wording instruction in Ohio

2024Unlike the flight instruction in State v. Fields, 35 Ohio App.2d 140 . . . (1st Dist. 1973) this instruction did not require Willis to ‘satisfactorily explain’ his actions.” Willis at ¶ 45 .

2014Unlike the flight instruction at issue in State v. Fields, 35 Ohio App.2d 140 , 300 N.E.2d 207 (1st Dist.1973), this instruction did not require Willis to “satisfactorily explain” his actions. {¶46} We find no error, plain or otherwise, in the trial court’s flight instruction provided.

2007State v. Williford (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 247 , 249 .

2004State v. Williford (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 247 , 249 .

2018In that regard I believe the law cited in Hamilton, supra and Comen, supra applies, rather than the rule cited in Ellis, supra. In other words the trial court may retain discretion in the wording of the instruction, but it cannot, as a matter of law, refuse to give an instruction where there is “appropriate to the facts” presented in evidence.

2017Jurgensen Co. , 136 Ohio St.3d 58 , 2013-Ohio-2237 , 990 N.E.2d 568 , ¶ 13, or to simply ignore the wording of the rule or to add words to it, State ex rel.

2017Jurgensen Co. , 136 Ohio St.3d 58 , 2013-Ohio-2237 , 990 N.E.2d 568 , ¶ 13, or to simply ignore the wording of the rule or to add words to it, State ex rel.

2012Id. {¶24} Prior to discussing each individual allegation of alleged bad acts testimony, it is noted that the majority of the statements Persohn directs us to look at are taken out of context.

2010Reith, 2005-Ohio-4852, at ¶49 . {¶35} Fourth, the wording of the instruction is misleadingly suggestive.

2009Specifications of error must be explicit and precise, Newman, 120 Ohio St.3d 127 , 2008-Ohio-5202 , 896 N.E.2d 995, ¶ 26 , but the wording of error in this notice is so general that it “might indeed have been raised in any [property] tax case,” (emphasis omitted) Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 335 , 2008-Ohio-4081 , 894 N.E.2d 35, ¶ 22 .

2009Specifications of error must be explicit and precise, Newman, 120 Ohio St.3d 127 , 2008-Ohio-5202 , 896 N.E.2d 995, ¶ 26 , but the wording of error in this notice is so general that it “might indeed have been raised in any [property] tax case,” (emphasis omitted) Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 335 , 2008-Ohio-4081 , 894 N.E.2d 35, ¶ 22 .

2009Specifications of error must be explicit and precise, Newman, 120 Ohio St.3d 127 , 2008-Ohio-5202 , 896 N.E.2d 995, ¶ 26 , but the wording of error in this notice is so general that it “might indeed have been raised in any [property] tax case,” (emphasis omitted) Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 335 , 2008-Ohio-4081 , 894 N.E.2d 35, ¶ 22 .

2009Specifications of error must be explicit and precise, Newman, 120 Ohio St.3d 127 , 2008-Ohio-5202 , 896 N.E.2d 995, ¶ 26 , but the wording of error in this notice is so general that it “might indeed have been raised in any [property] tax case,” (emphasis omitted) Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 335 , 2008-Ohio-4081 , 894 N.E.2d 35, ¶ 22 .

2003Saunders v. Metal Container Corp. (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 85 , the Ohio Supreme Court held that an order pursuant to R.C. 4123.52 , modifying the wording of a claim allowance, was not a determination of the claimant's right to participate in the workers' compensation fund because the parties did not dispute claimant's general right to participate for his injury but merely disputed the specific wording of the conditions.Similarly, in State ex rel.

2002THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY SENTENCING THE DEFENDANT TO A MAXIMUM SENTENCE." Defendant's first assignment of error asserts the trial court erred in the wording of the instruction the trial court gave the jury pursuant to Arthur, supra. To prove defendant was guilty of receiving stolen property, the state was required to show that defendant received, retained, or disposed of property of another knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the property had been obtained through commission of a theft offense.

2002State v. Melchior (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 15 , 381 N.E.2d 195 , paragraph one of the syllabus.

2002State v. Melchior (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 15 , 381 N.E.2d 195 , paragraph one of the syllabus.

2002"While a trial court has some discretion in the actual wording of an instruction, the issue of whether an instruction is required presents a question of law for de novo review." State v. Powell (Sept. 29, 1997), Ross App. No. 96CA2257, citing Murphy , supra; Epperson , supra; State v. Mitchell (1989), 60 Ohio App.3d 106 , 574 N.E.2d 573 . {¶ 25} "The standard for determining whether a criminal defendant has successfully raised an affirmative defense under R.C. 2901.05 is to inquire whether the defendant has introduced sufficient evidence which, if believed, would raise a question in the minds

2002"While a trial court has some discretion in the actual wording of an instruction, the issue of whether an instruction is required presents a question of law for de novo review." State v. Powell (Sept. 29, 1997), Ross App. No. 96CA2257, citing Murphy , supra; Epperson , supra; State v. Mitchell (1989), 60 Ohio App.3d 106 , 574 N.E.2d 573 . {¶ 25} "The standard for determining whether a criminal defendant has successfully raised an affirmative defense under R.C. 2901.05 is to inquire whether the defendant has introduced sufficient evidence which, if believed, would raise a question in the minds

1982Hence, the language of the amended complaint alleging that appellee was acting outside the scope of his employment, and in a “wanton and reckless manner,” conforms to the wording of the exception to official immunity in R.C. 9.86. 1 *117 Expanding upon the requirement (noted in Peterson, supra) that leave to amend be sought in “good faith,” the court in Billy Baxter Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co. (S.D.N.Y. 1969), 47 F.R.D. 345 , affirmed (C.A. 2, 1970), 431 F. 2d 183 , certiorari denied (1971), 401 U.S. 923 , held that there must be at least a prima facie showing that the movant can marshal support for

1982Hence, the language of the amended complaint alleging that appellee was acting outside the scope of his employment, and in a “wanton and reckless manner,” conforms to the wording of the exception to official immunity in R.C. 9.86. 1 *117 Expanding upon the requirement (noted in Peterson, supra) that leave to amend be sought in “good faith,” the court in Billy Baxter Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co. (S.D.N.Y. 1969), 47 F.R.D. 345 , affirmed (C.A. 2, 1970), 431 F. 2d 183 , certiorari denied (1971), 401 U.S. 923 , held that there must be at least a prima facie showing that the movant can marshal support for

1982Hence, the language of the amended complaint alleging that appellee was acting outside the scope of his employment, and in a “wanton and reckless manner,” conforms to the wording of the exception to official immunity in R.C. 9.86. 1 *117 Expanding upon the requirement (noted in Peterson, supra) that leave to amend be sought in “good faith,” the court in Billy Baxter Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co. (S.D.N.Y. 1969), 47 F.R.D. 345 , affirmed (C.A. 2, 1970), 431 F. 2d 183 , certiorari denied (1971), 401 U.S. 923 , held that there must be at least a prima facie showing that the movant can marshal support for

1975The term, "Allen charge,” derives from Allen v. United States (1896), 164 U. S. 492 , wherein a supplemental instruction respecting jurors’ duties in attempting to reach a verdict was approved. 4 Although Allen has never been overruled or modified by the United States Supreme Court, it has been increasingly criticized. 5 The principle and most frequent reason advanced is that it lacks balance; that the thrust of the Allen instruction is directed to the minority jurors only and is potentially coercive upon them to agree with those jurors constituting the majority.

1975We note the absence of any aggravating circumstances, such as inquiry as to the numerical division of the jury which the United States Supreme Court held coercive per se in Brasfield v. United States (1926), 272 U. S. 448 , the fixing of any set time limit for further deliberations condemned in Goff v. United States (1971), 446 F. 2d 623; Burroughs v. United States (1966), 365 F. 2d 431 , or the giving of the instruction at a late hour to a tired and exhausted jury.

1975We note the absence of any aggravating circumstances, such as inquiry as to the numerical division of the jury which the United States Supreme Court held coercive per se in Brasfield v. United States (1926), 272 U. S. 448 , the fixing of any set time limit for further deliberations condemned in Goff v. United States (1971), 446 F. 2d 623; Burroughs v. United States (1966), 365 F. 2d 431 , or the giving of the instruction at a late hour to a tired and exhausted jury.

1975We note the absence of any aggravating circumstances, such as inquiry as to the numerical division of the jury which the United States Supreme Court held coercive per se in Brasfield v. United States (1926), 272 U. S. 448 , the fixing of any set time limit for further deliberations condemned in Goff v. United States (1971), 446 F. 2d 623; Burroughs v. United States (1966), 365 F. 2d 431 , or the giving of the instruction at a late hour to a tired and exhausted jury.