that a claim shall be presented by a claimant or ‘by a person acting on his behalf’ and [former] section 910.2 provides that the claim shall be signed by claimant or ‘by some person on his behalf.’ ” (Lacy, supra, 44 Cal.App.3d at p. 155 .) The court did not discuss the meaning of the phrase “on his behalf.” It simply concluded that, based on the wording of the claim presented by the husband, it was clear that the claim was presented to the city “on his own behalf and on the behalf of his wife and

2021(Ibid.) The court identified the relevant statutory text by stating former “section 910 provides that a claim shall be presented by a claimant or ‘by a person acting on his behalf’ and [former] section 910.2 provides that the claim shall be signed by claimant or ‘by some person on his behalf.’ ” (Lacy, supra, 44 Cal.App.3d at p. 155 .) The court did not discuss the meaning of the phrase “on his behalf.” It simply concluded that, based on the wording of the claim presented by the husband, it was clear that the claim was presented to the city “on his own behalf and on the behalf of his wife and

2021(People v. Jones (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 995, 1001 .) Relatedly, the failure to object to the wording of an instruction forfeits any state law argument of error.

2020As the trial court noted, much of the wording of the instruction is taken from CALCRIM No. 3551, as well as the firecracker instruction we approved in Moore, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at pages 1119-1121 (which was a source for CALCRIM No. 3551, Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (2020 ed.) p. 1055).

2020The People assert, “When a defendant fails to request a modification to a standard jury instruction, he forfeits any claim of error on appeal that the wording of the instruction is defective. [Citation.] In other words, when a proposed instruction correctly states the law but the defendant believes it is misleading or confusing under the specific facts of the case, he is obliged to offer corrections or clarifications of the instruction to avoid forfeiting the issue on appeal. [Citation.]” “ ‘Generally, a party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law and responsive to the